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This dissertation examines the relationship between representation and institutional 
legitimacy.  More specifically, it examines the relationship between descriptive and substantive 
representation and judicial legitimacy.  In doing so, it departs from much of the extant literature in 
two important ways.  First, unlike nearly all previous studies examining this relationship, this 
project explicitly measures and incorporates individuals’ varying expectations of representation 
into the analysis.  Second, this project focuses on a state trial court context.  While the 
overwhelming majority of studies in this area focus on the most highly visible court, the Supreme 
Court of the United States, this project examines judicial legitimacy in the courts that handle more 
than 90% of all judicial business in the United States.  By conducting a survey with two embedded 
experiments on a nationally representative sample, this project provides support for several claims.  
First, who serves in the judiciary (i.e., what the judiciary looks like, or descriptive representation) 
affects the legitimacy ascribed to the courts.  Second, specific outputs of the judiciary (i.e., specific 
case decisions, or substantive representation) also affects judicial legitimacy.  Third, individuals 
hold different expectations of both the composition of the judiciary and the decision-making 
process of judges.  Finally, these expectations affect judicial legitimacy in various ways depending 
on the context.  As judicial systems across the United States become increasingly more diverse, 
the findings presented in this project provide some insight into the public’s response to this shift 
in composition of the courts. 
 v 
Chapter One introduces the project and outlines how it both aligns with and departs from 
much of the extant literature.  Chapter Two provides a review of the literature as it pertains to the 
theories relevant to the broader project and the following empirical chapters.  Chapter Three 
focuses strictly on the relationship between descriptive representation and judicial legitimacy, both 
at the state-level and individual-level.  Chapter Four extends the findings of Chapter Three by 
incorporating individuals’ descriptive representation expectations into the preceding chapter’s 
analyses.  Chapter Five examines the relationship between substantive representation and 
legitimacy.  Chapter Six concludes by discussing the contributions and limitations of the project, 
as well as directions for future research.  
  
 vi 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PREFACE ................................................................................................................................... xiii 
1.0 CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION ................................................................................... 1 
1.1 Chapter Outline ............................................................................................................ 10 
2.0 CHAPTER TWO: THEORY............................................................................................... 13 
2.1 Definitions ..................................................................................................................... 13 
2.2 Legitimacy Theory ........................................................................................................ 17 
2.3 Minority Representation in the Judiciary .................................................................. 22 
2.4 Social Identities and Heuristics ................................................................................... 26 
2.5 Expectations Matter ..................................................................................................... 30 
3.0 CHAPTER THREE:  STATE-LEVEL AND INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL 
DESCRIPTIVE REPRESENTATION ........................................................................... 32 
3.1 Theory and Hypotheses ................................................................................................ 33 
3.2 Empirical Approach ..................................................................................................... 37 
3.2.1 Experiment One:  Statewide Trial Court Descriptive Representation .........39 
3.2.1.1 Experiment One (State-Level) Sample ................................................ 41 
3.2.2 Experiment Two:  Individual-Judge Descriptive Representation .................42 
3.2.2.1 Experiment Two (Individual-Level) Sample ....................................... 43 
3.3 State-Level Representation Analysis and Discussion ................................................ 44 
3.3.1 Discussion of Results:  Female Judge Representation (State-Level) .............46 
3.3.2 Discussion of Results:  African American Judge Representation (State-Level)
 .............................................................................................................................48 
 vii 
3.4 Individual-Level Representation Analysis and Discussion ....................................... 49 
3.4.1 Discussion of Results:  Race and Gender Combined (Individual-Level) ......51 
3.4.1.1 Results for White Male Respondents (Individual-Level Desc. Rep.) 54 
3.4.1.2 Results for White Female Respondents (Individual-Level Desc. Rep.)
 ................................................................................................................. 55 
3.4.1.3 Results for Black Male Respondents (Individual-Level Desc. Rep.). 55 
3.4.1.4 Results for Black Female Respondents (Individual-Level Desc. Rep.)
 ................................................................................................................. 56 
3.5 Descriptive Representation Conclusion ...................................................................... 57 
4.0 CHAPTER FOUR:  EXPECTATIONS OF DESCRIPTIVE 
REPRESENTATION ........................................................................................................ 61 
4.1 Theory and Hypothesis ................................................................................................ 62 
4.2 Empirical Approach ..................................................................................................... 63 
4.2.1 Overall Survey Sample ......................................................................................65 
4.3 Analyses and Discussion ............................................................................................... 66 
4.3.1 Discussion of Results:  Descriptive Representation Expectations .................66 
4.3.2 Discussion of Results:  Moderating Effects of Expectations on the 
Relationship between Descriptive Representation and Judicial Legitimacy
 .............................................................................................................................72 
4.3.2.1 State-Level Experiment:  Moderating Effects of Descriptive 
Representation Expectations for African American Judges ............. 73 
4.3.2.2 State-Level Experiment:  Moderating Effects of Descriptive 
Representation Expectations for Women Judges ............................... 75 
 viii 
4.3.2.3 Individual-Level Experiment:  Moderating Effects of Descriptive 
Representation Expectations for African American Judges ............. 78 
4.3.2.4 Individual-Level Experiment:  Moderating Effects of Descriptive 
Representation Expectations for Women Judges ............................... 81 
4.4 Descriptive Representation Expectations Conclusion ............................................... 82 
5.0 CHAPTER FIVE:  SUBSTANTIVE REPRESENTATION AND 
EXPECTATIONS ............................................................................................................. 85 
5.1 Theory and Hypotheses ................................................................................................ 87 
5.2 Empirical Approach ..................................................................................................... 89 
5.3 Analysis and Discussion ............................................................................................... 92 
5.3.1 Discussion of Results:  Issue Importance .........................................................93 
5.3.2 Discussion of Results:  Substantive Representation Expectations .................97 
5.3.3 Discussion of Results:  Moderating Effect of Substantive Representation 
Expectations .....................................................................................................101 
5.4 Substantive Representation Conclusion ................................................................... 103 
6.0 CHAPTER SIX:  CONCLUSION ..................................................................................... 109 
6.1 Key Findings ............................................................................................................... 110 
6.1.1 Descriptive Representation .............................................................................110 
6.1.2 Substantive Representation .............................................................................113 
6.1.3 Representation Expectations ...........................................................................114 
6.2 Contributions, Limitations, and Future Directions ................................................. 116 
APPENDIX A DESCRIPTIVE REPRESENTATION EXPERIMENTAL 
CONDITIONS ................................................................................................................. 121 
 ix 
APPENDIX B SUBSTANTIVE REPRESENTATION VIGNETTES................................. 122 
APPENDIX C SUBSTANTIVE REPRESENTATION REGRESSION MODELS ........... 125 
APPENDIX D SURVEY INSTRUMENTS ............................................................................ 127 
Appendix D.1 Main Survey with Embedded Experiments ........................................... 127 
Appendix D.2 Pre-Test for Chapter Five Substantive Representations Issues .......... 179 
APPENDIX E PRE-ANALYSIS PLAN .................................................................................. 189 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ..................................................................................................................... 197 
 x 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1 Measures of Legitimacy ................................................................................................ 41 
Table 2 Mean Level of Agreement with Statement by Race and Gender .............................. 98 
Table 3 Percentage of Respondents Agreeing and Disagreeing with Statement ................... 99 
Table 4 Effect of Substantive Representation Expectation on Legitimacy ......................... 101 
Appendix Table 1 State-Level Descriptive Representation Experiment Sample (Experiment 
One) ................................................................................................................................ 121 
Appendix Table 2 Individual-Level Descriptive Representation Experiment Sample 
(Experiment Two) ......................................................................................................... 121 
Appendix Table 3 Effect of Issue Importance on Legitimacy (OLS Regression) ............... 125 
Appendix Table 4 Effect of Issue Importance on Legitimacy with Covariates (OLS 
Regression)..................................................................................................................... 125 
Appendix Table 5 Effect of Interaction between Issue Importance and Importance 




LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1 Race and Gender Composition of State Trial Court Judges Compared to U.S. 
Population (Replicated from George and Yoon 2016)................................................. 23 
Figure 2 Scores for Gender (Panel A) and Race/Ethnicity (Panel B) Representation in State 
Courts (Replicated from George and Yoon 2016) ....................................................... 24 
Figure 3 Scores for Combined Race and Gender Representation in State Courts (Replicated 
from George and Yoon 2016) ......................................................................................... 25 
Figure 4 Aggregate Representation of Female Judges in R’s State Trial Courts ................. 45 
Figure 5 Aggregate Representation of Black Judges in R’s State Trial Courts .................... 45 
Figure 6 Mean Legitimacy by Respondent Race ..................................................................... 50 
Figure 7 Mean Legitimacy by Respondent Sex ........................................................................ 51 
Figure 8 Mean Legitimacy - Black Female Respondents ........................................................ 52 
Figure 9 Mean Legitimacy - Black Male Respondents ............................................................ 52 
Figure 10 Mean Legitimacy - White Female Respondents ..................................................... 53 
Figure 11 Mean Legitimacy - White Male Respondents ......................................................... 53 
Figure 12 Descriptive Representation Expectations for Black Judges .................................. 67 
Figure 13 Descriptive Representation Expectations for Women Judges ............................... 67 
Figure 14 Legitimacy Differences by Descriptive Representation Expectations, State-Level 
African American Judges, Black Respondents ............................................................ 73 
Figure 15 Legitimacy Differences by Descriptive Representation Expectations, State-Level 
African American Judges, White Respondents............................................................ 74 
 xii 
Figure 16 Legitimacy Differences by Descriptive Representation Expectations, State-Level 
Women Judges, Female Respondents ........................................................................... 76 
Figure 17 Legitimacy Differences by Descriptive Representation Expectations, State-Level 
Women Judges, Male Respondents ............................................................................... 77 
Figure 18 Legitimacy Differences by Descriptive Representation Expectations, Individual-
Level African American Judges, Black Respondents .................................................. 79 
Figure 19 Legitimacy Differences by Descriptive Representation Expectations, Individual-
Level Women Judges, Female Respondents ................................................................. 81 
Figure 20 Mean Legitimacy by Treatment Group, Issue Importance ................................... 93 
Figure 21 Mean Legitimacy by Treatment Group, Most Important Issue Respondents Only
........................................................................................................................................... 95 
Figure 22 Predicted Legitimacy by Issue Importance Treatment and Substantive 
Representation Expectation ......................................................................................... 102 
Figure 23 Legitimacy Difference between Treatment Groups by Substantive Representation 
Expectation .................................................................................................................... 103 
Appendix Figure 1 Legitimacy Difference between High and Low Importance Treatments 




I would first like to express my deepest gratitude to Professor Chris Bonneau.  Thank you, 
Chris, for your support at every step along the way and for bearing with me the past few years as 
I inched along to the finish line.  Your encouragement, guidance, and student advocacy are more 
appreciated than you know and will forever stick with me.  I would also like to thank everyone 
who provided feedback on various ideas and drafts related to this project, including the rest of my 
dissertation committee, other Pitt graduate students, and fellow panelists and attendees at several 
conferences.  My final professional thanks go to my colleagues at ICPSR for encouraging me to 
finish this project, especially Dharma Akmon and Amy Pienta. 
This project was only made possible by the generous funding of several organizations.  I 
would like to thank the National Science Foundation Law & Social Sciences Program, the 
American Political Science Association Centennial Center, and the Center for American Politics 
and Society at the University of Pittsburgh for providing funding for this project. 
Lastly, I would like to thank my family and friends, and especially Justin Varney, for 
encouraging me and keeping me sane throughout my graduate school career.  Special thanks go to 
my parents for providing unwavering support in any endeavor I have taken on and for never failing 
to express just how proud they are of me.   
 1 
1.0 CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
In the United States, it is difficult to think of government or any public office without 
thinking about representation at some level.  In general, most people want a government that will 
represent them and their policy preferences, or more precisely, they want the individuals working 
in government to represent them.  Government makes the rules that define how individuals can 
and cannot behave in a legal sense; it sets guidelines and makes decisions that influence one’s 
educational opportunities, financial situation, and livelihood.  As a result, individuals have a stake 
in who the people are who make these rules.  Having more like-minded people in government 
helps to ensure the best chance of having rules made that result in the best possible outcome for 
an individual.   
Above and beyond any tangible benefit that may be received by having one’s preferences 
represented in government, good representation appears to be a positive thing for the country and 
for democracy, on a normative level.  It feels right to think that political elites should make policies 
that go along with what the people want.  Perhaps this normative conception of government stems 
from the education system in the United States, where children are taught at a young age the “of 
the people, by the people, for the people” sentiment of government, or perhaps it is the frequency 
of elections in the United States and the accompanying political rhetoric that is heard almost 
constantly that explains the notion of a government making decisions for the betterment of its 
citizens.1  To be sure, this sentiment is echoed by those already in government who are supposedly 
 
1 I should note here that this project focuses entirely on the United States.  Thus, any blanket statements or claims 
moving forward without a country-specific qualifier should be assumed to refer only to the U.S. context. 
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doing the representing.  Candidates for office at all levels of government urge citizens to vote for 
them because they will represent the people better than their opponent.  Government officials 
across a variety of offices tout their connection to the people and often justify the decisions they 
make by citing public opinion on a certain matter, again pointing to what seems to be an intrinsic 
notion that representation of the people is something good and desirable.  
Since representation seems naturally intertwined with our form of government in the U.S., 
a seemingly logical and natural association is made between representation and democracy.  A 
representative democracy is not necessarily the only occurrence of representation in politics, 
however.  As Pitkin (1967) notes, a king can represent a nation.  While I leave the historical 
discussion of the evolution of representation in various forms of governments throughout time to 
existing works by scholars like Pitkin, it is important to note the inherent link between 
representation and self-government in modern times.  It seems like something of an individual 
right that we should have our interests represented by and in our government. 
Despite the prevalence of the idea of representation in government, the term itself is 
somewhat ambiguous and has not been precisely or consistently defined over time.  If I say that I 
want my government to represent me, what do I mean?  Does that mean I want the policies that 
come out of the government to align with my policy preferences?  Probably.  Does it mean I want 
more people who look, sound, or behave like me in government?  Possibly.  Do I want both of 
these things, or do I mean something entirely different from these ideas?  Of course, I am far from 
the first or only scholar to point out the lack of clarity in the meaning of representation.  Again, 
Pitkin’s 1967 The Concept of Representation is perhaps one of the most thorough examinations of 
the meaning of representation.  Since then, many political scientists and legal scholars have 
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researched the multi-faceted aspects of representation across a number of institutions and 
governments.   
The ambiguity of the term representation stems from it being so broad as to encompass any 
number of scenarios in which one person is a substitute for one or more other persons.  Pitkin 
discusses several different “types” of representation, noting that it is important to understand each 
type of representation in order to understand the term more completely.  She argues that 
representation is akin to a three-dimensional structure being photographed in a dark room, stating 
(10): 
“Political theorists give us…flash-bulb photographs of the structure taken from 
different angles.  But each proceeds to treat his partial view as the complete 
structure…Yet there is something there…which all of them are photographing; and 
the different photographs together can be used to reconstruct it in complete detail.”  
It is the aim of this project to contribute to this decades-long photo session of representation 
by examining how two specific types of representation, descriptive and substantive, affect 
individuals’ evaluations of generally under-studied institutions in the United States:  state trial 
courts.  While there is an abundance of research over the past several decades examining 
representation generally, and even specifically within a legislative context, there is a dearth of 
representation research in the judicial context.  The broad research questions addressed in this 
project are:  How does the presence or absence of representation affect individuals’ evaluations of 
their courts, what do individuals expect from their state’s judges in terms of representation, and 
how do these expectations interact with actual levels of representation to affect court evaluations?   
Although there is a stark difference between the amount of research on judicial representation and 
representation in the other branches of government, it is not wholly surprising.  After all, there are 
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many institutional differences between the judiciary and other branches of government that tend 
to lead people to think that representation is more important or at the very least more prevalent in 
the latter than in the former, including selection mechanisms, prerequisites for entry, and the 
general role of the branch vis-à-vis the others.  In general, federal and state executive and 
legislative branches are responsible for making laws and are made up of individuals who are 
directly elected by the people.  Aside from some age and citizenship requirements, these branches 
also tend to have no prerequisites for entering them so long as an individual garners more votes 
than his or her opponent who is seeking entry to the same office.  In theory, anyone (who is of age 
and has appropriate citizenship in some cases) can hold a legislative or executive office.  Judges, 
however, are tasked with interpreting laws2, they may be elected directly by the people in some 
states, but in other states and at the federal level, they are appointed by another branch of 
government, and judges typically will have completed some formal training before they are able 
to serve in the judiciary (i.e., have a law degree).3 
Of course, some individuals may believe that representation is not even applicable in the 
judicial context because the job of judges is simply to apply or interpret the law as written without 
considering the public’s opinion or concerns.  To combat this notion from the start, let me lay out 
here the reasons why judges are, in fact, representatives of the public, and why it is important to 
understand how representation works in the “least” representative branch. 
 
2 At least as far as conventional wisdom goes.  The role of judges will be discussed in greater detail in later chapters. 
3 A law degree is not officially required for many judgeships.  There is no mandate that federal judges must have a 
law degree, and the same is true for trial court judges in several states.  In some other states, judges must be licensed 
attorneys in order to serve in the judiciary.  
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1. At this point, numerous empirical studies have found that judges are influenced by extra-
legal factors when making their decisions, including public opinion (e.g., Black, Owens, 
Wedeking, and Wohlfarth 2016; Friedman 2009; Kuklinski and Stanga 1979; Marshall 
1989; McGuire and Stimson 2004; Mishler and Sheehan 1993; Owens and Wohlfarth 
2017, 2019).  Thus, even if one believes that judges should strictly adhere to legal texts 
and precedent when making decisions from the bench, the reality is that in practice 
judges rely on a variety of sources outside of legal texts to inform their decisions. 
2. Despite normative conceptions referenced above that some people hold of judges, many 
individuals believe that judges should represent the majority of the public (e.g., Gibson 
2011, 2012; National Center for State Courts 2009; also see Chapter 5).  Like politicians 
in other branches of government, judges make decisions that set the rules for how 
society operates, so why shouldn’t judges consider how their decisions might affect the 
citizens within their jurisdiction? 
3. Many judges themselves recognize their role as being that of a representative or 
delegate, and that their decisions are influenced by a number of factors (e.g., Gibson 
1978, 1980; Scheb, Bowen, and Anderson 1991; Scheb, Ungs, and Hayes 1989).  As 
Sonia Sotomayor (2001) states, “The aspiration to impartiality is just that—it’s an 
aspiration because it denies the fact that we are by our experiences making different 
choices than others…Personal experiences affect the facts that judges choose to see.”4 
 
4 Supreme Court of the United States Associate Justice Sonia Sotomayor.  2001.  “A Latina Judge’s Voice.”  Delivered 
at the Judge Mario G. Olmos Memorial Lecture in at the University of California, Berkeley, School of Law.  Text 
available at:  https://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/15/us/politics/15judge.text.html.  
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Moreover, it is important to recognize that the judiciary is not a homogenous entity.  In 
fact, there are significant institutional differences across levels and types of courts.  For example, 
all federal judges are appointed while state court judges vary widely in how they are selected, with 
some being elected and some appointed.  Similarly, federal judges hold their position for life under 
good behavior while most state court judges have some sort of term limit.  These differences, and 
several others, make it necessary for a thorough and cohesive examination of representation in the 
judiciary to focus on one type of court at a time.  An endeavor to understand the nuances of how 
representation works across every possible type of court would certainly exceed the length of this 
project.   
For the purposes of this project, then, I choose to focus on state trial courts.  As alluded to, 
part of the reason for focusing on one type of court is practical; in order to be able to thoroughly 
investigate representation in the judiciary, focusing on one type of court on its own is a necessary 
first step before comparing across various types of courts.  Indeed, the overwhelming majority of 
judicial studies tend to focus on just one court:  the Supreme Court of the United States.  Of course, 
there are many benefits of studying the Supreme Court:  it is perhaps the most visible court in the 
world, its decisions have a broad reach, and its outcomes or judicial opinions are easily 
discoverable.  However, there are limitations to studying the Supreme Court as well, particularly 
in the area of representation as there has been very little demographic variation of  Supreme Court 
justices.  As of 2021, there have only been five female justices to ever serve on the nation’s highest 
court and only two African American justices.  
The primary reason I choose to focus on state trial courts, however, is that state courts 
handle more than ninety percent of all judicial matters across the United States, with the 
overwhelming majority of these cases originating (and ending) at the trial court level (George and 
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Yoon 2016).  Despite the relatively low visibility of these courts vis-à-vis the Supreme Court of 
the United States in the extant political science literature, these courts play an integral role in 
citizens’ everyday lives and are the courts with which most citizens will encounter throughout their 
lives.  Trial court judges are tasked with resolving highly personal disputes, are increasingly called 
upon to express community concerns, and interact more frequently with the public (e.g., through 
witness testimony, settlement discussions, serving on a jury, or public attendance at trials) than 
their counterparts serving in higher levels of the judiciary (Ifill 1997).  Thus, understanding how 
individuals view these courts and the judges within them is important for understanding citizens’ 
attitudes toward U.S. courts and the judiciary more broadly. 
In addition to focusing on the state trial court context, this project also focuses on two types 
of representation:  descriptive and substantive.  I follow previous works that conceptualize 
descriptive representation as the matching or mirroring of a particular characteristic or identity 
between an individual and a judge (Haider-Markel 2010; Pitkin 1967).  Haider-Markel (2010) 
states (2), “If an elected official clearly belongs to or identifies with a particular ethnic, racial, or 
religious group, it can be argued that the group has achieved ‘descriptive’ representation.”  In other 
words, an African American citizen is descriptively represented by an African American judge 
because they share the same race.  It is important to note that representation can be provided both 
at the individual-level as well as at the broader institutional level.  For example, a single judge 
descriptively represents someone who shares their same race.  At the same time, as more and more 
judges of the same race enter the bench, the institution as a whole is increasing its descriptive 
representation for those who share that race (or any other identity).   
Also consistent with prior works, in this project I use the term substantive representation 
to mean that a judge makes a decision that is in line with an individual’s preference (Haider-Markel 
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2010; Pitkin 1967; Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005).  Haider-Markel (2010) explains that 
substantive representation is achieved when an official pursues “the policy interests of the group 
with which he or she identifies.”  For example, if an individual thinks that recreational marijuana 
should be legal and a judge decides a case that supports this outcome, this person has been 
substantively represented by the judge.  It is important to note that descriptive and substantive 
representation are not mutually exclusive.  In fact, several studies show that increased descriptive 
representation (in an institution as a whole) can lead to increased substantive representation 
(Bratton 2002; Reingold 2000; Swers 2002; Thomas 1991). 
Finally, in addition to focusing on representation in state trial courts, I have chosen to focus 
particularly on race and gender.  More specifically for race, this project examines representation 
differences among African Americans and whites.  The reason for choosing particular 
demographic groups to examine is similar to the reason for focusing on just one type of court.  The 
goal is to provide an in-depth, thorough investigation of how representation works in a judicial 
context.  Given the varying experiences of different groups with the courts, it is important to 
narrow the scope of the project to a limited number of groups.  In other words, I am choosing depth 
over breadth.  That being said, I believe focusing on black and white males and females has 
generalizable qualities that would extend to other groups, which I discuss in later chapters.   
Moreover, the disproportionate consequences that judicial decisions have on minority 
communities (e.g., Overby et. al. 2005), coupled with the fact that neither women nor African 
Americans are represented on state benches in proportion to their numbers in the general 
 9 
population5, makes understanding how the lack of diversity in state courts affects attitudes toward 
these courts even more important.  At the same time, numbers of women and African American 
judges have been increasing over the past several decades.  As more and more groups begin to 
recognize the importance of, and work toward, diversifying political institutions, understanding 
the relationship between this reality, and perhaps goal, and public attitudes is particularly timely.  
As Kang (2016) states, “When the men and women who deliver justice look more like the 
communities they serve, there is greater confidence in our justice system overall.”  With a shift in 
the demographic profile of the court system in recent and potentially in coming years, now is an 
opportune time to analyze how this shift might affect the courts’ standing among citizens. 
To recap, the overall goal of this project is to understand the relationship between 
representation and evaluations of state trial courts.  In order to accomplish this goal, I focus on 
descriptive and substantive representation among black and white male and female U.S. citizens.  
One final noteworthy departure from much of the extant literature is that rather than simply 
examine how one type or level of representation affects court evaluations, I also pay special 
attention to what individuals expect in terms of representation from their state court judges.  
Although I have suggested already that judges are indeed representatives of the people, and will 
continue to do so throughout this project, it is possible that some individuals feel differently.  If 
someone does not expect any representation, descriptive or substantive, from their judges and 
instead believes that judges are simply neutral arbiters of the law who make decisions in a vacuum, 
 
5 As of December 2014, women made up almost 28% of all state trial court judges in the U.S. while making up about 
half of the U.S. population.  Similarly, African Americans made up just over 6% of all state trial court judges in the 
U.S. while making up around 13% of the U.S. population (George and Yoon 2016). 
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then we would not expect actual representation of any kind to have an effect on their evaluations 
of the court.  Indeed, I will show later on (in Chapters Four and Five) that individuals do hold 
varying expectations of their judges in terms of representation.  Rather than assuming that 
representation will have the same effect on all individuals’ evaluations of the courts like much of 
the existing literature, I am able to examine exactly how expectations moderate these effects across 
individuals.  Knowing what individuals expect from judges and the role these expectations play in 
affecting evaluations has important implications for understanding how best to frame 
representation in a judicial context in order to protect or even increase judicial legitimacy. 
1.1 Chapter Outline 
In this chapter, I have outlined the scope and relevance of this project.  In the proceeding 
chapters, I undertake an examination of how representation affects evaluations of state trial courts 
among whites and African Americans in the United States.  More specifically, I explore how 
descriptive and substantive representation, and expectations thereof, affect judicial legitimacy.  
Judicial legitimacy is a common measurement in the extant judicial literature that examines an 
individual’s (un)willingness to make fundamental changes to the court (Caldeira and Gibson 1992, 
1995), a concept that is explored more in the following chapter. 
Chapter Two walks through the several theories that serve as the foundation for a number 
of expectations that will be empirically tested in the later chapters.  In the second chapter, I will 
discuss judicial legitimacy, social identity theory, and expectancy theory, and discuss the existing 
literature related to all of these theories.  I also discuss the current state of diversity in state courts 
in this chapter. 
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Chapter Three focuses on descriptive representation.  In this chapter, I present two survey 
experiments:  one that examines the relationship between descriptive representation and judicial 
legitimacy in the aggregate, at the state-level, and one that examines this relationship at the 
individual-judge level.  Chapter Three provides evidence that descriptive representation does 
affect judicial legitimacy, but that it varies across race and gender groups of individuals.  The 
significance of this relationship also varies a bit by whether the survey respondents are presented 
with information about descriptive representation at the state level or the individual-judge level. 
Chapter Four extends the findings from Chapter Three by incorporating individuals’ 
expectations into the analyses.  I first present and discuss the expectations that individuals hold in 
terms of descriptive representation in their state’s trial courts.  These results reveal that individuals 
vary in the expectations that they have about the numbers of black and female judges that should 
be in their state’s trial courts.  The results also show that expectations vary widely from what we 
would expect if levels of representation in the judiciary matched numbers of these groups in the 
general public.  This chapter also presents evidence that these expectations have a moderating 
effect on the impact that descriptive representation has on judicial legitimacy, but in limited 
contexts. 
Chapter Five shifts the focus to substantive representation.  I first examine how substantive 
representation, or the lack thereof, affects judicial legitimacy, and find that it does.  When 
substantive representation is not provided by a judge, an individual is less likely to grant legitimacy 
to the court.  Next, I present and discuss the expectations that individuals have of substantive 
representation in the courts.  Similar to descriptive representation, I find that individuals vary in 
the expectations they hold.  Finally, this chapter examines how these expectations moderate the 
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relationship between substantive representation and judicial legitimacy.  The evidence shows that 
these expectations do moderate the relationship, but again, only for specific individuals. 
Chapter Six summarizes the key findings and brings the current project to a close.  I discuss 
the generalizability and implications that the findings have in the real world moving forward.  I 
also discuss the contributions that this project makes to the relevant literature as well as the 




2.0 CHAPTER TWO: THEORY 
This chapter focuses on discussing the relevant theories that form the foundation of the 
testable hypotheses presented in the following empirical chapters.  It also provides a picture of the 
current levels of diversity in state courts.  Before presenting this information, however, it is 
important to clearly define some concepts that are used throughout the remainder of the project. 
2.1 Definitions   
What factors affect an individual’s evaluations of the courts?  This question appears 
straightforward, but there are several elements that affect the answer.  First, it is important to note 
the generality of the term “courts.”  What do we mean when we talk about courts?  Do we mean 
the actual physical structure of a courthouse, the judges inside the courthouses, the outputs or 
judicial decisions, any combination of these, or something entirely different?  Clearly identifying 
what is meant by the term “courts” is important for understanding where to look for factors that 
affect evaluations of courts.   
For example, consider the distinction between judges, or political actors, and a more 
encompassing version of courts, or political institutions more broadly.  Factors that affect 
evaluations of one are not necessarily the same as factors that affect the other.  One deals with 
forming an opinion of other individuals and the other deals with forming opinions of a collection 
of individuals, processes, and outputs.  I would not, for example, use the same metrics for 
determining how much I like a coworker as I would for how much I like my place of employment.  
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To determine the former, I may look to things like personality traits for that one person, and for 
the latter, I might look to things like the work that we produce, the interactions between employees, 
the physical structure, and so on.  That being said, however, the two evaluations are not necessarily 
made in isolation, and indeed, are likely correlated.  Part of my evaluation of my place of business 
might include how much I like my coworkers, and vice versa.   
In order to understand evaluations of political institutions, then, it is also important to 
understand how individuals relate to members within that institution.  This is perhaps made even 
clearer when we think about a more concrete, real-world scenario.  Imagine getting your oil 
changed and the mechanic is incredibly rude to you.  You would leave from your oil change with 
a negative impression of the business as a whole based on the negative interaction you had with 
an employee there.  
Second, it is important to understand the type or dimension of evaluation itself.  One can 
evaluate both individuals and institutions on any number of dimensions, and they may not always 
align.  I might consider a coworker to be very personable and a great person, but I may not trust 
that coworker to produce a quality product.  Likability and trust are distinct evaluations.  Similarly, 
I might have confidence that my place of work produces quality outputs that will benefit consumers 
or society more broadly, but that does not necessarily mean that I enjoy coming to work every day.  
Thus, in order to address the question of what factors affect evaluations of the courts, we must 
have both a clear definition of what is meant by courts, and a clearly defined evaluation or metric 
on which to focus.   
For the latter, one of the most common evaluations used in the judicial politics literature 
that examines public attitudes toward, or evaluations of, courts is judicial legitimacy.  Judicial 
legitimacy has been widely studied and used in a variety of contexts, and I continue the use of it 
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in this project as the primary type or metric of evaluation that individuals use when forming 
attitudes toward the courts.  In other words, the extent to which an individual grants legitimacy to 
the court is a proxy for that individual’s evaluation of the court, at least in the current project.  The 
additional benefit of using judicial legitimacy is that it makes it easier to compare the results here 
to the many other studies that have also used the concept as the outcome variable.  The foundation 
of judicial legitimacy is discussed in more detail below. 
For the former, Chapter One has already alluded to what is meant by “courts” in this 
project:  state trial courts.  While that limits the scope of this project, this can still refer to various 
elements even within state trial courts (e.g., judges, processes, outputs), as I discuss above.  For 
this project, I conceptualize courts very broadly to include the people, processes, and institutional 
setup that are all parts of any given state’s trial courts.  In this sense, it could be thought of as 
referring to the broad judicial system at the state trial court level.  I use such a broad definition for 
two reasons.   
First, and primarily, I am interested in examining how representation affects judicial 
evaluations (i.e., judicial legitimacy).  Representation can be provided both at the individual and 
institutional levels.  In part, this has to do with me examining both descriptive and substantive 
representation in this project.  Descriptive representation is most often thought of at the individual 
level:  I am descriptively represented by a judge when the judge shares one of my characteristics.  
However, we can also think of how descriptively representative an institution is of the broader 
public.  If all the judges within a state’s court system are white males, or is not diverse on any 
number of demographic characteristics, then the institution as a whole likely provides very little 
descriptive representation to the broader public.   
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Substantive representation can also be thought of at both the individual or institutional 
level.  In trial courts, there is one judge making the decision on a case.  In this sense, a singular 
person is or is not providing an individual substantive representation.  However, if looking at all 
the judicial outputs from the state trial court system as a whole in a particular state, an individual 
can feel more or less substantively represented when considering all the decisions from various 
cases together compared to his or her own substantive preferences.  At certain points in later 
chapters I focus on one level at a time (individual or institutional), but overall, this contributes to 
my using the term “courts” to mean a combination of all elements of the judicial system at the state 
trial court level.   
Second, I do not want to invoke or impose any particular attitudes on the individuals who 
take part in this project.  I am interested in understanding what their natural or organic beliefs 
about judges and courts are generally, as they think of them in their everyday, normal lives.  I do 
not want to guide their thoughts in any way by providing them with definitions or leading them to 
focus on one aspect of courts over another.  So, although it is somewhat ambiguous and all-
encompassing, the term “courts” in this project refers to however an individual conceptualizes 
state trial courts on their own. 
The final set of terms worth mentioning are not necessarily done so to provide formal 
definitions, but rather to make a point about diction and syntax.  Throughout this project, I use 
various terms to refer to this general understanding of the court system to avoid annoying repetition 
of syntax, including courts, state trial courts, judicial system, judiciary, etc.  I acknowledge that 
there may be nuanced definitions for each of these terms, but since I am focused on a variety of 
views from the subjects taking part in this project, consistently using one term over another would 
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unfairly represent what is actually being examined (i.e., the system as a whole as defined by the 
collective pool of subjects). 
Similarly, I use different terms interchangeably to refer to respondent groups that took part 
in the survey and the judges presented in various parts of the survey.  Specifically, I use the terms 
“black” and “African American” interchangeably as well as “female” and “woman.”  Again, I 
recognize that these terms do not necessarily mean the same thing in all contexts and indeed there 
are important differences between them.  My purpose for using terms interchangeably is in no way 
meant to diminish the important work that has been done to distinguish these unique concepts, but 
rather to avoid repetition and dullness for the reader.  Precision of words is incredibly important, 
but so is readability, especially since these sets of terms are used very frequently in the following 
chapters. 
Now that some important terms and concepts used throughout this project are defined, the 
remainder of this chapter focuses on distinct theories or strands of literature that inform a set of 
testable hypotheses that are presented in the empirical chapters that follow. 
2.2 Legitimacy Theory 
Perhaps best explicated in several works by Caldeira and Gibson (Caldeira and Gibson 
1992; 1995; Gibson 2007; 2012; Gibson and Caldeira 1998; 2009a; 2009b), legitimacy is best 
conceptualized as an individual’s willingness to support an institution even in the face of 
disagreement.  David Easton (1965; 1975) equated legitimacy with diffuse support.  Unlike 
specific support, which is based on specific institutional outputs, diffuse support is more of a 
psychological disposition or commitment toward an institution.  Put in a way that is perhaps most 
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relatable, Gibson and Caldeira (2009a) explain the differences between specific and diffuse 
support by drawing a comparison to friendships.  An individual can be loyal to a friendship without 
necessarily agreeing with every decision that her friend makes.  Even if a friend disapproves of 
the other’s action, the friendship still remains and the two individuals can still be loyal friends to 
each other.   
Similarly, institutional legitimacy is especially important when institutions produce 
something dissatisfying to the public.  Gibson (2012, 5) calls this an “objection precondition,” 
meaning that legitimacy comes into play only when institutional outputs do not align with the 
public’s preferences.  It is easy to be supportive of an institution when its outputs align with all of 
one’s preferences.  However, when the institutional outputs start to deviate from one’s own 
personal preferences, it is the legitimacy of that institution that has been built up over time that 
protects it from suffering from a loss of support for any extended amount of time.   
Another relatable example to help understand the objection precondition is to think about 
dining out at your favorite restaurant.  The restaurant has become your favorite presumably 
because you have had a number of positive experiences there over some amount of time.  If you 
have one negative experience at the restaurant, if it is your favorite, you will likely continue to 
visit the restaurant in the future rather than completely abandon it due to the accumulation of 
positive experiences you had always had in the past.  Except perhaps in the most extreme 
circumstances, you would not, for example, suggest that the restaurant get all new staff or a whole 
new menu if you had one bad experience over the course of years visiting the restaurant.  The 
restaurant maintaining the status quo (i.e., of providing a positive experience to you) does not test 
how supportive you are of the restaurant.  Instead, it takes an objectionable experience to truly test 
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how supportive you are of the restaurant.  Similarly, an institution must do something you disagree 
with in order for its legitimacy or diffuse support to be truly observable.    
Legitimacy is particularly important for the judiciary given that the judiciary has no other 
enforcement mechanism for compliance with its decisions.  The judiciary relies on other branches 
or agencies of government to enforce its decisions.  Without maintaining its legitimacy, the 
judiciary risks its outputs not being enforced as the other branches and agencies would face little 
backlash for not enforcing judicial decisions.  As Gibson (2012, 70) states, “When courts have 
legitimacy, they are efficacious; where a legitimacy shortfall exists, courts are often impotent.”   
Indeed, judges themselves recognize the importance of protecting and promoting public 
confidence in the courts.  Cann and Yates (2016) point out that several state court systems have 
implemented public outreach initiatives to bolster the confidence in their courts.  The authors also 
note that the American Bar Association also noted in 2007 the importance of promoting confidence 
in the judiciary by amending its comments to the Model Code of Judicial Conduct (Rule 1.2), 
advising that “judges should participate in activities that promote public understanding of and 
confidence in the administration of justice.”  Indeed, judges themselves recognize their peculiar 
position with regard to the implementation of their decisions and the importance of public support.  
Cann and Yates (2016) cite Chief Justice Rehnquist on this point, remarking:   
“I suspect the Court will continue to encounter challenges to its independence and 
authority by the other branches of government because of the design of our 
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Constitutional system.  The degree to which that independence will be preserved 
will depend again in some measure on the public’s respect for the judiciary.”6 
Given the importance that public support has on the proper functioning of our courts, 
understanding the determinants and factors that affect judicial legitimacy is crucial to 
understanding how the judiciary functions within the separation-of-powers system and society 
more broadly. 
As mentioned, the theory underpinning the concept of legitimacy comes from Easton’s 
(1965; 1975) concept of diffuse support.  Easton identifies a distinction between what he calls 
specific support and diffuse support.  While specific support relates to whether or not one agrees 
with a particular institutional output (e.g., a court’s decision in one particular case), diffuse support 
is a more deeply-rooted propensity to support an institution and view its outputs as legitimate or 
authoritative, even in the face of disagreement.  Since judges are seen as applying the rule of law 
when making their decisions, the public tends to believe in the integrity of judicial decision-making 
and recognizes the court’s authority to make these decisions even when it goes against one’s 
preferences.  Diffuse support, or legitimacy, is akin to a reservoir of good will, which the judiciary 
has built up over time and which affords the courts support even in times of decision-making that 
is unpopular among the public (Easton 1965).     
Empirical studies have found numerous factors that affect the legitimacy of the judiciary.  
Regarding the Supreme Court, scholars find that knowledge of the Court (Caldeira and Gibson 
1992; Gibson, Caldeira, and Baird 1998), level of attention paid to the Court (Caldeira 1986; 
 
6 Remarks of the Chief Justice, Symposium on Judicial Independence, University of Richmond, T.C. Williams School 
of Law, March 21, 2003:  https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/speeches/viewspeech/sp_03-21-03.  
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Caldeira and Gibson 1992), education (Caldeira and Gibson 1992), perceptions of the Court’s 
ideology (Bartels and Johnston 2013), commitment to democratic values (Caldeira and Gibson 
1992), Court decisions (Grosskopf and Mondak 1998; Johnson and Martin 1998), and opinion 
rationales (Baird 2001; Caldeira and Gibson 1992; Farganis 2012; Gibson, Caldeira, and Spence 
2005; Scheb and Lyons 2000) all affect legitimacy.   
Regarding state high courts, scholars find that legitimacy is affected by experience with 
the courts (Benesh 2006), judicial elections and campaign activity (Cann and Yates 2008; Gibson 
2009, 2012), knowledge of the courts (Cann and Yates 2016), and perceptions about court 
procedures and institutional design (Benesh 2006).  To my knowledge, one of the only studies 
examining legitimacy of lower-level courts’ main finding is that there are differences in 
determinants of legitimacy between lower-level courts and the Supreme Court (Benesh, Scherer, 
and Steigerwalt 2009).  
Although legitimacy is not exclusively or specifically associated with representation, the 
two concepts become intertwined in this project.  Just as political socialization from a young age 
has contributed to individuals’ propensity to grant legitimacy to the courts, individuals who belong 
to historically marginalized groups have grown up seeing little to no political actors (i.e., judges 
in this case) who look like them or otherwise represent them.  The next two sections will outline 
the state of minority representation in the judiciary and social identity theory, which is used to 
connect representation to legitimacy.  
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2.3 Minority Representation in the Judiciary 
 
Who serves in political institutions matters.  It matters for the types of outputs we see from 
the institution (e.g., Bratton 2002) and it matters for the attitudes that individuals hold toward the 
institution (e.g., Scherer and Curry 2010).  However, when it comes to state courts, we know 
relatively little about the judges who serve in these institutions.  George and Yoon (2016) were the 
first known researchers to comprehensively collect data on the demographic characteristics of state 
court judges in all fifty states.7  In their State Bench Database, they collected biographical data for 
every sitting judge in state appellate courts and state trial courts of general jurisdiction.  The figures 
below (Figures 1-3) replicate the graphics found in the authors’ report.  The middle panel in Figure 
1 (Panel B) shows the demographic makeup of the U.S. population.  Panel A in Figure 1 shows 
the racial (white and non-white) and gender (men and women) composition of all state trial court 
judges.  Panel C in Figure 1 shows additional details of the racial composition of all state trial court 
judges.   
As the figure shows, white men represent about every three in ten people.  In state trial 
courts, this representation nearly doubles, as almost six in ten state trial court judges are white 
men.  White women appear to be only slightly underrepresented on state trial court benches, 
 
7 I recognize that these data are several years old.  That said, I am unaware of any data in existence that are more 
recent that illustrate representation of women and racial minorities in state courts.  While there may be some changes 
in an individual state bench’s demographic composition since the time of data collection, I believe the overall trends 
and picture presented by these data still hold true today.  These data are only meant to highlight that a lack of diversity 
in state courts exists, which I believe would still be an uncontested statement today. 
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making up about 26% of state trial court judges while they make up just over 30% of the U.S. 
population.  For people of color, both men and women, their representation on state trial court 
benches does not even reach half of their representation in the U.S. population.  I include Panel C 
since this project is particularly interested in African Americans rather than all people of color.  As 
Panel C shows, the overwhelming majority of state trial court judges are white.  African Americans 
make up only about 7% of state trial court judges, just over half of their representation in the U.S. 
more broadly.  
 
Figure 1 Race and Gender Composition of State Trial Court Judges Compared to U.S. Population 
(Replicated from George and Yoon 2016) 
 
With their biographical data, George and Yoon (2016, 8) score every state based on the 
representativeness of that state’s bench.  They calculate what they term the “Gavel Gap” by first 
determining the difference between the proportion of women/minorities on a state’s bench and the 
proportion of women/minorities in that state’s general population.  They then divide this by the 
proportion of women/minorities in that state’s general population.  In other words, their formula 
for determining the Gavel Gap is:  (Fraction of judges who are women (minorities) – fraction of 
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general population who are women (minorities)) ÷ fraction of general population who are women 
(minorities). 
The result of this calculation shows where a state stands in terms of reaching the proportion 
of women and minorities on its bench that we would expect based on the proportions in the general 
population.  If 50% of a state’s judges were women and that state also had 50% women in its 
general population, then there would be no Gavel Gap ((.50-.50)/.50 = 0).  Based on this score, 
states are graded an A if they come close to parity (at least 90%), B for 80-89%, C for 70-79%, D 
for 60-69%, and F for states that are below 60%.   
 
Figure 2 Scores for Gender (Panel A) and Race/Ethnicity (Panel B) Representation in State Courts 
(Replicated from George and Yoon 2016) 
 
Figure 2 shows the scores for both Gender (Panel A) and Race & Ethnicity (Panel B).  As 
we can see from this figure, no state comes within 10% of reaching gender parity on its bench.  
More than half of all states receive the worst possible score, not even reaching 60% of the 
proportion of female judges we would expect based on the proportion of females in those states’ 
general populations.  While there are quite a few more states that fare better when it comes to race 
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and ethnicity on their bench (7 states received an A score, meaning they have nearly reached parity 
between the proportion of racial and ethnic minority judges on their bench and the proportion of 
racial and ethnic minorities in their general population), there are also quite a few more that score 
worse (nearly two-thirds of all states receive an F score).8   
 
Figure 3 Scores for Combined Race and Gender Representation in State Courts (Replicated from George and 
Yoon 2016) 
 
Figure 3 shows the scores for each state when race and gender are combined.  Here again, 
the image is bleak in terms of representation of women and racial minorities.  Only one state 
(Hawaii) nearly reaches parity when it comes to the number of women and racial/ethnic minorities 
 
8 In general, the highest-scoring states are also the states that have some of the lowest levels of racial and ethnic 
populations as a percentage of the state’s general population, with the exception of Hawaii which is ranked highest in 
terms of racial/ethnic diversity among all states.  The seven highest-scoring states are Montana, South Dakota, West 
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on the bench compared to that state’s general population.  Similar to Figure 2, more than half of 
the states fall below the 60% representativeness mark when race and gender are combined. 
Overall, the information presented in this section shows that there are serious gaps in the 
representativeness of state courts when compared to the general population.  Whites are 
overrepresented on state benches while people of color, notably African Americans, are severely 
underrepresented.  Normative implications of not having state benches being representative of the 
people (in terms of descriptive representation) aside, this information tells us nothing about public 
perceptions of the court.  The purpose of including this information is rather to illustrate that 1. 
(descriptive) representation varies by demographic group in state courts, and 2. (descriptive) 
representation of women and African Americans varies by state.  The effects of these variations 
on public attitudes toward the court (i.e., legitimacy) is precisely what this projects seeks to better 
understand.   
2.4 Social Identities and Heuristics 
Broadly, Social Identity Theory (SIT) claims that individuals identify with a relevant “in-
group”, which affects their social perceptions, attitudes, and behaviors (Tajfel 1981; Tajfel and 
Turner 1979).  An individual’s social identity is one’s self-concept as defined by their group 
membership (Turner and Oakes 1986).  A social identity can refer to any and all groups with which 
an individual identifies, including large groups such as race, gender, occupation, religion, or 
student status as well as smaller, seemingly trivial groups such as car color or handedness.  
Identifying oneself as a member of a group helps individuals gain a sense of self.   
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The theory posits that individuals are motivated to positively differentiate the group(s) to 
which they belong from other groups in order to create a positive social identity (Turner et. al. 
1987).  Members who identify with an in-group magnify differences between themselves and the 
“out-group,” showing favoritism toward in-group members while perceiving out-group members 
as inferior.  The original experiments that serve as a foundation to SIT found that breaking up 
participants into separate groups for seemingly meaningless reasons resulted in individuals 
rewarding members of their own group (i.e., in-group members) more than members of the other 
group (i.e., out-group members) (Tajfel, Billig, and Bundy 1971). 
Importantly, Oakes (1987) points out that the possible social identities that an individual 
can take on are basically unlimited.  They are also situationally-dependent so that an individual 
might identify more strongly with one group in a given situation and with a different group in a 
different situation.  As the salience of a particular identity increases, so too does one’s social 
identity with that group.  For example, if a black student is watching or taking part in a debate with 
others and the topic is education reform, the “student” identity is likely most salient and she will 
identify with other students more than with non-students.  If the discussion then turns to issues of 
race in society, her racial identity will likely become more salient than her student identity.   
Simultaneously, in any given situation individuals use heuristics to simplify complex tasks 
in order to make value judgments and make sense of the social world (Tversky and Kahneman 
1974).  This allows individuals to make rational decisions even with limited information 
(Kahneman et. al. 1982; Lupia 1994; Lupia and McCubbins 1998).  When considering 
interpersonal trust, both social identity theory and the use of heuristics help translate limited 
information into stereotypes (Burns 2006; Carlin and Love 2013; Chandra 2003).   
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Consider meeting someone new, for example.  Without much context, individuals already 
form opinions or judgments of a person based on characteristics that are readily observable, like 
race or gender.  Without additional information, someone likely considers the new person as being 
typical of other members of that particular group.  If the new person is an in-group member (e.g., 
both are African American), the individual is more likely to have a positive initial judgment 
compared to if the new person is a member of an out-group (e.g., the individual is black and the 
new person is white).  Scholars have found that individuals are willing to cooperate with strangers 
(Cardenas and Carpenter 2008; Johnson and Mislin 2009) until information about one’s 
counterpart is revealed and trust bias emerges.   
Most relevant to the current project, two types of signals that can induce trust bias are 
gender (Buchan et. al. 2008; Gabarino and Slonim 2009) and race (Burns 2006; Wilson and Eckel 
2006).  While the majority of studies examining trust bias based on group membership focus on 
the relationship between individuals within the mass public, we can apply the same ideas to the 
dynamics between political elites and the public through a representation lens.  Given that 
individuals hold elites accountable for representing their preferences, either directly for elected 
judges or indirectly for appointed judges through the elected officials who appoint them, it is 
important to understand any bias that might emerge when making accountability decisions.  Bias 
might emerge from descriptive representation, substantive representation, or both.   
Scholars have found that both descriptive and substantive representation can affect 
individuals’ attitudes and behaviors.  When studying racial representation, scholars find that 
African Americans are more likely to approve of black members of Congress than their white 
counterparts (Tate 2001, 2003), are more likely to contact their own representative if she is black 
compared to if she is white (Banducci, Donovan, and Karp 2004; Gay 2002), and are more likely 
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to vote and have higher political interest as the percentage of black state legislators increases (Clark 
2010).  Regarding female representation, scholars have found that as the percentage of female 
legislators increases, more female-oriented policies are implemented (Bratton 2002; Reingold 
2000; Schwindt-Bayer 2006; Swers 2002) and women have more trust and confidence in 
institutions (Mansbridge 1999; Norris and Franklin 1997; Phillips 1995), greater feelings of 
efficacy (Atkeson and Carrillo 2007), and greater perceptions of institutional legitimacy 
(Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005).  
To sum this all up and relate it to the current project, individuals have a propensity to 
identity with groups and to positively differentiate the group’s members (in-group members) from 
members of other groups (out-group members).  Doing so gives the individual a positive sense of 
self in the social world.  Individuals also use shortcuts to help them make decisions, including the 
groups to which others belong and how they compare to the groups with which the individual 
belongs.  Race and gender are the two groups that I focus on in this project.  Just like an individual 
meeting a new person for the first time, I suspect that individuals use the same shortcuts to make 
judgments of institutions and institutional outputs based on the limited information they have (in 
this project, the race and gender of a judge as well as the judge’s decision in a particular case).  
Thus, when presented with information about a judge, I suspect that individuals will have more 
positive evaluations of the courts when the judge belongs to the individual’s in-group as opposed 
to the judge belonging to an out-group. 
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2.5 Expectations Matter 
Thinking about institutional legitimacy only through a social identity theory lens would 
lead to the expectation that an individual trusts an institution less when there are fewer people like 
herself (members of her in-group) in that institution.  For example, a woman would likely trust the 
judiciary less if she believes that only 2% of judges are women compared to a woman who believes 
that 30% of judges are women.  However, this expectation relies on the assumption that both 
women expect the judiciary to look like herself (in terms of gender).  Regarding this assumption, 
Gibson (2012, 11) states, “One mistake that those who think about…judges and their constituents 
sometimes make is to assume uniformity in the expectations citizens hold of the judiciary.”   
However, for some Americans, this assumption might not hold.  For citizens who do not 
believe that political institutions should mirror the public in terms of demographic characteristics, 
having greater or fewer minorities working within these institutions might not affect legitimacy 
(or any other institutional evaluation) at all.  The same can be said for substantive representation; 
if an individual does not believe that the judiciary should represent her own interests, a judge’s 
decision that goes against those interests might do nothing to the legitimacy of the institution.   
This is the essence of Expectancy Theory as developed by Gibson (2012).  Gibson’s 
Expectancy Theory states that citizens’ expectations of institutions matter when forming 
evaluations of those institutions.  He explains (2012, 90), “Legitimacy is ultimately grounded in 
the satisfaction of the expectations of the citizenry.”  If an institution, or actors within an 
institution, behave in expected ways, there will likely not be any damage to the institution’s 
legitimacy.  However, when citizens expect one thing and perceive another, legitimacy may be 
endangered.  As Gibson and Nelson (2014, 204) point out, “Should it be the case that the American 
people view the Court’s process of decision making as unacceptable (i.e., as a violation of their 
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normative expectations for how the Court ought to make its decisions), then the decision-making 
process can wind up undermining the Court’s legitimacy….” 
In addition to Gibson, several other scholars have considered how expectations affect 
institutional evaluations.  Kimball and Patterson (1997) examine the expectation-perception 
discrepancy and find that it is directly related to an individual’s expressed favorableness toward 
Congress.  Patterson, Boynton, and Hedlund (1969) find a similar relationship in a state legislative 
context.  Examining the German Federal Constitutional Court, Baird (2001) finds that expectations 
of decision-making styles affect the legitimacy of that institution.   
Confirming that expectations regarding institutions can vary considerably, Gibson (2012) 
finds that nearly one-third of respondents in Kentucky believe in majoritarianism for judicial 
decision-making and almost one-half of respondents believe that judges should be involved in 
politics since they should represent the majority.  More than two in every five (43.7%) people in 
the Kentucky study expect judges to give weight to the respondents’ own ideological views.  
Gibson and Caldeira (2009a) find similar results in the broader American public.  Unsurprisingly, 
they find that 75.5% of Americans expect fairness and impartiality in the Supreme Court.  
However, they also find that almost one-fifth of Americans believe justices should base their 
decisions on partisan preferences and almost one-third of Americans believe that justices should 
consider citizens’ ideological positions when interpreting the Constitution.   
Thus, in order to gain a more accurate understanding of whether and how descriptive and 
substantive representation affects judicial legitimacy, it is important to directly measure 
expectations that individuals hold of their state’s judges.  Only then can we determine whether 
these expectations moderate the relationship between representation and legitimacy.  The survey 
and analyses presented in the following chapters do just that. 
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3.0 CHAPTER THREE:  STATE-LEVEL AND INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL DESCRIPTIVE 
REPRESENTATION 
“When the men and women who deliver justice look more like the communities 
they serve, there is greater confidence in our justice system overall.” –Christopher 
Kang, Co-Founder and Chief Counsel of Demand Justice and former Deputy 
Counsel to President Obama, NBC News Editorial (2016)  
 
How do personal characteristics of judges, like race and gender, affect evaluations of the 
courts?  In this chapter, I assess the degree to which descriptive representation in state trial courts 
affects judicial legitimacy.  As discussed in Chapter One, this project focuses specifically on 
African American representation and female representation.  Descriptive representation is 
conceptualized as the matching of a characteristic or identity between one person and another.  
More specific to this project, descriptive representation refers to the matching of either race or 
gender (or both) between individuals and judges.  It is worth noting that only one characteristic 
between an individual and a judge need to match in order for the individual to be descriptively 
represented.  For example, a black female is descriptively represented by a black judge (regardless 
of sex), a female judge (regardless of race), and a black female judge.   
Importantly, I examine the relationship between descriptive representation and judicial 
legitimacy at two levels:  the individual-judge level and the statewide trial court level.  Doing so 
sheds light on how individuals process information about descriptive representation presented in 
various forms.  Consequently, the results could be used to assess how to most effectively present 
new information about descriptive representation to individuals in order to increase or maintain a 
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certain level of judicial legitimacy as diversity on the bench increases.  Moreover, examining both 
levels allows us to understand whether individuals who encounter a single judge in one context 
view that judge as being representative of the broader judiciary, or if the two contexts are evaluated 
separately. 
3.1 Theory and Hypotheses 
I expect that descriptive representation will affect judicial legitimacy because of the 
tendency individuals have to view in-group members more favorably than out-group members, as 
outlined by Social Identity Theory.  Moreover, in the absence of other information, individuals use 
heuristics that are available to them to help form evaluations of others, almost immediately.  The 
race and gender of judges are the heuristics that I focus on in this chapter.      
Combining the literature about social identities and the use of heuristics leads us to expect 
that the racial and gender makeup of an institution has the ability to affect an individual’s 
willingness to support that institution.  Thus, we should expect that when individuals encounter 
information where members of their own in-group are representing an institution, evaluations of 
that institution should be more positive than when an out-group member represents the institution.  
More specifically, we should see that an individual grants greater legitimacy to the court when 
presented with a judicial scenario in which the judge is a member of their “in-group” compared to 
a scenario where the judge is a member of an “out-group.”  To formalize this expectation and make 
it applicable to all of the main demographic groups I am most interested in (i.e., black and white 
males and females), I expect: 
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H1a:  A black (white) individual will grant greater legitimacy to the court when 
they read about a black (white) judge deciding a case than they will when they read 
about a white (black) judge deciding a case. 
H1b:  A female (male) will grant greater legitimacy to the court when they read 
about a female (male) judge deciding a case than they will when they read about a 
male (female) judge deciding a case.  
Given that I examine both race and gender, there is the possibility that a judge provides 
descriptive representation on both dimensions simultaneously, as noted above.  How this affects 
legitimacy in relation to the scenario in which a judge provides descriptive representation on just 
one of the dimensions may require a more nuanced examination.  I can imagine three distinct, 
admittedly mostly atheoretical, possibilities for how sharing both the race and the gender of a 
judge might affect one’s evaluations of the court compared to sharing just one of these 
characteristics. 
1. Ceiling Effect:  Legitimacy will be no greater when the judge provides descriptive 
representation on both racial and gender dimensions than when the judge provides 
descriptive representation on just one of these dimensions.  In other words, there is a 
ceiling effect of legitimacy such that it increases when any level of descriptive 
representation is provided, but does not increase any further when there are additional 
shared identities between the individual and the judge.  In this case, descriptive 
representation is similar to a binary concept:  it is either present (and consequently, 
legitimacy increases) or is absent (and legitimacy decreases). 
2. Additive Effect:  Legitimacy receives an additional boost when the judge shares both the 
race and gender of the individual compared to a situation where the judge shares just one 
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of these identities.  In other words, legitimacy consistently increases with each new 
shared identity between the judge and individual (perhaps reaching a limit or ceiling at 
some point, but not after sharing just two identities).  In this case, descriptive 
representation has a continuous, positive relationship with legitimacy:  individuals 
continue to grant more legitimacy to the court as the number of identities shared between 
the individual and the judge(s) within that court increases. 
3. Intersectional Effect:  In this case, individuals view judges who provide both racial and 
gender representation simultaneously as something altogether different than a judge who 
shares just one identity.  In other words, the intersection of the two attributes or identities 
creates a distinct evaluation that is not the same as evaluating on one dimension, then the 
other, and adding the two evaluations together.  The overall evaluation is more, and 
different, than the sum of its constituent parts.  Empirically, this case is unclear in terms 
of how judicial legitimacy would be affected.  Of course, descriptive representation is 
present, but legitimacy may increase a little (which would be a similar effect as the 
Ceiling Effect case), it may increase significantly (which would be empirically similar to 
the Additive Effect case), it may have a net null effect (perhaps one shared identity 
receives a boost but the additional shared identity receives a hit depending on how the 
individual connects with each identity, which would be indistinguishable from a situation 
where there is no relationship between descriptive representation and judicial legitimacy), 
or it may even decrease legitimacy if an individual expects something different from a 
judge that shares both her race and gender than she would from a judge that shares just 
one of these identities. 
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Although a limited number of scholars have examined the intersection of race and gender 
in a judicial context (e.g., Collins and Moyer 2008; Crenshaw 1989; Miller, Rossi, and Simpson 
1986), most studies focus on how the intersection of race and gender affect judicial behavior rather 
than institutional evaluations by the public.  Nevertheless, the issue of intersectionality focuses on 
minority women.  As Crenshaw (1992, 1467-1468) notes, black women face the “dual 
vulnerability” of racism and sexism that intersect to “create experiences that are sometimes 
unique.”  Despite there being no studies to my knowledge that examine how intersectionality 
affects feelings toward descriptive representation or judicial legitimacy, it is clear that many 
scholars agree that minority women encounter unique experiences that are not necessarily the same 
as either white women or African American men.  Thus, the Intersectional Effect discussed above 
seems to be the most plausible (and most grounded in the extant literature) case for what happens 
when individuals encounter judges who provide descriptive representation on both race and gender 
dimensions, particularly for black female respondents.  In other words, black female respondents 
evaluate black female judges in a different way than they would a white female judge or an African 
American male judge.  However, how exactly this plays out in terms of the direction and magnitude 
of the relationship between descriptive representation and legitimacy remains unclear.  The 
analyses below will shed some light on this.  
It is important to point out that the hypotheses above center on a singular judge.  The 
inherent assumption is that when the individual is faced with information about a single judge, she 
makes an evaluation based solely on that information and views that one judge as representative 
of the broader judiciary in her state trial court system.  In other words, if I am descriptively 
represented by a judge and make an evaluation of the entire court based on that one judge, I must 
think that the judge fairly represents the court or judiciary as a whole.  If I think the judge is an 
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anomaly, then my perception of the makeup of the broader judge pool may cloud my evaluation 
of the larger judiciary.  For example, consider a black male presented with information about a 
case over which a black male judge presided.  If the individual believes that particular judge is the 
only black male judge in a pool otherwise full of white male judges, the individual may view the 
court more negatively (i.e., ascribe less legitimacy) despite having read about a black male judge.   
Thus, it is important to examine separately individual-judge level representation and 
statewide descriptive representation in order to test this assumption.  While this has implications 
for the empirical strategy, I expect that the relationship works similarly in the statewide 
representation scenario as it does at the individual-judge level.  In other words, I expect: 
H2a:  As the percentage of female trial judges in a given state increases, women 
(men) will grant greater (less) legitimacy to their state’s trial courts. 
H2b:  As the percentage of African American trial judges in a given state increases, 
black (white) individuals will grant greater (less) legitimacy to their state’s trial 
courts. 
3.2 Empirical Approach 
In order to test the hypotheses, I conducted two original survey experiments.  The survey 
with the embedded experiments was conducted in the spring of 2018 using Qualtrics’ online 
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national probability sample.9,10  The survey description asked for adult U.S. citizens to participate 
in a study examining political attitudes.  All subjects were first presented with screening questions 
to ensure they met citizenship and age requirements (only U.S. citizens 18 years of age or older 
were eligible to participate).  Respondents were randomly assigned to either receive one of the two 
embedded experiments later in the survey, or to a control group that received no experiment.11  
Respondents were asked several questions about their attitudes regarding descriptive racial and 
gender representation and judicial decision-making in their state’s trial courts.12  Those assigned 
to one of the experiments were then presented with a vignette that varied across experimental 
conditions.  Finally, respondents answered questions measuring their judicial legitimacy and other 
demographic questions. 
One of the experiments examined the relationship between descriptive racial and gender 
representation and judicial legitimacy at the individual-judge level and the other experiment 
examined this relationship at the statewide institutional level.  I present the experiments below.  
First, I discuss the experiment that tests the hypotheses related to statewide trial court 
representation.  The next experiment described tests the individual-judge descriptive 
representation hypotheses and is presented second to help make a smooth transition from Chapter 
Four to Chapter Five, which focuses exclusively on the individual-judge level.   
 
9 Funded by the NSF Law and Social Sciences Program (Award 1728928) and the APSA Centennial Center Special 
Fund for Women and Politics. 
10 The sample is nationally representative aside from race due to an oversample of African Americans. 
11 The survey experiments were preregistered with EGAP prior to the survey being fielded.  The pre-analysis plan can 
be found in Appendix E. 
12 These are examined in Chapters Four and Five. 
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3.2.1 Experiment One:  Statewide Trial Court Descriptive Representation 
The state-level experiment consisted of a 2 (race/gender) x 3 (level of descriptive 
representation) between-subjects factorial design, with respondents who were assigned to this 
experiment randomly assigned to one of the six treatment conditions.13  The experimental 
conditions varied by whether the treatment conveyed information about female judges in their 
state’s trial courts or African American judges.  They also varied by the reported percentage of 
judges in their state’s trial courts that belong to each group (female or African American), with 
one treatment presenting information that underrepresents that group compared to the true national 
average, one that presents the real national average, and one that overrepresents the group 
compared to the national average.  The template vignette presented in this experiment can be found 
below.14   
[BLACK/FEMALE] JUDGES A [STRONG/WEAK] PRESENCE IN 
[RESPONDENT’S STATE] TRIAL COURTS15 
Last week, the Administrative Office of the State Court Association published its 
annual report on the composition of state trial court judges across the country.  One 
notable aspect of the report was that [African Americans/women] make up about 
[under/over/actual percent] of all [respondent’s state] trial court judges.  This 
puts [respondent’s state] [well above/well below/on par with] many other states 
 
13 See Table 1 in Appendix A for the number of respondents in each condition. 
14 Actual wording for the vignettes can be found in the blank survey instrument in Appendix D.1. 
15 The header for the treatment that involved the true national average of black/female judges read:  [Black/Female] 
Judges in [Respondent’s State] on Par with National Average. 
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in terms of [racial/gender] diversity of trial court judges, with the national average 
at [actual average].  
For the female judge conditions, the underrepresented condition (“under”) reported 10%, 
the “actual” condition was based on the 2017 national average across states of 30%, and the 
overrepresented condition (“over”) reported 50%.  For African American judge conditions, the 
“under” condition reported 1%, the “actual” condition based on 2017 data reported 7%, and the 
“over” condition reported 13%.  These numbers varied across female judge and black judge 
conditions in order to maintain believability of the vignette.  In other words, I did not want to 
present a vignette that contained information about a state trial court having 50% African American 
judges as that seemed too unrealistic given their percentage of the overall U.S. population, and 
thus potentially leading respondents to recognize the number and vignette as fictitious.  My goal 
was to present information that seemed plausible in order to measure true reactions.  All 
respondents were debriefed at the end of the survey and were informed of the actual national 
averages of female and black judges in state courts. 
Immediately after reading the vignette, each respondent was presented with a battery of 
questions that measures judicial legitimacy.  This battery consists of adaptations of questions that 
have been used in the existing literature, originally developed by Caldeira and Gibson (1992; 1995) 
and which have been shown to have a high degree of reliability (Gibson and Nelson 2015).  Table 
1 presents this battery.16  The response for each question within this battery was on a 7-point Likert-
 
16 Note that the state in which each respondent lived was piped into the text of each statement making up the judicial 
legitimacy battery so that it was clear to respondents that the statements directly referred to their own state’s trial 
courts.  See Appendix D.1 for how this appeared in the survey. 
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type scale, ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree.  The dependent variable of legitimacy 
consists of the average of the responses to all of these questions, ranging from 1 to 7, with greater 
values indicating greater legitimacy after reverse-scoring.   
 
Table 1 Measures of Legitimacy 
 
1. It is inevitable that state trial courts get mixed up in politics; therefore, we 
ought to have stronger means of controlling the actions of state trial court 
judges. 
2. State trial courts ought to be made less independent so that they listen more 
to what the people want. 
3. Judges in state trial courts who consistently make decisions at odds with 
what a majority of the people want should be removed from their position 
as judge. 
4. State trial court judges are just like any other politicians; we cannot trust 
them to decide court cases in a way that is in the best interests of our state. 
5. If state trial courts started making a lot of decisions that most people 
disagree with, it might be better to do away with state trial courts altogether. 
6. State trial courts get too mixed up in politics. 
7. The power of state trial courts to decide certain types of controversial issues 
should be reduced. 
 
 
*All items reverse-scored. 
Adapted from Caldeira and Gibson (1992; 1995). 
3.2.1.1 Experiment One (State-Level) Sample 
Overall, there were 849 respondents assigned to one of the six treatment conditions in this 
experiment.  There were 164 individuals randomly assigned to no experiment who serve as a 
control group for all of the following analyses throughout this project.  The average age for the 
experimental sample was 47 years old, with the youngest respondent being 18 and the oldest being 
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87.  I specifically requested a sample that came as close to an even split between males and females 
as possible.  There were 426 (50.2%) males and 423 (49.8%) females in this sample.  I also 
requested to oversample African Americans to ensure that I had a sufficient number of black 
respondents in each treatment group for analysis.  Since I was specifically interested in comparing 
African American to white respondents, I requested an even split across these two races as well 
(and these two races only).  Thus, the sample for this experiment included 431 (50.8%) respondents 
who identified as white only and 418 (49.2%) respondents who identified as African American 
only.  35% of the sample held at least a Bachelor’s degree.  61% of respondents at least leaned 
Democrat while 26% at least leaned Republican and almost 14% reported not leaning toward either 
major party.17   
3.2.2 Experiment Two:  Individual-Judge Descriptive Representation 
The individual-judge experiment was a 2 (judge race:  black/white) x 2 (judge gender:  
female/male) x 2 (issue importance) between-subjects factorial design.  Respondents who were 
randomly assigned to receive this experiment were then randomly assigned to one of the eight 
experimental conditions.  However, the importance of the legal issue is analyzed in Chapter Five 
when we turn to examining substantive representation.  Thus, in this chapter we can think of the 
experiment simply a 2 (judge race) x 2 (judge gender) design. 
 
17 Note that these percentages do not appear to be nationally representative, but this is due to the oversampling of 
African Americans.  When broken down by race, each racial group’s partisan makeup matches national averages quite 
closely. 
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In each experimental condition, respondents were asked to read a short vignette about a judicial 
decision made in one of their state’s trial courts.  To signal the gender of the judge in the vignette, the 
judge was first introduced by a typical male/female name and then corresponding gendered pronouns 
(e.g., his/her) were used when referring to the judge throughout the vignette.  The race of the judge 
was also signaled by name, with stereotypical black and white aliases being used (see Butler and 
Broockman 2011).18  A template for the vignette is below. 
JUDGE [JUDGE ALIAS] DECIDES CASE ON [ISSUE] 
Last Tuesday, [respondent’s state] trial court judge [judge alias] handed down a 
ruling on [issue].  In [his/her] final judgment, Judge [judge surname] ruled that 
[for/against issue].19 
Immediately after reading the vignette, respondents were presented with the same judicial 
legitimacy battery as the state-level judge experiment. 
3.2.2.1 Experiment Two (Individual-Level) Sample 
Overall, there were 1,111 individuals assigned to receive one of the four treatments in this 
experiment.20  The average age of respondents in this experiment’s sample was 47 years old, with 
the youngest respondent being 18 and the oldest being 85.  This sample included 551 (49.6%) 
 
18 For African American judges, the female was Shanice Washington and the male was Tyrone Washington.  For white 
judges, the female was Molly Mueller and the male was Connor Mueller.  Census data was used to determine these 
names, with both first and last names overwhelmingly (over 90% of all people with these names) belonging to each 
race category. 
19 Note that the for/against treatment is what will be taken up in Chapter Five.  The analysis in this chapter combines 
these groups. 
20 See Table 2 in Appendix A for the number of respondents in each condition. 
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males and 560 (50.4%) females, with 563 (50.7%) respondents identifying as white and 548 
(49.3%) respondents identifying as African American.  38% of the sample held at least a 
Bachelor’s degree.  58% of respondents at least leaned Democrat while 27% at least leaned 
Republican and 15% reported not leaning toward either major party.   
3.3 State-Level Representation Analysis and Discussion 
To examine how the relationship between descriptive representation and judicial 
legitimacy works at the state-level, I conduct a series of t-tests comparing the mean legitimacy 
levels across treatment groups in the first experiment.  Figure 4 shows the mean level of legitimacy 
for each female-judge treatment condition, separated by respondent gender.  Figure 5 shows the 
mean level of legitimacy for each black-judge treatment condition, separated by respondent race.  
Both figures include the control group as a baseline.  The “Under” bars correspond to experimental 
groups where female/black judges were underrepresented compared to the national average, the 
“Actual” bars correspond to experimental groups that presented the actual national average of 
female/black judges, and the “Over” bars correspond to experimental conditions where 
female/black judges were overrepresented in the vignette compared to the national average. 
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Figure 4 Aggregate Representation of Female Judges in R’s State Trial Courts 
 
 
Figure 5 Aggregate Representation of Black Judges in R’s State Trial Courts 
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3.3.1 Discussion of Results:  Female Judge Representation (State-Level) 
Figure 4 shows females in the control condition have an average legitimacy level of 4.00.  
When presented with information that females are underrepresented in their state’s trial courts 
compared to the national average, legitimacy is not affected.  Similarly, legitimacy is not affected 
when they read about their state being around the national average in terms of female descriptive 
representation in their state’s trial courts.  However, when presented with information that females 
make up about 50% of their state’s trial court judges (well above the national average), legitimacy 
significantly increases to 4.34 (this difference is significant at the 0.05 level when compared to the 
control and actual groups, and at the 0.10 level when compared to the underrepresented group).   
This provides partial support to hypothesis 2a, which predicted that women will grant 
greater legitimacy to the courts as the percentage of female judges increases.  Legitimacy increases 
when women are represented the most out of all of the possible scenarios, but this increase is not 
constant as we go from lowest level of representation of females to highest.  I can think of a few 
explanations for these results.  First, it is likely that female respondents know that females make 
up around half of the population (this assumption will be examined directly in Chapter Four).  If 
female respondents want true descriptive representation on their state’s bench, then any percentage 
of female judges that does not meet at least the 50% mark falls short of descriptive representation.  
This might explain why we see no significant differences between the control group, the 
underrepresented group, and the actual group.   
Second, females might expect (empirically) females to be underrepresented compared to 
their percentage of the population, as they are in many areas of politics and government.  This 
might explain why we see no difference between the control group and the two lower-
representation experimental groups.  Since the percentages presented in both experimental groups 
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are in line with what females expect, empirically, from the judiciary, there is no effect on 
legitimacy.  However, the overrepresented condition goes against their empirical expectations in 
a positive direction.  That is, the overrepresented condition might be more in line with their 
normative expectations (i.e., that their descriptive representation in the judiciary should be 
proportionate to their representation in the general population).  Thus, since their normative 
expectations are met, legitimacy gets a boost in this condition.  Again, expectations will be 
discussed in greater detail in the proceeding chapters. 
For male respondents, legitimacy does not appear to be affected when presented with 
aggregate information about female descriptive representation in their state’s trial courts.  
Legitimacy appears to drop slightly in the underrepresented and overrepresented groups compared 
to the control group and the actual group.  At first glance, this looks like males want females to 
have some descriptive representation in the judiciary (more than being significantly 
underrepresented anyway).  Once females start receiving too much descriptive representation (i.e., 
when they are overrepresented compared to the national average) in the courts, perhaps males start 
feeling threatened as this necessarily means that their own descriptive representation is being 
decreased.  However, none of these differences reach statistical significance so the prediction from 
hypothesis 2a that males will decrease legitimacy as the percentage of female judges increases 
cannot be confirmed.  Importantly, however, this is good news for those most interested in 
diversifying state benches.  The judiciary will not suffer a loss of legitimacy (from neither men 
nor women) as the number of female judges continues to increase, even to the point of matching 
their proportion in the general population.  
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3.3.2  Discussion of Results:  African American Judge Representation (State-Level)  
Figure 5 shows that for black respondents, legitimacy is highest in the condition where 
black judges in their state’s trial courts are on par with the national average of 7%.  Legitimacy is 
significantly higher in this condition than in every other condition, including when black judges 
are overrepresented compared to the national average.  The difference is statistically significant at 
the 0.05 level between the actual group and both the underrepresented and overrepresented groups, 
and at the 0.10 level between the actual group and the control group.  There are no other significant 
differences when doing any other pairwise between-group comparisons.   
Similar to females in hypothesis 2a, these results partially confirm hypothesis 2b, which 
predicted that black respondents would increase legitimacy of the courts as the percentage of black 
judges in their state increased.  We see this happening as we move from the underrepresented 
treatment condition to the actual average treatment condition.  This trend does not hold, however, 
as we move from the actual average treatment condition to the overrepresented treatment 
condition.   
What might explain these results?  It’s possible that black respondents want true descriptive 
representation (i.e., descriptive representation that is proportionate to their representation in the 
general public), but they may fear some sort of backlash from others if the number of black judges 
is far above the national average.  In other words, they may want to be descriptively represented, 
but they do not want the level of African American representation on their state’s bench to reach 
a point where others start feeling threatened.  They want their state’s level of descriptive 
representation to be on par with the national average so as not to appear an outlier and draw 
unwanted attention.  Another possibility, like with females in the above results, is that the actual 
average group meets black respondents’ descriptive expectations.  The underrepresented and 
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overrepresented treatments might violate their expectations, causing them to maintain their level 
of legitimacy that they would ascribe to the court in the absence of the information provided in the 
vignette altogether.   
Finally, for white respondents, the percentage of black judges in their state’s trial courts 
does not affect their evaluations of court legitimacy at all.  There are no significant differences 
across any of the treatment conditions or the control group.  Here again, this is great news for 
advocates of increased diversity on state benches.  If the first possible explanation discussed above 
for why we see no increase in legitimacy when African Americans are overrepresented on the 
bench is true, the results from white respondents tell us that this fear of backlash might be 
unwarranted.   
3.4 Individual-Level Representation Analysis and Discussion 
In order to test the hypotheses related to descriptive representation at the individual-judge 
level, I conduct a series of similar t-tests that compare the mean level of legitimacy across the 
various conditions in the second experiment, grouped and separated by the race and gender of 
judges and respondents as appropriate.  As a first step, I compare the mean level of legitimacy 
across gender groups (Figure 6) and race groups (Figure 7) at the individual-judge level.   
At first glance, Figure 6 seems to offer some support to hypothesis 1b, which states that a 
female (male) will grant greater legitimacy to the court when a female (male) judge decides the 
case compared to when a male (female) judge decides the case.  We see in these results that female 
respondents do indeed grant slightly greater legitimacy to the court in the female-judge treatment 
and males grant slightly greater legitimacy to the court in the male-judge treatment.  However, the 
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t-tests reveal that the differences are not statistically significant between the treatment conditions 
for either gender of respondent.   
Figure 7 compares the mean legitimacy across treatment conditions of black and white 
judges, and the exact same pattern found in Figure 6 emerges.  Black respondents grant slightly 
more legitimacy to the court in the black-judge condition and white respondents grant slightly 
more legitimacy in the white-judge treatment.  Here again, however, neither of these differences 
is statistically significant, so there does not appear to be much support for hypothesis 1a. 
 
 
Figure 6 Mean Legitimacy by Respondent Race 
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Figure 7 Mean Legitimacy by Respondent Sex 
 
3.4.1 Discussion of Results:  Race and Gender Combined (Individual-Level)  
Note that the figures in the preceding section only consider one identity at a time: race or 
gender.  In order to see a more nuanced picture of the results, and to examine how intersectionality 
of identities works, I break these figures down further in Figures 8 through 11.  Figure 8 presents 
the mean legitimacy level for black female respondents across each judge treatment (black female, 
black male, white female, white male), Figure 9 does the same for black male respondents, Figure 
10 for white female respondents, and Figure 11 for white male respondents.  Each figure also 
includes the mean level of legitimacy for the control group to serve as a baseline reference. 
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Figure 8 Mean Legitimacy - Black Female Respondents 
 
 




Figure 10 Mean Legitimacy - White Female Respondents 
 
 
Figure 11 Mean Legitimacy - White Male Respondents 
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3.4.1.1 Results for White Male Respondents (Individual-Level Desc. Rep.) 
For white males, Figure 11 shows a pattern consistent with what was predicted in 
hypothesis 1b.  In the baseline, the mean level of legitimacy is 4.52.  After reading about a court 
case where the judge decides in the opposite direction of the individual’s preference on an issue, 
legitimacy decreases regardless of the race and gender of the judge.21  However, when the judge 
is also a white male, legitimacy decreases the least (and the difference is only significant at the 
0.10 level), followed by when the judge is a black male (difference significant at the 0.05 level).  
Legitimacy decreases even more when the judge is a white female (significant at the 0.05 level), 
and legitimacy is lowest when the judge is a black female (difference significant at the 0.01 level).   
When a white male judge decides the case, legitimacy only drops by about 9.7% whereas 
when the judge is a black female, legitimacy drops by about 17.3%.  White male respondents 
punish the court (in terms of legitimacy) nearly twice as harshly when the judge is a black female 
and they are provided with no descriptive representation than when the judge provides descriptive 
representation on both race and gender dimensions.  Thus, it appears as though white males follow 
a pattern most similar to the Additive Effect case discussed above.  Legitimacy gets a boost from 
sharing one identity with the judge (either race or gender), and get an additional boost when both 
identities are shared.  When neither identity is shared, legitimacy suffers the most. 
 
21 Why the vignette contained a decision in opposition to the respondent’s preferences will be addressed in Chapter 
Four. 
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3.4.1.2 Results for White Female Respondents (Individual-Level Desc. Rep.) 
For white female respondents (Figure 10), legitimacy is affected much less by the race and 
gender of the judge, despite the graph showing a pattern similar to what we would expect.  When 
there is a black female judge, black male judge, and white male judge, legitimacy is not 
significantly different from the control group.  When there is a white female judge, however, 
legitimacy increases significantly (at the 0.10 level) from the control group.  In other words, for 
white females, when presented with information about a judge deciding against their preferences, 
legitimacy is not affected in most cases.  However, when the individual is descriptively represented 
on both the race and gender dimensions, legitimacy actually increases despite the judge deciding 
against the individual’s preferences. 
Thinking back to the state-level experiment, these results seem to fit well with the results 
for women who read about the number of female judges in their state’s judiciary.  In that 
experiment, legitimacy significantly increased only in the treatment where women were 
overrepresented compared to the national average.  Here, we see legitimacy increases significantly 
for white women who read about a white female judge deciding a case. 
3.4.1.3 Results for Black Male Respondents (Individual-Level Desc. Rep.) 
For black male respondents (Figure 9), legitimacy also decreases in every case when a 
judge decides against their preferences.  Similar to white males, black males punish the court least 
when the judge provides descriptive representation on both race and gender dimensions.  However, 
this difference is not significantly different from the control group.  In fact, the only condition 
where the difference in legitimacy compared to the control group comes close to statistical 
significance (at the 0.10 level) is when the judge is a white male.  In fact, the lowest level of 
legitimacy granted to the court across all treatment conditions and across all combinations of race 
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and gender among respondents is when black males read about a case decided by a white male 
judge.   
Like white males and white females, black males punish the court the least when the judge 
who decides against their preferences shares both racial and gender identities with them.  
Interestingly, black males punish the court the most even when a judge shares one identity (i.e., 
gender in the white male judge treatment).  This differs from white males who punish the court 
most when the judge differs on both racial and gender identities (i.e., black female judges).  
Comparing across these three groups (white males, white females, and black males), it appears as 
though descriptive racial representation is more important to black males than descriptive gender 
representation as they punish the court more harshly when the judge does not share their race 
(regardless of gender).  For white males and females, it appears as though descriptive gender 
representation is more important as both groups punish the court least in the treatment conditions 
where the judge shares their gender (regardless of race). 
3.4.1.4 Results for Black Female Respondents (Individual-Level Desc. Rep.) 
Black female respondents (Figure 8) exhibit a pattern that is the most dissimilar to any of 
the other three groups examined.  Legitimacy appears to decrease in every experimental condition, 
but the only condition that is statistically different (at the 0.05 level) from the control group is the 
black female judge treatment.  Black females only punish the court significantly when the judge 
shares both their race and gender.  When the judge shares only one identity or neither identity, 
legitimacy is not significantly affected.  In fact, this is the complete opposite of white females who 
actually reward the court significantly when the judge shares both their race and gender.  Indeed, 
as just stated in the preceding section, every other demographic group examined punishes the court 
the least when the judge shares both their race and gender.   
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It also appears that black female respondents are similar to black male respondents in that 
descriptive racial representation appears to be more important than descriptive gender 
representation.  Here, however, black females punish the court the most when the judge shares 
their race (regardless of gender) whereas black male judges punish the court the least when the 
judge shares their race (regardless of gender).  Going back to the discussion of results for the state-
level experiment, I suspect the reason for this has something to do with a violation of expectations.  
Black females may have strong associations with other in-group members who share both their 
race and gender (perhaps stronger than the other groups examined here).  Consequently, they may 
have the highest expectations of and feelings of similarity with other black females.  When a black 
female reads about another in-group member acting in a way that is contrary to her own 
preferences, their strongly held expectation is violated, and they end up reacting most negatively 
(by punishing the court the most harshly in this case).   
3.5 Descriptive Representation Conclusion 
Overall, the results presented in this chapter show that descriptive representation does 
indeed affect judicial legitimacy, but that the strength and the direction of the relationship is highly 
contextual.  In general, on an individual-judge level, descriptive representation protects against 
negative consequences of judges deciding against an individual’s preferences.  However, it appears 
that in most cases, the judge needs to provide descriptive representation on both race and gender 
dimensions in order for legitimacy not to decrease significantly.  This is particularly true for white 
females, who actually ascribe greater legitimacy to the courts when they encounter cases with 
white female judges.  However, this is not the case for black females.  In fact, black females 
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actually punish the court most when a black female judge makes a decision against their 
preferences, which seems to support the Intersectional Effect discussed above.  This is also 
consistent with other studies examining intersectionality in that it appears that black females have 
unique experiences, including with the judicial system, that affects their views and evaluations of 
descriptive representation in the courts. 
Moreover, in looking at the state-level analysis, it appears that the representation of females 
in state trial courts only affects legitimacy among females.  Only when females are overrepresented 
compared to the national average does legitimacy increase.  Interestingly, this means that as female 
representation continues to grow on the bench, and even approaches gender parity, legitimacy 
overall will likely increase since this does not appear to reduce legitimacy among males either.  
These results confirm that increasing the descriptive representation of women would have no 
negative effect on judicial legitimacy.   
For African Americans, however, the story is a bit more complex.  The results here tell us 
that African Americans prefer descriptive racial representation among their state’s trial court 
judges to be on par with the national average of 7% rather than above that number.  However, it is 
impossible to determine from this study whether this means that African Americans prefer the 
percentage of their state’s judges who are black to be around 7% or merely to be around the 
national average (which may increase or decrease from 7% over time).  As mentioned above, it is 
possible that black respondents reading about African Americans being overrepresented in their 
state’s courts compared to the national average (i.e., black respondents in the overrepresented 
group) may be concerned about backlash if others (e.g., white individuals) read this same 
information and take it to mean that their own representation is being threatened.  Thus, legitimacy 
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among black respondents in this group is not increased from when their representation is at the 
national average (and do not pose an obvious threat to the representation of white individuals).   
It is also possible that black respondents in the overrepresented treatment group do not see 
increased substantive representation for members of their racial in-group.  If black respondents see 
African Americans receiving disproportionately negative outcomes in the courts (see Overby et. 
al. 2005), then reading about a high number of black judges in their state (compared to the national 
average) means that even black judges may not be helping members of their own racial in-group.  
In other words, increased descriptive representation may not translate into increased substantive 
representation for some respondents.  Therefore, legitimacy will not increase significantly until 
they see a meaningful change in the outcomes produced by their state’s judges.  Regardless of the 
reason for why legitimacy is not increased consistently as the percentage of black judges increases, 
the good news is that legitimacy is also not harmed, even as the percentage of judges who are black 
reaches the percentage of African Americans in the overall population in the U.S. (about 13%).  
This is true even among white individuals.   
Overall, the findings in this chapter indicate that individuals do differ in how they evaluate 
the courts based on whether they are presented with information about one judge or about their 
state’s judicial system more broadly.  In the aggregate, reporting increased numbers of descriptive 
representation for females and African Americans does not appear to have a negative effect on 
judicial legitimacy, and may even increase it.  When given information about particular cases, 
however, judicial legitimacy has the potential to suffer.  While descriptive representation can guard 
against the negative backlash from an adverse decision in some cases, there are times where 
descriptive representation can actually exacerbate this backlash.   
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These results tell us that descriptive representation is indeed important to individuals.  The 
strongest effects that descriptive representation had on legitimacy occurred in instances where the 
identity or identities between the respondent and the judge matched.  In the state-level experiment, 
females’ willingness to grant legitimacy to the court was affected much more than that of male 
respondents when reading about the number of women in the judiciary.  Similarly, black 
respondents’ willingness to grant legitimacy to the court was affected much more than that of white 
respondents when reading about the number of African Americans in the judiciary.  In the 
individual-level experiment, all four groups of respondents responded most strongly when the 
judge shared both their race and gender.  While some of the effects appear to be small, the fact that 
legitimacy (i.e., diffuse support built up over time) can be budged at all by simply presenting 
information about the race and gender of a judge is quite surprising and shows just how important 
descriptive representation is to individuals.   
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4.0 CHAPTER FOUR:  EXPECTATIONS OF DESCRIPTIVE REPRESENTATION 
“Our court system should be filled with judges who not only are intelligent, 
thoughtful, and faithful to the rule of law, but also bring diversity of experience and 
background…It is critical that when people access our courthouses, they see people 
at all levels of the court system that look like them.  When the only people of color 
in a courthouse are in handcuffs, the public’s perception of Justice is ‘Just Us.’” -
Yvette McGee Brown, Former Supreme Court of Ohio Justice22 
 
As the previous chapter showed, descriptive representation can affect an individual’s 
propensity to grant legitimacy to their state’s judicial system.  Rather than accepting that and 
moving on, this chapter aims to take a deeper dive into understanding individuals’ opinions on 
descriptive representation and how these affect the relationship between descriptive representation 
and judicial legitimacy.  More specifically, this chapter aims to answer the following questions: 
1. What level of descriptive representation do individuals expect from their judges? 
2. Do these expectations moderate the relationship between actual level of descriptive 
representation and legitimacy ascribed to the court, and if so, how? 
Importantly, by incorporating individuals’ expectations of what level of representation 
should exist in their state’s trial courts, this chapter addresses a shortcoming of past scholarship in 
this area.  As Gibson notes (2012, 11), “One mistake that those who think about…judges and their 
 
22 Foreword in “Building a Diverse Bench:  A Guide for Judicial Nominating Commissioners.”  Available at 
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/Building_Diverse_Bench.pdf.  
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constituents sometimes make is to assume uniformity in the expectations citizens hold of the 
judiciary.”  Indeed, Gibson’s study uncovers significant variation across individuals in their 
expectations of judges.  Thus, incorporating individual expectations into analyses of court 
evaluations provides a much more nuanced view of the relationship between representation and 
evaluations than previous research can provide. 
4.1 Theory and Hypothesis 
Like much of the extant literature, the hypotheses in the previous chapter assume that 
individuals hold similar expectations regarding the demographic makeup, or level of descriptive 
representation, of the judiciary.  In other words, they assume that individuals value having a 
member of their in-group as a judge, or at least that other considerations will not diminish the 
effect that descriptive representation has on evaluations of the institution.  This becomes much 
clearer when we think about the aggregate composition of the judiciary.  For example, based on 
the above expectation, a woman would be less supportive of the judiciary if she believes that only 
2% of judges are female compared to if she believes that 30% of judges are female.  The more in-
group members, the more likely she is to be supportive than an alternative makeup of the institution 
with fewer in-group members.   
However, this may not be the case for everybody.  As Gibson (2012) discusses, this 
assumption of uniformity in expectations is problematic because individuals vary widely in the 
expectations they have of the courts and judges.  For example, Gibson and Caldeira (2009a) find 
that a large majority of Americans expect fairness and impartiality in the Supreme Court.  At the 
same time, they find that a significant portion of Americans are also comfortable with justices 
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basing their decisions on their partisanship, as well as considering the public’s ideological 
preferences in their decision-making.  Gibson (2012) finds similar results in his study on the 
Kentucky Supreme Court.  Almost half of the respondents in this study believe that judges should 
be involved in politics since they should represent the majority.  Chapter Five will also present 
evidence along these same lines.  In other words, not an insignificant portion of Americans believe 
that judges should do more than strictly adhere to and apply the law when deciding cases.  While 
some individuals do believe judges should be neutral arbiters of the law, and thus may not be 
affected by the race or gender of the judge, others recognize that there are other factors that may 
come into play when judges make decisions. 
Recall from Chapter Two that Expectancy Theory states most simply that expectations 
matter, and several scholars have shown that expectations affect institutional evaluations (e.g., 
Baird 2001; Kimball and Patterson 1997; Patterson, Boynton, and Hedlund 1969).  Thus, an 
important condition to add to the hypotheses from Chapter Three is: 
H3:  Normative expectations of descriptive representation among judges will 
moderate the relationship between descriptive representation and legitimacy such 
that the greater descriptive representation an individual expects, the greater impact 
the actual level of descriptive representation received will affect legitimacy. 
4.2 Empirical Approach 
In order to test the hypothesis, I build on the analyses conducted in Chapter Three by 
incorporating individuals’ descriptive representation expectations into the examination of levels 
of legitimacy across the relevant treatment conditions.  Recall that prior to study participants being 
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presented with a vignette in one of the two embedded experiments in the Qualtrics survey 
discussed in Chapter Three, they were asked several questions about their attitudes regarding 
descriptive racial and gender representation in their state’s trial courts.23  Specifically for the 
analyses presented in this chapter, subjects were asked what percentage of their state’s trial court 
judges they believe should be African American or women (in separate questions).   
It is important to note here that I conceptualize expectations normatively for this project.  
In other words, I am interested in the levels of descriptive representation that individuals would 
like to see in their state’s courts rather than what level of representation they think actually exists 
in the real world.  While I believe it is important for future work to also consider empirical 
expectations of judicial representation and how these might affect legitimacy, I focus only on 
normative here for brevity.  To measure normative descriptive representation expectations, the 
questions were phrased to respondents as: 
On the slider below, please indicate the percentage of judges in [respondent’s 
state]’s trial courts that you believe should be African American/women, regardless 
of what you believe the actual percentage is in real life.  This is your opinion so 
there is no correct answer. 
I believe about ___% of judges in [respondent’s state]’s trial courts should be 
African American/women. 
Respondents were presented with a slider underneath the question that they could set anywhere 
from 0 to 100 to fill in the blank in the last statement.  The slider had to be moved in order to be 
 
23 Funded by the NSF Law and Social Sciences Program (Award 1728928) and the APSA Centennial Center Special 
Fund for Women and Politics. 
 65 
recorded so respondents could not just proceed to the next question without clicking on the slider 
and dragging it to their answer.  Following these attitudinal questions, respondents were then 
presented with the vignettes for one of the two surveys discussed in Chapter Three (except for the 
control group that did not receive a vignette).   
4.2.1 Overall Survey Sample 
While the individual samples for each of the two experiments are the same as in Chapter 
Three, I present descriptive information here for the entire sample (both experimental samples 
combined plus the control group).  I do this because the questions about representation 
expectations were presented to all respondents, regardless of the experiment (or control group) 
they were assigned.  Overall, there were 2,124 individuals who took the survey:  164 in the control 
group, 1,111 assigned to the individual-level experiment, and 849 assigned to the state-level 
experiment.  The average age of respondents in the full sample was 47 years old, with the youngest 
respondent being 18 and the oldest being 87.  As mentioned, I specifically requested a sample that 
came as close to an even split between males and females as possible.  1,069 (50.33%) respondents 
identified as female and 1,055 (49.67%) identified as male.  Similarly, 1,037 (48.82%) respondents 
identified as African American only and 1,087 (51.18%) respondents identified as white only.  
Almost 37% of the sample held at least a Bachelor’s degree.  59% of respondents at least leaned 
Democrat while 26% at least leaned Republican and 15% identified as being independent.24   
 
24 Note that there are virtually no differences between the individual experimental samples and the sample overall, 
indicating random assignment worked properly.  Also note, as I did in Chapter Three, that the breakdown for some of 
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4.3 Analyses and Discussion 
Descriptive results for the questions about descriptive representation expectations are 
worth examining on their own first before analyzing how these expectations might moderate the 
effect of real descriptive representation on judicial legitimacy.   
4.3.1 Discussion of Results:  Descriptive Representation Expectations 
Figures 12 and 13 present the responses from the questions about descriptive representation 
expectations for African American judges and female judges, respectively. 
 
 
these characteristics does not appear to be nationally representative, but this is due to the oversampling of African 
Americans.  When broken down by race, everything aligns with national averages quite closely. 
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Figure 12 Descriptive Representation Expectations for Black Judges 
 
 
Figure 13 Descriptive Representation Expectations for Women Judges 
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Of the four groups of respondents presented, white males report the lowest percentage of 
judges who they believe should be African American at about 32%, followed by white females 
who believe about 37% of judges should be African American.  This takes a significant leap for 
black male and female respondents, with the former believing 45% of their state’s trial court judges 
should be African American and the latter believing that this number should be about 46%.  The 
difference between black male respondents and black female respondents is not statistically 
significant, but every other comparison between groups is statistically significant (i.e., the 
difference between white male and white female respondents, as well as the difference between 
each of the white respondent groups and the black respondent groups, is statistically significant). 
For descriptive representation of females, black females are once again the group of 
respondents that reports the highest numbers.  Black females believe that just over 44% of judges 
should be female, followed by white females at just under 44%.  The average for black male 
respondents is 41%, and finally white males believe that almost 40% of their state’s trial court 
judges should be women.  The differences here between the female respondent groups (both races) 
and the male respondent groups (both races) are statistically significant, but the differences 
between racial groups of the same sex are not statistically significant.   
This information aligns quite well with what we saw in Chapter Three.  Recall that for 
white respondents, gender seems to be more important than race in terms of descriptive 
representation and its effect on judicial legitimacy.  Here, we see that both white males and white 
females believe the percentage of female judges should be higher than the percentage of African 
American judges.  Similarly, for both African American males and African American females, 
racial representation appears to be more important than gender representation as both groups 
believe there should be higher percentages of African American judges than female judges.   
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Moreover, the graphs show that the groups that are most prominent in the experimental 
vignettes (females and African Americans) both want greater descriptive representation.  The two 
African American respondent groups want more African American judges than the two white 
respondent groups and the two female respondent groups want more female judges than the two 
male respondent groups.  It is interesting to note that while black female respondents want to see 
the highest levels of both gender and racial representation among judges, when they are presented 
with a scenario that involves a judge that is representative on both identities, this is the instance 
where they punish the court most significantly if the judge rules against their preferences (see 
Chapter Three). 
Further, it is incredible to note that every demographic group believes that African 
Americans should be represented among judges at significantly higher levels than the percentage 
of African Americans in the broader U.S. population.  While African Americans only make up 
about 12-13% of the U.S. population, even the group with the lowest normative expectation of 
African American descriptive representation among judges (i.e., white males) believes that African 
Americans should be represented in their state’s courts at nearly three times (~32%) their presence 
in the general population!  The opposite is true with female judges.  Even the group that would 
like to see the highest numbers of female judges (i.e., black females) believes that just 44% of 
judges in their state’s trial courts should be female despite females making up nearly 51% of the 
general population. 
Why might this be the case?  In the case of African American judges, these results may be 
partially explained by a social desirability bias, whereby respondents (particularly white 
respondents) indicate a percentage that is much higher than their true beliefs in order for their 
results to be viewed more favorably.  Another highly plausible explanation is that most individuals 
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largely overestimate the number of African Americans in the general population.  This is likely in 
part due to the overrepresentation of African Americans in the mass media (e.g., Entman and 
Rojecki 2000; Gilens 1999).  Indeed, I can verify that this is true with my survey.  After asking 
about their representation expectations, I asked respondents what they believed the real proportion 
of African Americans is in the general population.  The mean percentage for all respondents was 
39.6% (42.4% was the mean for black respondents and 37.0% was the mean for white 
respondents).  It is clear that the perception that most individuals have, both black and white, about 
the racial makeup of the general population does not match reality.  Moreover, this makes sense 
of the descriptive racial representation expectations presented in Figure 12.  Both black and white 
respondents come close to wanting African Americans to be represented on the bench in proportion 
to what they believe to be their proportion of the general population. 
The case of female judges seems to be a bit different.  When asked about the proportion of 
the general population that is female, respondents seemed to come quite close to matching the 
correct number of 50-51%.  The mean for female respondents on this question was 50.4% and the 
mean for male respondents was 48.6%.  This seems quite unsurprising as the fact that women make 
up about half of the general population seems to be much more common knowledge than the racial 
composition of the United States.  Here again, the representation expectations for female judges 
comes close to matching the proportion of females in the general population, but the gap between 
perceived general population representation and expected judicial representation is a bit wider for 
gender than it is for race.  White male respondents, for example, believe that the proportion of 
judges that are female in their state should be about 9 percentage points lower than what they 
believe the proportion of females to be in the general population.  For black judges, this gap is 
only about 2.5 percentage points (between the proportion of judges in their state that they believe 
 71 
should be African American compared to what they believe the proportion of African Americans 
to be in the general population).   
One possibility for this might be that male respondents want females to have representation 
up to a certain point, but not at the expense of their own representation.  If female representation 
increases, that automatically means that male representation decreases.  Male respondents might 
want to keep a buffer between the numbers of male and female judges to ensure that they still keep 
their majority status in the judiciary.   
This same argument could also be applied to African American judicial representation.  
White respondents are willing to believe that black judges in their state should be close to 
proportionate with their numbers in the general population, but only because this number still 
maintains a comfortable majority of white judges.  In other words, their own representation is not 
threatened by the numbers represented in their expectations.   
For female respondents, it is less clear why their expectations of judicial gender 
representation are still six to seven percentages points less than the proportion of females in the 
general population.  One possible explanation might be that their normative expectation of 
numbers of female judges in already an increase compared to what they believe the real number 
of female judges in their state’s courts to be.  In other words, their expectation of representation is 
still better than what they believe exists currently and that might be good enough.  Another possible 
explanation is that women downplay their actual normative representation expectations in the 
survey. 
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4.3.2 Discussion of Results:  Moderating Effects of Expectations on the Relationship 
between Descriptive Representation and Judicial Legitimacy 
How do the differences in expectations presented in the preceding section affect the impact 
that descriptive representation has on judicial legitimacy?  In order to examine this, I examine the 
marginal differences in the levels of legitimacy between experimental treatments in both of the 
experiments presented in Chapter Three.  The first set of figures (Figures 14-17) examines these 
differences for the state-level experiment and the second set of figures (Figures 18-21) examines 
these differences for the individual-level experiment.   
More specifically, Figures 14 and 15 present the marginal differences in legitimacy at each 
level of descriptive racial representation expectation between the three experimental groups that 
contained state-level information about African American judges:  one in which black judges were 
underrepresented compared to the national average, one in which black judges were represented 
at the same level as the actual national average, and one in which black judges were 
overrepresented compared to the national average.  The condition in which black judges were 
underrepresented serves as the baseline or reference category to which the other two groups are 
compared.  Figures 16 and 17 do the exact same but for the three experimental conditions that 
involve female judges.  Here, too, the condition in which female judges were underrepresented 
compared to the national average serves as the baseline reference group. 
The final set of figures (Figures 18 and 19) presents the moderating effects of descriptive 
representation expectations on the relationship between descriptive representation and judicial 
legitimacy in the individual-level experiment (Experiment Two) presented in Chapter Three.  
Figure 18 shows the results for black respondents in the African American judge treatments.  
Figure 19 shows the results for female respondents in the women judge treatments. 
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4.3.2.1 State-Level Experiment:  Moderating Effects of Descriptive Representation 
Expectations for African American Judges 
Figure 14 shows the differences in legitimacy at each level of descriptive representation 
expectation for black respondents in the African American judge treatment conditions.  Figure 15 
presents the same information for white respondents. 
 
 
Figure 14 Legitimacy Differences by Descriptive Representation Expectations, State-Level African American 
Judges, Black Respondents 
 
For black respondents, it appears that the effect of descriptive representation on legitimacy 
does vary based on expected level of descriptive representation.  Black respondents who are 
presented with information about the number of African American judges in their state being on 
par with the national average grant more legitimacy to the court than when they are presented with 
information about the number of African American judges in their state being both lower and 
higher than the national average.  This is in line with the results presented in Chapter Three.   
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However, what the previous chapter could not show is that this is driven entirely by 
individuals whose representation expectations are between around 20% and 50%.  Only at these 
levels of representation expectations are the differences between the experimental conditions 
statistically significant.  As we get closer to the extremes of normative expectations of 
representation, there appears to be no differences in legitimacy across any of the treatment 
conditions.  That said, it is important to note that there are far fewer respondents whose 
expectations are at the extremes, thus making the point estimates here less precise (hence the larger 
confidence intervals) than the more moderate expectations. 
 
Figure 15 Legitimacy Differences by Descriptive Representation Expectations, State-Level African American 
Judges, White Respondents 
 
For white respondents, their descriptive representation expectation for black judges does 
not appear to have any effect on differences in legitimacy levels across the treatment conditions.  
At first glance, it appears that white respondents who want to see higher levels of African 
Americans in their state’s courts do grant greater legitimacy to the judiciary when they read about 
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their state being on par with the national average or when African American judges are 
overrepresented compared to the national average.  In other words, legitimacy increases for white 
respondents who want higher numbers of black judges in their state as they read about more judges 
in their state being black versus reading about African Americans being underrepresented on their 
state’s bench.  However, none of these differences are statistically significant.  Similar to what we 
saw in Chapter Three, it appears as though descriptive representation expectations matter more for 
individuals whose descriptive representation is the subject of what is being presented to them:  in 
this case, black respondents reading about the number of black judges in their state.   
4.3.2.2 State-Level Experiment:  Moderating Effects of Descriptive Representation 
Expectations for Women Judges 
Figures 16 and 17 show the same analysis as the preceding sections but for the state-level 
experimental conditions involving female judges.  Figure 16 shows the results for female 




Figure 16 Legitimacy Differences by Descriptive Representation Expectations, State-Level Women Judges, 
Female Respondents 
 
As a reminder, the reference group is the condition in which women judges are 
underrepresented compared to the national average.  Figure 16 shows that as descriptive 
representation expectations increase, female respondents are more likely to grant legitimacy to the 
court in the condition where females are overrepresented on the bench compared to when females 
are underrepresented on the bench.  Again, we saw this in Chapter Three.  However, the graph 
here shows that this is driven entirely by females who expect the highest numbers of female judges.  
Only once we get to the 50% point for descriptive representation expectations do these differences 
in legitimacy emerge.  In other words, descriptive representation affects those female respondents 
who expect the highest levels of descriptive representation, exactly as hypothesis three suggests.  
For females who do not expect as much descriptive representation, it does not make much of a 
difference in terms of legitimacy what information they are presented with regarding the numbers 
of judges who are female in their state’s trial courts. 
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Figure 17 Legitimacy Differences by Descriptive Representation Expectations, State-Level Women Judges, 
Male Respondents 
 
For male respondents, we see a somewhat different pattern emerge.  In this case, the 
condition in which female judges in the respondent’s state are on par with the national average 
behaves similarly to the overrepresented condition for female respondents.  Legitimacy increases 
more for male respondents who expect higher numbers of women in the judiciary when they read 
about their state being on par with the national average for female representation on the bench than 
compared to when they read about their state being below the national average.  Again, this is 
consistent with the pattern expected by hypothesis three, however the differences in legitimacy 
here are not statistically significant. 
The opposite is true for males who read about females being overrepresented on their 
state’s bench.  As they expect greater numbers of female judges, legitimacy actually decreases 
when they are presented with information about females being overrepresented on the bench 
compared to the national average.  Again, this may be because they begin to feel as though their 
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own representation is being threatened, even if they gave a socially desirable answer for the 
question about their normative expectations of female representation.  That being said, here again, 
the differences are not statistically significant across any of the treatment groups at any level of 
representation expectation.  Similar to the preceding section regarding race, it appears as though 
representation expectations matter more to those whose representation is being explicitly discussed 
in the vignettes (i.e., female respondents reading about female representation in this case). 
4.3.2.3 Individual-Level Experiment:  Moderating Effects of Descriptive Representation 
Expectations for African American Judges 
Figure 18 shows the differences between the average legitimacy levels among black 
respondents presented with a scenario with a black judge and black respondents presented with a 
scenario with a white judge, by normative expectation level.   
As the graph shows, legitimacy does indeed differ significantly at different levels of 
normative expectations.  Black respondents who expect lower levels of descriptive racial 
representation among judges ascribe greater legitimacy to the courts when reading about a case 
with a black judge than when they read about a case with a white judge.  Similarly, black 
respondents who believe there should be greater descriptive racial representation among judges 




Figure 18 Legitimacy Differences by Descriptive Representation Expectations, Individual-Level African 
American Judges, Black Respondents 
 
This seems counterintuitive, and is the opposite of what was expected.  We would expect 
to see that when normative expectations are confirmed (e.g., when I want more black judges and 
then I see a black judge deciding a case), legitimacy is higher than when my expectation is violated 
(e.g., when I want more black judges and then see a white judge deciding a case).  How can we 
make sense of this?  Recall that in every scenario, the judge decides against an individual’s policy 
preferences since this is the “objection precondition” necessary to test the strength of legitimacy 
(Gibson 2012).25  Thus, a possible explanation for this seemingly counterintuitive result is that 
African Americans who would like to see more black judges in the courts want to see this because 
they believe it will also increase their substantive representation. 
 
25 This is discussed in greater detail in Chapter Five. 
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In other words, these individuals want more black judges because they believe black judges 
will decide cases in ways that align with their policy preferences more than white judges would.  
In this scenario, then, the respondents who want to see a black judge see a black judge, but the 
judge violates their substantive representation preferences.  Thus, legitimacy is decreased even 
more than when a white judge makes the same decision because they would not expect the white 
judge to provide substantive representation in the first place so their expectations were not violated.  
This also helps explain the results above in this chapter and in Chapter Three where African 
American females want the highest levels of descriptive representation, but punish the court the 
most when these representative judges rule against their policy preferences. 
Note that I do not include the results for white respondents here.  I ran the same analysis 
for white respondents in the black judge treatments and there did not appear to be any significant 
differences at any level of expected descriptive representation.  The graph for white respondents 
did have a slope opposite to that of black respondents.  That is, white respondents appeared to 
follow what hypothesis three predicted:  as white respondents’ expectations of the proportion of 
judges who are African American in their state increased, they were more likely to ascribe 
legitimacy to the court when presented with a scenario with an African American judge compared 
to a scenario with a white judge.  However, none of the differences in legitimacy between the black 
and white judge groups for white respondents were statistically significant at any level of 
representation expectation. 
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4.3.2.4 Individual-Level Experiment:  Moderating Effects of Descriptive Representation 
Expectations for Women Judges 
Figure 19 presents the marginal differences in legitimacy between male and female judges 
from the individual-level experiment at each level of expected representation for female 
respondents. 
 
Figure 19 Legitimacy Differences by Descriptive Representation Expectations, Individual-Level Women 
Judges, Female Respondents 
 
As we can see, there is no difference at all in legitimacy levels across normative 
expectations between male judge and female judge scenarios for female respondents.  This is 
interesting when comparing this to the state-level experiment where expectations did moderate the 
effect of descriptive representation on legitimacy to some extent for females.  It appears that when 
presented directly with information about the level of descriptive representation in their state’s 
trial courts, women are more responsive than when presented with information about a single judge 
deciding a single case.  It is likely that those who read about one judge deciding a case do not 
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interpret the details of the judge as reflective of the larger judicial pool in their state’s courts.  Here 
again, I ran the same analysis for male respondents, but do not report the results here because they 
nearly mirror those of female respondents.  Expected descriptive representation levels of women 
in the judiciary have no statistically significant moderating effect on the relationship between 
descriptive representation and legitimacy for male or female respondents. 
4.4 Descriptive Representation Expectations Conclusion 
Overall, this chapter focused on answering two main questions:  what sort of expectations 
do individuals have about descriptive representation in their state’s trial courts and how do these 
expectations affect the relationship between descriptive representation and judicial legitimacy?  
Regarding the first question, the results presented show that individuals have varying normative 
expectations of levels of descriptive representation in their state’s judiciary for females and African 
Americans.  Regarding African Americans, both white and black respondents expect numbers of 
African American judges in their state to far exceed the proportion of African Americans in the 
general population.  However, given that respondents expressed significantly skewed perceptions 
of the racial makeup of the general population, the expectations did not appear too far-fetched.  
Indeed when it came to African American judges, normative expectations seemed to be more or 
less in line with respondents’ perceptions of African Americans’ proportion of the general 
population.  This was true for both white and black respondents. 
For female representation on the bench, however, the gap between perceived gender 
composition of the general population and normative expectations of the number of female judges 
in a given state was not insignificant.  While most respondents knew that women make up about 
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half of the general population, they wanted to see the proportion of judges in their state who are 
female be somewhere between six and nine percentage points lower than the general population 
numbers.  
Overall, expectations of descriptive representation aligned with what we would expect.  
Females (regardless of race) expressed higher normative expectations of female judges than males 
(regardless of race).  Similarly, black respondents (regardless of gender) expressed higher 
normative expectations of African American judges than white respondents (regardless of gender).  
Indeed, this strengthens some of the key premises of this entire project as discussed in earlier 
chapters:  that individuals have varying expectations of judges and that many individual do indeed 
want their judges to represent them. 
Related to the second main research question, the analyses presented in this chapter show 
mixed results regarding the moderating effect that normative expectations have on the relationship 
between descriptive representation and judicial legitimacy.  It appears as though expectations have 
a moderating effect on this relationship in some situations, but not in others.  Mainly, expectations 
matter to those whose descriptive representation is made explicit in the information presented to 
them.  When presented with state-level information about African American judges, black 
respondents’ expectations affected judicial legitimacy more than white respondents’ expectations.  
Similarly, when presented with state-level information about women judges, female respondents’ 
expectations affected judicial legitimacy more than male respondents’ expectations.  This was the 
same for black respondents when they were presented with individual-judge information.  
However, expectations of descriptive gender representation did not matter for males or females 
when presented with individual-judge information. 
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The most surprising result in this chapter was that expectations of black respondents 
affected legitimacy in the opposite way than what was predicted.  Legitimacy decreased in the 
black judge treatments for black respondents who wanted the highest numbers of black judges.  
This appeared to be counterintuitive at first.  However, after considering the wording of the 
vignette and that the black judge always decided against the individual’s policy in the vignettes, 
the result made much more sense.  This points out the importance of substantive representation in 
addition to descriptive representation.  The judiciary can continue to diversify as much as possible, 
but these results seem to show that a blanket increase in the numbers of African Americans will 
not necessarily increase legitimacy unless the increase is accompanied by higher levels of 
substantive representation as well.  If black judges decide cases at odds with a majority of black 
citizens, the results here seem to suggest that judicial legitimacy might actually suffer despite any 
significant increase in the number of black judges in the judiciary overall.  The next chapter takes 
up the question of substantive representation more directly. 
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5.0 CHAPTER FIVE:  SUBSTANTIVE REPRESENTATION AND EXPECTATIONS 
“The Supreme Court of the United States decides that a corporation cannot hide 
itself behind the plea of self-incrimination, when called upon to produce its letters 
and documents.  This no doubt is gain; there are lawyers who think it doubtful if 
the question would have been so decided a few years ago.  The judicial indicator is 
beginning to turn to the pressure of the greater social force, the public.”   
-Melville M. Bigelow, Legal Historian and Founding Member of Boston University 
School of Law, The Atlantic Monthly (December 1906) 
 
While the two preceding chapters examined the relationship between descriptive 
representation and judicial legitimacy, this chapter turns to the second type of representation that 
has been touched on at various points throughout this project already:  substantive representation.  
While descriptive representation has to do with how another individual or institution looks, 
substantive representation turns to how that individual or institution behaves.  Here, substantive 
representation refers to the behavior of state trial court judges, namely the decisions they make in 
a particular case.  Recall that substantive representation in this project is conceptualized as a judge 
making a decision that is in line with an individual’s preference (Haider-Markel 2010; Pitkin 1967; 
Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005).  Along the same lines as previous chapters, the research 
questions that this chapter addresses are: 
1. How does substantive representation (or the lack thereof) affect judicial legitimacy? 
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2. What normative expectations do individuals hold of judges related to substantive 
representation and how do these expectations affect the relationship between substantive 
representation and judicial legitimacy. 
At one point in time, the “myth of legality,” that judicial decisions are based solely on legal 
principles without any other influences, was a much more common belief among scholars and in 
American political culture than it has been in more recent history (Scheb and Lyons 2000).  The 
idea that judges could actively provide substantive representation by being influenced in their 
decision-making processes by extra-legal factors would be completely at odds with the myth of 
legality.  While I do not propose that this belief has been completely eradicated, many scholars, 
even early on, have debunked this myth and have further argued that there is indeed a 
representative function that judges serve (e.g., Ifill 1997; Kuklinksi and Stanga 1979).   
At this point in time, several scholars have examined judicial decision-making and have 
found that decisions made by judges are in fact influenced by a number of variables, including 
their race (Cox and Miles 2008), gender (Boyd, Epstein, and Martin 2010), other branches of 
government (Bailey and Maltzman 2011), and public opinion (Hall 2013).  Other scholars have 
directly examined substantive representation, or the lack thereof, in the judiciary.  For example, 
Grosskopf and Mondak (1998) find that disagreement with a judicial decision significantly reduces 
confidence in the Supreme Court.  Others have found that decisions made by judges affect the 
ideological perceptions of the court, and the resulting ideological disagreement or congruence then 
affects legitimacy evaluations (e.g., Bartels and Johnston 2013).   
Thus, this chapter takes it as a given or makes the assumption that judges provide 
substantive representation in the decisions that they make.  The following sections proceed with 
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examining just what type of expectations individuals hold of their judges related to substantive 
representation and how these affect judicial legitimacy. 
5.1 Theory and Hypotheses 
As we know by now, judicial legitimacy is an individual’s willingness to support the court 
even in the face of disagreement with judicial outputs (e.g., Caldeira and Gibson 1992, 1995; 
Easton 1965; 1975; Gibson and Caldeira 1998, 2009a, 2009b).  It is a long-standing commitment 
to an institution:  a “reservoir of good will.”  Chapter Two mentioned an important point made by 
Gibson (2012, 5) about legitimacy, which was passively mentioned in the preceding empirical 
chapters as it related to the vignettes presented in Experiment Two (individual-level experiment):  
legitimacy requires an “objection precondition.”  It is worth spending some time here discussing 
what this means as it is central to substantive representation and the empirical approach in this 
chapter. 
An objection precondition means that the true test of legitimacy requires individuals to 
disagree with an institutional output or a series of institutional outputs.  If an institution does 
nothing objectionable to an individual, there is no way to know how legitimacy is affected.  
Legitimacy is what protects the institution in the face of outputs that do not align with the public’s 
preferences.  The reason why courts can make unpopular decisions is because they have built up 
this reservoir of support over time.  In fact, legitimacy from the public is crucial for courts given 
the lack of other enforcement mechanisms for compliance with their decisions.  If the court makes 
a decision that an individual agrees with, that does not test the individual’s willingness to grant 
legitimacy to the institution.  Indeed, we would expect legitimacy to be unaffected (even though 
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specific support may increase temporarily).  In the face of disagreement, however, is when we can 
see if legitimacy indeed shields the court from negative consequences or not.  
Of course, for judicial decisions to affect attitudes toward the courts, individuals must be 
aware of the decisions coming out of the judiciary.  As Caldeira and Gibson (1995, 357) note, “The 
formation of attitudes requires information.”  This may partially explain the dominance that the 
Supreme Court displays in the political science literature – its decisions, at least the relatively 
controversial ones, enjoy media attention that most decisions coming from state and lower federal 
courts do not.  Nevertheless, consistent with much of the extant literature, I expect: 
H4:  When presented with a case in which a judge decides against an individual’s 
preference, legitimacy will decrease. 
Like many hypotheses in existing studies, however, this assumes that individuals hold 
similar expectations regarding the role of judges in representing the public’s preferences, or the 
level of substantive representation that judges should provide.  In other words, this assumes that 
1. individuals care about the substantive decision being made by the judge, and 2. individuals all 
believe judges should decide cases in a way that is consistent with the public’s preferences.  Even 
if this assumption is true for the majority of people, at the very least, by not examining individuals’ 
expectations of judges’ representative role, we are missing out on a more nuanced view of the 
process by which individuals evaluate political institutions.   
Regarding the first assumption, I suspect that if an individual does not care about the 
substantive issue involved in the case, her propensity to grant legitimacy to the court will not be 
affected by the decision as much as it would be when she actually cares about the issue.  In the 
former case, there is no objection precondition because the individual just does not care enough to 
object to the decision the judge makes.  However, if she cares about the issue, I expect: 
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H5:  For issues that are important to an individual, he/she will grant less legitimacy 
to the court given the judge decides against the individual’s preference. 
As we know from Cann and Yates (2016), Gibson (2012), Gibson and Caldeira (2009a), 
and Chapter Four, the assumption of uniformity in expectations is problematic because individuals 
actually vary widely in the expectations they have of the courts and judges.  Indeed, as has been 
noted several times already, related to the decision-making of judges, Gibson (2012) finds that 
many individuals expect their state court of last resort to do much more than strictly apply the law 
to the facts of a case.  Individuals recognize that there are other factors that may come into play 
when judges make decisions.  Furthermore, we also know by now that expectations matter, as 
outlined by Expectancy Theory and as discovered in the preceding chapter.  Thus, I expect: 
H6:  The more an individual believes judges should represent the public’s 
preferences, the less legitimacy he/she will grant to the court given the judge 
decides against the individual’s preference. 
5.2 Empirical Approach 
In order to test the hypotheses, I use the individual-level survey experiment described in 
Chapter Three.  Recall that this was a 2 (judge race) x 2 (judge gender) x 2 (issue importance:  
low/high) between-subjects factorial design.26   Here, however, the analysis will focus on the issue 
 
26 Funded by the NSF Law and Social Sciences Program (Award 1728928) and the APSA Centennial Center Special 
Fund for Women and Politics. 
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importance treatments since the preceding chapters examined judge race and gender as part of the 
relationship between descriptive representation and judicial legitimacy.    
In order to determine issue importance, respondents were asked to rank four issues by how 
important each one is to them personally and where they stand on the issue.  The four issues 
presented were chosen based on results from a pre-test.  The pre-test was conducted on Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk and asked respondents to rank fourteen public policy issues based on 
importance.27  The issues chosen to use in the main survey were one of the issues that were most 
important and one that was least important for both Republicans and Democrats in the pre-test.  
The issues chosen for the main survey included drug testing for welfare applicants (least important 
for Democrats), minimum wage (most important for Democrats), LGBT rights (least important for 
Republicans) and gun control (most important for Republicans).28,29   
Next, respondents were asked their position on the issue that would be presented to them 
in the vignette (either their most important or least important issue).  The question presented the 
respondent with a statement about that issue and the respondent had to select the extent to which 
they agreed with the statement.  The scale forced respondents to at least slightly agree or slightly 
disagree with the statement so that there was no middle position.  This was done so that the vignette 
that would be presented to the respondent could have the judge always deciding against the 
respondent’s preference on that issue (i.e., the survey forced the “objection precondition” 
 
27 Funded by the Center for American Politics and Society at the University of Pittsburgh. 
28 To maximize statistical power, I do not separate the analysis by issue in this project. 
29 The survey instrument for the pre-test can be found in Appendix D.2. 
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necessary for testing legitimacy).  Respondents were also asked a series of questions about their 
normative expectations for how judges should behave or make decisions. 
Finally, respondents received the vignette corresponding to the experimental group to 
which they were randomly assigned, which described a judicial decision made recently in their 
state’s trial court.  Below is a template for the vignettes.  The actual text for each issue can be 
found in Appendix B. 
JUDGE [INSERT JUDGE NAME] DECIDES CASE ON [INSERT ISSUE] 
Last Tuesday, [insert respondent’s state] trial court judge [insert judge name] 
handed down a ruling on [insert issue].  In [his/her] final judgment, Judge [insert 
judge surname] ruled that [for/against issue].30      
Immediately after reading the vignette, each respondent was presented with the legitimacy 
battery discussed in previous chapters (Caldeira and Gibson 1992, 1995).  As a reminder, there 
were 1,111 respondents in this experiment.31  565 respondents were in the treatment group that 
contained a case involving their least important political issue and 546 respondents were in the 
treatment group that contained a case involving their most important political issue.  The same 
control group of 164 respondents is used in these analyses as well. 
 
30 Judges’ names varied to indicate the race and gender of the judge, which is analyzed in Chapter Three. 
31 Descriptive statistics on the sample can be found in Chapter Three. 
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5.3 Analysis and Discussion 
In order to examine whether or not an individual grants less legitimacy to the courts when 
a judge decides against an individual’s preference, t-tests were conducted that compare the mean 
level of legitimacy across treatment conditions.  Figure 20 presents the results.  As we can see, the 
control group enjoys the greatest level of legitimacy (4.12) while both treatment groups have a 
significantly lower level of legitimacy (3.85 for the group in the least important issue treatment 
and 3.86 for the group in the most important issue).  As expected, when individuals are presented 
with information about a case in which a judge decides against the individual’s preference (i.e., 
they do not provide substantive representation), they grant less legitimacy to the court.  This aligns 
with the findings of Bartels and Johnston (2013).  They find that ideological disagreement with 
the tenor of the Supreme Court (as perceived by individuals) has a negative effect on the Court’s 
legitimacy.  For example, if an individual is liberal and perceives the Court’s decisions to be more 
conservative, they will grant less legitimacy to the Court than if they perceive the Court’s decisions 
to be more liberal.  Here, there is no doubt that the judge is deciding against each respondent’s 




Figure 20 Mean Legitimacy by Treatment Group, Issue Importance 
 
5.3.1 Discussion of Results:  Issue Importance 
We can also see in Figure 20 that there is almost no difference in legitimacy between the 
group that read about a case that was most important to them and the group that read about a case 
that was least important to them.  However, in order to examine how the importance of the issue 
involved in the case might affect evaluations of the court, we must consider how important the 
issue presented in the vignette is to the individual more generally, outside of the issue’s relation to 
the other issues that were presented to respondents earlier in the survey.   
Recall that respondents were presented with four different issues and were asked to rank 
the issues by importance.  Based on this ranking, individuals were then assigned to the vignette 
that corresponded to either their most important or least important issue from that list.  In other 
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words, individuals were forced to identify a most important issue of the four issues presented.  
However, even if that issue is the most important out of the four presented, that does not necessarily 
make the issue important to that person.  It is possible that an individual does not believe that any 
of the four issues presented are important.  In this case, the ranking question assigns an artificial 
importance to at least one issue.  Similarly, all four issues might be incredibly important to an 
individual, so even if they are assigned to receive the vignette about their least important issue, it 
might still be quite important to them. 
In order to get a more accurate picture of how the importance of an issue affects legitimacy, 
the survey asked respondents some additional questions.  First, after respondents ranked the issues 
by importance, a separate question inserted the issue that they ranked as most important and asked 
whether it was one of the top three most important issues to them out of all political issues.  Almost 
84% of respondents indicated that the issue that they ranked as most important from the four 
presented was one of the top three most important political issues to them.  For the other 16% then, 
it is possible that the issue they read about in the vignette was not actually important to them, even 
if it was their highest ranked issue.   
Figure 21 presents the mean level of legitimacy between the group that received the least 
important issue and the smaller group of individuals that received the most important issue who 
also indicated that the issue is one of the top three most important political issues to them.  As the 
figure shows, for the group that read about a judge deciding a case against their preference on one 
of the most important issues to them, legitimacy is harmed more than when individuals read about 
a case involving the least important issue.  However, the difference is not statistically significant, 





Figure 21 Mean Legitimacy by Treatment Group, Most Important Issue Respondents Only 
 
This goes against what was predicted.  Why might there not be a difference in legitimacy 
between low importance issues and high importance issues?  One possibility is that any substantive 
representation, or lack thereof, is more important than how an individual feels about any particular 
issue.  In other words, the effect of there being no substantive representation outweighs or 
overshadows any effect related to whether the particular issue presented was of high importance 
or low importance to the individual.  Once the lack of substantive representation generally drops 
the level of judicial legitimacy, any differences between low and high importance issues are so 
marginal that they do not show up as any differences at all.   
Another possibility is that the low importance issue might include individuals who still 
believe that the issue that was presented to them (in the low importance condition) is still 
important.  In other words, I was able to take out individuals in the high importance group who 
didn’t believe their highest-ranked issue was important, but I have no way of identifying 
 96 
individuals in the low importance group who believe even their lowest-ranked issue is still quite 
important.  The survey did not include a similar question about the lowest-ranked issue as it did 
for the highest-ranked issue.  If this is the case, the actual level of legitimacy in the low importance 
condition might be higher than presented in Figure 21 because those in this group who believe the 
issue presented is still important may be artificially driving down the legitimacy level that we see.   
After taking out the respondents from the high importance condition that should not have 
been there, legitimacy changed by about 0.07 (the difference between the high importance group 
between Figures 20 and 21).  If we assume that a similar effect would happen to the low importance 
group if we could take out those who did not truly belong, then the average level of legitimacy for 
the low importance group would be somewhere around 3.92.  This would then follow the trend 
that was predicted:  when presented with a low importance issue, legitimacy would be affected 
less than when presented with a high importance issue.  It is difficult to say with any certainty 
whether the difference between the two groups would become statistically significant or not in this 
scenario.  If the confidence intervals do not change much from what we see in Figure 21, it is 
possible that a statistically significant difference between the groups would emerge. 
To probe this question of issue importance even further, another question on the survey 
asked respondents to indicate how important each issue presented in the original ranking question 
is to them on a 0 (Not at all Important) to 100 (Very Important) scale.  This allows me to identify 
individuals who do not actually care much about any of the issues presented.  In order to examine 
whether this has an impact on legitimacy, I regressed the scale variable on the mean level of 
legitimacy.  The relationship between the level of importance of the issue and legitimacy does not 
even come close to being statistically significant.  I estimate this with only the scale variable as an 
explanatory variable as well as with a series of other covariates (e.g., controlling for experimental 
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condition, issue presented in the vignette, and a number of demographic variables) and the level 
of importance is not statistically significant in either case.   
I also estimated a regression model that included an interaction term between the 0-100 
importance variable and the treatment variable that indicates whether the individual was in the 
least important or most important group.  While the interaction term becomes significant in this 
model, the substantive impact is zero.  I refrain from including all of these regression analyses in 
the chapter because they are somewhat misleading.  Given the small number of respondents (less 
than 10% of the sample) who are both assigned to the most important issue treatment and also rate 
that issue’s importance as less than 50 on the 100-point scale, the significance on the interaction 
variable is driven by a very small number of respondents.  Similarly, when examining the marginal 
effects on the predicted levels of legitimacy of the two treatment groups, the only significant 
differences are when the issue is ranked between 0 and 40 on the 100-point scale.  Again, for the 
high importance treatment, there are only a handful of respondents who drive these marginal 
differences.  I include this set of analyses in Appendix C.  Overall, these analyses together with 
the results presented in Figures 20 and 21 indicate that the importance of an issue does not make 
much of a difference at all in the level of legitimacy ascribed to the courts. 
5.3.2 Discussion of Results:  Substantive Representation Expectations 
So far, it appears that substantive representation matters for legitimacy, but the importance 
of the issue does not.  How is the impact of substantive representation on legitimacy affected by 
individual’s expectations of their judges?  In order to examine this question, the survey asked 
respondents the extent to which they agree (1 Strongly Disagree to 7 Strongly Agree scale) with a 
number of statements regarding the normative expectations of judicial behavior.  The responses to 
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these questions are interesting to consider on their own before looking into how they might affect 
legitimacy.   
Table 2 shows the mean level of agreement with each of the statements while Table 3 
shows the percentage of respondents who agree (responses of 5-7 on the 7-point scale) and disagree 
(responses of 1-3 on the 7-point scale) with each statement.  In order to show additional variation 
across individuals, I have broken the tables down by both race and gender of respondents.  It is 
also important to note that in order to increase accuracy, I have included survey respondents who 
were not part of the experiment since these questions were asked to all survey respondents 
regardless of which experiment they were assigned.32 
Table 2 Mean Level of Agreement with Statement by Race and Gender 
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base their decisions on whether 
























use their own personal moral 











look to public opinion on issues 















32 There are no significant differences in these responses between respondents who were part of the experiment and 
respondents who were not part of the experiment. 
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Table 3 Percentage of Respondents Agreeing and Disagreeing with Statement 
I believe trial 
judges in [R State] 
should… 
 
strictly follow the 
law when deciding 
all cases no matter 
what people in [R 
State] want. 
decide cases the way 
the majority of the 
people in [R State] 
prefer. 
base their decisions 
on whether they are 
a Republican or 
Democrat. 
R Group Dis. Agree Dis. Agree Dis. Agree 
Black Male 16.09 74.33 40.42 40.23 65.71 22.41 
Black Female 14.95 72.04 50.87 28.93 73.40 16.50 
White Male 9.94 81.05 53.10 29.64 78.05 13.32 
White Female 10.47 78.70 51.81 25.63 82.13 9.75 
     Total 12.81 76.60 49.11 31.03 74.95 15.40 
 
I believe trial 
judges in [R State] 
should… 
 
ensure fairness for 
all people under the 
law. 




look to public 
opinion on issues 
when making legal 
decisions. 
R Group Dis. Agree Dis. Agree Dis. Agree 
Black Male 5.94 89.08 45.98 38.89 43.87 39.27 
Black Female 3.88 89.90 49.32 33.40 49.13 33.98 
White Male 3.75 91.74 51.22 29.08 58.16 26.83 
White Female 1.44 94.40 53.43 29.06 55.42 25.27 
     Total 3.72 91.34 50.05 32.53 51.74 31.21 
 
Consistent with several of Gibson’s (2012) findings, there is substantial variation in what 
individuals expect from judges.  About 75% of individuals believe that judges should strictly 
follow the law when deciding all cases no matter what the public wants.  At the same time, almost 
one-third of individuals believe that judges should decide cases the way the majority of the public 
wants, should use their own personal moral judgment when deciding cases, and look to public 
opinion when making legal decisions.  A much lower, but not insignificant, percentage of 
individuals (about 15%) believe that judges should base their decisions on their partisanship.  This 
may seem high since the judiciary is often seen as the politically neutral branch, but keep in mind 
that these questions refer to state judges, some of which are elected through partisan elections.   
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The greatest consensus is reached (about 9 in 10 people agree) on the statement that judges 
should ensure fairness for all people under the law.  For some, these responses may indicate that 
individuals have no idea about what they expect from judges, or at the very least are inconsistent 
in their beliefs.  This is not necessarily true, however.  Judges can use external factors, like public 
opinion, to inform their decisions while still crafting their decisions to fit within the law.  I may 
believe that judges should decide cases based on what the majority of people want, but that does 
not mean that I think judges should step outside the law in order to do this.  These are not mutually 
exclusive.   
Looking across race and gender of respondents, it is interesting to note that in almost all 
cases, respondents of the same race tend to have more similar expectations to each other across 
genders than they do with either gender of the other race.  White male respondents and white 
female respondents have similar expectations; their agreement with every statement is within a 
few percentage points of each other.  This is also mostly true for black male respondents and black 
female respondents, with a few exceptions.  The major exception is the statement about judges 
deciding cases the way a majority of the people prefer.  In this case, black females have 
expectations that are much more similar to white respondents than black male respondents.  About 
40% of black male respondents agree that judges should decide cases the way the majority of the 
people want while less than 30% of all other demographic groups agree with that statement.   
One other noteworthy observation is that black respondents tend to have higher 
expectations of judges using extra-legal factors when making decisions (i.e., factors outside of the 
law).  On the statements about judges’ using their personal morals, public opinion, and their 
partisanship, black respondents agree in higher numbers than white respondents.  Similarly, on the 
statements regarding strictly following the law and ensuring fairness for all, black respondents 
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agree with these statements in lower numbers than white respondents.  I suspect this has to do with 
the historical use of the law to perpetuate racial discrimination (e.g., Munger and Seron 2017).   
5.3.3 Discussion of Results:  Moderating Effect of Substantive Representation Expectations 
How do these expectations affect legitimacy?  In order to assess this, I created a variable 
that indicates respondents’ substantive representation expectations from the two statements that I 
believe most align with substantive representation:  the statement about judges deciding cases the 
way the majority of people prefer and the statement about judges looking to public opinion when 
making legal decisions.  The new substantive representation expectation variable is an average of 
responses from these two statements.  Table 4 shows the results from an OLS regression model 
that includes the substantive representation expectation variable and a dummy variable that 
indicates the treatment condition (most or least important issue).  As the table shows, substantive 
representation expectations have a significant impact on judicial legitimacy.  The more an 
individual expects judges to look toward public opinion and represent the majority’s preferences 
when making legal decisions, the less legitimacy they are willing to grant to the court when 
presented with a decision that goes against their own policy preferences. 
Table 4 Effect of Substantive Representation Expectation on Legitimacy 
 Sub. Rep. Expectation -0.32*** 
  (0.018) 
 High Imp. Treatment  0.03 
(0.06) 




N  1,111 
R2  0.220 
   
Std. Errors in parentheses 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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In order to assess whether the importance of the issue involved in the case moderates the 
effect that substantive representation expectations have on legitimacy, I interact the variables and 
look at the marginal effects.  Figure 22 shows the predicted level of legitimacy at various levels of 
substantive representation expectations by treatment condition.  Figure 23 graphs the differences 
between the marginal effects of the treatment at each level of substantive representation 
expectations.  As the figures show, there is no significant difference between treatment conditions 
for how substantive representation expectations affect legitimacy.  Regardless of whether an 
individual receives a vignette about the most important or least important issue, the more she 
expects substantive representation from judges, the less legitimacy she will give the courts when 
the judge decides against her preferences.   
 




Figure 23 Legitimacy Difference between Treatment Groups by Substantive Representation Expectation 
5.4 Substantive Representation Conclusion 
This chapter set out to answer the questions of how substantive representation, or the lack 
thereof, affects judicial legitimacy, what expectations do individuals have of judges in terms of 
substantive representation, and how do these expectations affect the relationship between 
representation and legitimacy.  Regarding the first question, the analysis in this chapter finds that 
substantive representation in the courts does have an effect on individuals’ propensity to grant 
legitimacy to the judiciary.  When a judge decides against the policy preferences of an individual, 
they grant less legitimacy to the court.  This finding is consistent with several other studies in the 
(limited) extant literature on the topic (e.g., Bartels and Johnston 2013; Christenson and Glick 
2015), and supports the idea that judges indeed serve a representative function within the political 
system.  Despite what constitutions or historical writings suggest about justices and courts being 
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neutral arbiters of the law, the results presented here suggest that not only does the substantive 
representation that comes out of these institutions affect public attitudes toward them, but also that 
many people fully expect judges to provide that type of representation.   
Interestingly, the findings also suggest that the importance of the issue involved in the case 
that an individual reads about does not have any impact on legitimacy.  If someone cares a great 
deal about the issue being decided on by a judge or if they care very little about the issue, their 
propensity to ascribe legitimacy to the court is nearly the same.  When a judge decides against the 
preferences of an individual, legitimacy decreases in all cases.  As I touched on briefly above, 
there are a couple possible explanations for why there are no differences between low importance 
and high importance issues in terms of legitimacy.   
I believe a likely explanation is that individuals want their preferences to be represented in 
any case.  Legitimacy suffers in both cases because the judge decides against individuals’ 
preferences.  The fact that their preferences are not being represented by a judge is more important 
to them than the fact that they may not actually care about the issue involved in the case.  In other 
words, the fact that the judge decides against the individual’s preference is what is most salient to 
them.  The substantive issue involved in the decision is a secondary consideration, and thus, has 
very little, if any, effect on legitimacy after it was already reduced.  Another possibility is that the 
issue presented in the experiment was still relatively important to some of the individuals who 
were considered part of the low importance treatment condition, artificially pushing legitimacy 
down to be more similar to the high importance treatment condition.   
One final possible explanation, which is somewhat of a correlate to both of the previous 
explanations and perhaps happens simultaneously in either case, is that individuals still feel 
strongly or passionately about the issue even if the policy is not necessarily important to them.  For 
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example, I might feel very strongly that there should be more restrictions on gun ownership.  
However, in the broader context of politics, I might consider this one of the least important issues 
to me personally because it does not have any real impact on my everyday life.  If I were to read 
about a judge deciding a case in a way that lifts restrictions on gun ownership, I will likely grant 
less legitimacy to the court because I am passionate about my position on the subject, not because 
it is the most important issue to me.  Unfortunately, the questions asked in this study do not allow 
me to tease apart strongly or passionately held beliefs from issue importance.   
Importantly, this chapter finds that the effect that the presence or lack of substantive 
representation has on legitimacy is relatively large.  As we know, legitimacy is the long-standing, 
diffuse support for an institution.  As such, it should be one of the more difficult concepts to affect.  
However, after reading about a court decision that goes against an individual’s preference, judicial 
legitimacy drops by about 0.27 on average.  This equates to about a 5% drop in legitimacy.  While 
this sounds small, when the context is considered, it is quite substantial.  Judges produce numerous 
decisions every day.  Over time, if individuals hear about several of these decisions and they 
continue to be against their preferences, the courts’ legitimacy could be severely damaged.   
This could be particularly damaging to the courts if there is a negativity bias (see Grosskopf 
and Mondak 1998), whereby support for the courts suffers more when they produce disagreeable 
decisions than any increased support gained from agreeable decisions.  It is also important to note 
that most of the questions asked to measure legitimacy are about making fundamental changes to 
the judiciary (e.g., removing judges from their positions, getting rid of trial courts altogether in the 
respondent’s state).  A 5% move on a scale that is made up of the average of seven responses 
regarding significant changes to the judiciary is no insignificant number. 
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These findings align well with studies like Bartels and Johnston (2013), Christenson and 
Glick (2015) and Malhotra and Jessee (2014) that find a relatively strong correlation between 
specific support (satisfaction with specific decisions) and diffuse support (i.e., institutional 
legitimacy).  While they appear to be somewhat at odds with other studies that find an empirically 
weaker relationship between specific institutional outputs and legitimacy (e.g., Gibson and 
Caldeira 2009a; Gibson and Nelson 2016; Gibson, Caldeira, and Baird 1998), the results here are 
not necessarily in conflict with these studies.  One reason is that some of the older studies (e.g., 
Gibson, Caldeira, and Baird 1998) employ research designs that ask about general satisfaction with 
institutional outputs rather than presenting information about a specific instance where individuals 
disagree with judges (i.e., an actual decision that goes against their preferences).  Without the 
“objection precondition” present in these studies, it is difficult to conclude anything more than 
correlations between specific and diffuse support.   
Additionally, many of Gibson et. al.’s studies test more than just the relationship between 
specific support and diffuse support.  They actually do find that legitimacy takes a hit when 
individuals disagree with judicial outcomes, but that the hit to legitimacy is overcome by increases 
in legitimacy due to other contextual factors, such as symbols of justice (e.g., see Gibson and 
Caldeira’s Positivity Theory in Gibson and Caldeira 2009a and Gibson and Nelson 2016).  Indeed, 
Gibson and Nelson (2016) push back on Bartels and Johnston’s (2013) finding that a misalignment 
between an individual’s ideology and their perceptions of the Supreme Court’s ideology causes a 
decrease in support for the institution.  The former scholars found that diffuse support for the 
Supreme Court increased over the course of their survey in which respondents were presented with 
a judicial decision that went against the respondents’ policy preferences.  However, this finding is 
conditional on the level of disappointment with the Court’s decision.  As Gibson and Nelson (2016, 
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637) note, “Losing, per se, may not undermine legitimacy; instead, it depends on one’s 
expectations.”  They go on to mention that dissatisfaction with a judicial decision may indeed 
result in a decrease in legitimacy, but this is diminished by symbols of judicial authority.  In other 
words, Gibson and Nelson’s findings provide additional nuance and context to the findings of 
Bartels and Johnston.  As I mentioned in a previous chapter, this project is meant to be the cleanest 
possible test of the relationship between descriptive and substantive representation and judicial 
legitimacy.  As such, I do not introduce other contextual factors into the vignettes presented to 
respondents in the experiments, which is why they appear to align more with Bartels and Johnston 
(2013) than Gibson and Nelson (2016).   
Lastly, this study is one of the few that have addressed the issue of varying expectations 
among individuals when it comes to courts.  As the results show, variation in the expectations that 
individuals hold of judges’ representative role has a significant effect on judicial legitimacy.  
Going from one end of the spectrum where individuals expect judges to provide no substantive 
representation to the other end where individuals expect judges to provide a significant level of 
substantive representation (minimum to maximum) results in a drop in legitimacy of nearly 2 
points on the 7-point scale (or nearly 33%)!  Given that nearly one-third of the sample agrees that 
judges should be providing substantive representation by looking toward public opinion and 
representing the majority’s opinion in their decisions, this has important implications for judicial 
legitimacy moving forward.  If legitimacy is damaged most by individuals who expect substantive 
representation, it suggests that judges would benefit by aligning their decisions more with what 
the public wants if they want to preserve their institution’s legitimacy.  Of course, given the fact 
that a large majority of individuals also believe that judges should strictly follow the rule of law 
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when making decisions, judges will have to strike a balance between following public opinion 




6.0 CHAPTER SIX:  CONCLUSION 
From the beginning, the most basic goal of this project was to provide a deeper 
understanding of the relationship between representation and judicial legitimacy than previous 
studies have been able to do.  Going back to Pitken’s (1967) photography analogy, my aim was to 
provide very specific and very clear snapshots of the overall concept of representation and its 
relationship to legitimacy.  Targeting very specific aspects of representation in specific contexts 
allows for a clear picture of this relationship.  
First, I limited the focus to two specific types of representation:  descriptive and 
substantive.  Second, I limited the context of the analysis to state trial courts.  A focus on one 
specific type of court was required to avoid the blurring any of the results with differences in 
institutional design across different types of courts.  As state trial courts handle an overwhelming 
majority of all judicial matters across the United States, examining the effects of representation in 
these courts is crucial to understanding opinions individuals hold of the broader judiciary.  Third, 
I limited the project to understanding how representation works for very specific groups of 
individuals:  those who identify as male or female only and those who identify as black or white 
only.  Similar to limiting the context to state trial courts, limiting the analysis to these specific 
groups of people allows me to dive deeper into how these individuals view the connection between 
representation and legitimacy.  As mentioned in Chapter One, I chose depth rather than breadth in 
this project. 
While I used a number of existing theories to inform a set of testable hypotheses—
legitimacy theory, Social Identity Theory, and Expectancy Theory—I took an important departure 
from almost all of the extant literature in this area by explicitly measuring individuals’ expectations 
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of representation and incorporating these expectations into the analyses.  Indeed, in doing so this 
project addresses a shortfall of many existing studies that assume uniformity in individuals’ 
expectations.  Many of the results presented in this project comport well with many other studies 
in the literature and many also provide a more nuanced view to some of those results reported by 
other scholars.   
In this final chapter, I review the most important findings derived from the analyses 
presented in the preceding chapters.  I then provide a discussion of the contributions that this 
project makes to the extant literature.  I close this project by acknowledging some of the limitations 
to this study and provide suggestions for future research.   
6.1 Key Findings 
One of the major findings that comes out of all of the analyses presented in this project is 
that representation matters to individuals and that it affects their evaluations of courts.  
Additionally, the expectations that individuals hold regarding representation in the judiciary can 
moderate the effect that representation has on judicial legitimacy, but in specific contexts.  The 
following three sections discuss the intricacies of these findings in more detail. 
6.1.1 Descriptive Representation 
Chapter Three focused on descriptive representation’s relationship to judicial legitimacy.  
I presented the results from two survey experiments in this chapter:  one that examined how this 
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relationship works at the aggregate state-level and one that examined how this relationship works 
at the individual-judge level. 
Results from the state-level experiment show that presenting information to individuals 
about the level of descriptive representation in their state’s trial courts affects the level of 
legitimacy ascribed to the court in some cases, but not in others.  For descriptive representation of 
females in the judiciary, female respondents’ willingness to grant legitimacy to the court was 
impacted more than male respondents’ willingness.  When the proportion of judges that are female 
in a given state matched the proportion of females in the general population (i.e., 50%), females 
viewed the court as more legitimate than when their representation was at any other (lower) level.  
Male respondents’ evaluations of the courts were not impacted by the number of females in their 
state’s judiciary.   
For descriptive representation of African Americans in the judiciary, black respondents’ 
legitimacy levels given to the court were much more impacted than that of white respondents as 
the level of descriptive representation of African Americans changed across the treatment 
conditions.  Black respondents were significantly more likely to grant legitimacy to the courts 
when the number of black judges in their states’ trial courts was on par with the national average 
of 7%.  Interestingly, black respondents did not grant more legitimacy to the court when their level 
of descriptive representation increased to match their proportion of the general population (about 
13%), which I suspect has to do with not wanting to stand out of the crowd from other states and 
garner any special attention that might cause backlash from any groups opposed to increased black 
representation in the courts.  That said, white respondents were no more likely to ascribe less 
legitimacy to the courts when the number of African American judges matched the proportion of 
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African Americans in the general population.  In fact, white respondents granted the same level of 
legitimacy to the courts regardless of the number of black judges presented to them in the vignettes.   
These results are great news for individuals who want to see increased diversity on state 
benches but who might fear that too much too fast might spark a backlash among other individuals.  
Increasing the number of female judges in the aggregate causes no decrease in legitimacy among 
females or males.  Indeed, the net effect was an increase in legitimacy due to female respondents.  
Similarly, in the treatment conditions that included the highest number of African American judges 
(when their representation matched the proportion of African Americans in the general 
population), legitimacy was not harmed at all among any group of respondents. 
In the individual-level experiment, respondents were presented with information about one 
judge deciding one case.  For most respondents (black males, white males, and white females), the 
race and gender of the judge deciding the case affected legitimacy for the most part in line with 
expectations based on Social Identity Theory.  When the judge in the vignette shared both the race 
and the gender of individuals in these three groups, legitimacy was harmed the least given that the 
judge decided against the individual’s policy preference.  In these cases, descriptive representation 
shielded the courts from losing greater legitimacy. 
Black female respondents reacted in ways that were both unexpected and completely 
opposite from all of the other groups examined.  When the judge deciding against the black female 
respondent’s preference was also a black female, courts suffered the greatest loss of legitimacy 
compared to when the judge was any other race and gender combination.  Although this goes 
against what we would expect from Social Identity Theory, research on intersectionality that 
focuses on female racial minorities explains these results (e.g., Crenshaw 1992).  Black females 
often have unique experiences that are different from the experiences of females of other races and 
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from males of the same race.  We can expect that this applies to experiences with courts and the 
judicial system as well.  These unique experiences may lead them to hold different expectations of 
judges who belong to their same in-group, and thus, when these expectations aren’t met, the 
negative consequences are more severe than they are when there are fewer expectations of judges 
who do not share both race and gender identities with the individual. 
6.1.2 Substantive Representation 
Chapter Five focused on the relationship between substantive representation and judicial 
legitimacy.  By this point in the project, it came as no surprise that the results showed that when a 
judge does not provide substantive representation to the individual, the courts suffered a loss of 
legitimacy (the previous chapters had already showed this even though it was not explicitly 
discussed in them).   
More surprising was the fact that the importance of the issue involved in the case presented 
to respondents, in which the judge decided against their preference on the issue, had no effect on 
legitimacy.  In the condition where individuals were presented with a judge deciding a case on an 
issue that was highly important to the individual, respondents reduced the legitimacy granted to 
the courts by the same level as they did when the judge decided a case that was not important to 
them.  I suspect this is mostly due to the fact that individuals simply do not like to see things 
implemented that go against their preferences.  Even if an issue is not that important to them, they 
would still prefer to see the issue decided in a way that aligns with their (even weakly held) 
preference rather than the complete opposite.  Thus, the damage to legitimacy is done when 
substantive representation isn’t provided and is not then moderated by the specific issue involved 
in the case.  
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6.1.3 Representation Expectations 
As mentioned above, one of the unique features of this project that departs from almost all 
of the extant literature (but see Gibson 2012) is that it explicitly measures individuals’ expectations 
and incorporates these expectations into the analysis.  Chapter Four did this for descriptive 
representation expectations and Chapter Five did this for substantive representation expectations.  
The survey included questions that explicitly asked respondents about their normative expectations 
for both types of representation, which provided interesting results on their own. 
Regarding descriptive representation of females, individuals come close to wanting the 
proportion of judges in their state’s trial courts who are female to match the proportion of females 
in the general population.  Unsurprisingly, female respondents would like to see more female 
judges than male respondents.  However, even female respondents only reported believing that 
around 43% of judges in their state’s trial courts should be female while recognizing that females 
make up about 51% of the general population.  This may be due in part to respondents wanting to 
go along with the status quo, which involves males holding more seats on the bench than females.  
Respondents may believe that female judges should have more representation than they do 
currently, but they do not want to upset the perceived balance of justice too much.  
Regarding descriptive representation of African Americans, however, individuals reported 
normative expectations that far exceed the proportion that African Americans hold in the general 
population.  White respondents reported descriptive representation expectations for African 
Americans that were about 2.5 times greater than blacks’ proportion of the population.  For black 
respondents, it was about 3.5 times greater than their proportion of the population.  While shocking 
at first, I discovered that this is due in large part to a wildly inaccurate perception of the proportion 
of African Americans in the general population.  Based on the perceived demographic makeup of 
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the general population among all respondent groups, the normative expectations reported for 
African American descriptive representation was much less shocking and appeared to be in line 
with respondents’ misperceptions. 
When it comes to the question of how these expectations affect the relationship between 
representation and legitimacy, there are mixed results.  In the case where respondents were 
presented with information about descriptive representation at the state level, expectations only 
had a moderating effect for respondents whose representation was explicitly presented in the 
vignettes (i.e., female respondents in the female judge treatments and black respondents in the 
black judge treatments).  This was also the case for black respondents who read about an individual 
judge deciding a case.  The level of legitimacy granted to the courts varied across the white and 
black judge conditions depending on the descriptive representation expectations of black 
respondents.  This was not the case when respondents read about an individual female judge.  In 
this case, expectations had no role in moderating the relationship between representation and 
legitimacy for either males or females.     
Regarding substantive representation expectations, a large majority of respondents believe 
that judges should strictly follow the law when deciding cases and should ensure fairness under 
the law.  However, about one third of respondents also believe that judges should decide cases the 
way the majority in the state wants, should use their own morals when deciding cases, and should 
look to public opinion when making decisions.  This shows that individuals hold a variety of 
expectations of judges and their decision-making processes.  Furthermore, individuals can believe 
that judges should look to extra-legal factors when deciding cases while still following the law.  
These expectations do not necessarily contradict each other.  Substantive representation 
expectations also had a significant impact on judicial legitimacy.  Individuals who expect more 
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substantive representation from their judges punish the court more harshly when the judge decides 
against their preference than individuals who do not expect as much substantive representation 
from their judges. 
6.2 Contributions, Limitations, and Future Directions 
Overall, the findings presented in this project align well with many studies in the extant 
literature that find a direct relationship between representation and judicial legitimacy (e.g., Bartels 
and Johnston 2013; Christenson and Glick 2015; Mansbridge 1999; Scherer and Curry 2010).   
Similarly, the results complement another set of studies that find that the relationship between 
representation and legitimacy is highly conditional, with many other contextual factors competing 
with representation to affect legitimacy in different ways (e.g., Gibson 2012; Gibson and Caldeira 
2009a; Gibson and Nelson 2016).  We see this in the current project as both the race and gender 
of the respondents are just as important as the race and gender of the judges in the vignettes to 
determining when representation will affect legitimacy and when expectations will moderate this 
relationship.  Additionally, the results presented in this project support other studies finding that 
judges do indeed serve a representative function (Gibson 2011, 2012; Scheb, Bowen, and 
Anderson 1991; Scheb, Ungs, and Hayes 1989).  This project finds that a significant number of 
individuals fully expect their state’s trial courts to be representative of the broader population in 
terms of descriptive representation, but also that judges should represent the public’s policy 
preferences.  Individuals are comfortable with judges looking outside of the law when making 
their decisions, including toward public opinion. 
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One of the most important contributions I see this project making to the literature is the 
explicit measurement and inclusion of individuals’ expectations.  Very few previous studies take 
differences in individuals’ expectations into account in any serious way in their empirical analysis 
(but see Cann and Yates 2016; Gibson 2012).  On the whole, this may not be detrimental to many 
studies.  Assuming expectations are evenly distributed among respondents in any particular study, 
they may not make much of a difference in terms of empirical results.  However, the inclusion of 
expectations can provide a much more rich and nuanced view of the relationships being examined.  
This extends far beyond the judicial politics literature. 
Given the focus of this project mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, it is worth 
considering the generalizability of the findings.  First, I will focus on the generalizability to other 
judicial contexts such as federal courts, including the Supreme Court of the United States, and 
higher level state courts.  I believe that the relationship between representation and judicial 
legitimacy found in this project would likely be similar when examining other types of courts.  In 
other words, I believe that, on average, individuals will be more supportive of any court that 
provides descriptive and/or substantive representation versus not providing either type of 
representation.  I cannot think of any institutional differences across court types that would affect 
this relationship more than marginally, all else being equal. 
However, I believe that the findings related to the expectations that individuals hold of 
their state’s trial court judges may be less generalizable to other contexts.  For example, an 
individual might believe that judges in higher level courts (e.g., courts of last resort) should not 
look to public opinion in deciding cases as much as a trial court judge.  The jurisdiction of trial 
court judges is much smaller than that of a state’s court of last resort.  Thus, an individual might 
want the trial court judge to look to public opinion when making decisions because the public 
 118 
opinion in that particular jurisdiction is likely much more similar to the individual (if they live 
within that jurisdiction) than the public opinion of the state as a whole.  Similarly, individuals 
might view federal judges as more authoritative or might believe that their decisions affect more 
aspects of more people’s lives.  They might believe that these judges should stick to legal texts 
when deciding cases much more than state-level judges.  Thus, I believe the expectations presented 
in this study truly do only represent expectations of state trial court judges.   
The second question of generalizability pertains to whether the results are specific to black 
and white males and females or if we would see similar results if we were to include other racial 
or ethnic groups.  I suspect that the results for other racial or ethnic minorities would be much 
more similar to those presented here from African American respondents than from white 
respondents.  The overwhelming majority of judges across all judicial systems in the United States 
has been made up of white individuals (mostly males) for all of history.  Thus, it is difficult to 
imagine members of any other racial or ethnic group in the U.S. having a similar view of 
representation in the courts as white individuals.  Thus, in terms of both how representation affects 
judicial legitimacy and the expectations that individuals hold of representation in the courts, I 
believe the results of African American respondents reported in this project are more generalizable 
to other racial and ethnic groups in the U.S.  
Admittedly, the generalizability of results is a limitation of this project.  Again, I wanted 
the project to be the cleanest possible test of these relationships, and thus, narrowed the scope in 
various ways.  Generalizability is the price for this.  I do believe this project is an excellent starting 
point for other researchers to examine how these relationships work for other racial and ethnic 
minority groups.  It would be incredibly interesting to focus on a state that actually scores well in 
terms of the Gavel Gap (George and Yoon 2016) presented in Chapter Two.  What do individuals 
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expect from judges in states that have high numbers of racial and ethnic minority judges?  How 
does this compare to individuals in a state that is nearly homogenous in terms of race on the bench?  
Another limitation is that this project was conducted at one point in time.  If the same 
survey and experiments were administered today, we may get different results, especially given 
the recent social justice movements against racial inequities in government and society more 
broadly.  Additionally, a one-time experiment prevents any conclusions from being made about 
the longevity of these results.  How long does a reduction in legitimacy last, if at all?  What happens 
if an individual reads about a case with a favorable outcome immediately after an unfavorable 
outcome – is the hit to legitimacy recuperated by the agreeable decision?  One possible solution to 
help overcome this limitation without conducting a costly longitudinal study is for data from 
studies like this to be shared with other researchers.  Having comparable (or even exact) measures 
available from various studies over time would help researchers see longer-term patterns in the 
relationship between representation and legitimacy or changes in expectations of representation.   
As more and more groups work toward increasing the presence of both African Americans 
and women, as well as other racial and ethnic groups, in the judiciary, they should remain mindful 
that a blanket increase in sheer numbers might not necessarily facilitate more support among 
members of these groups in the population.  This also leads to further interesting questions for 
scholars to consider.  For example, if the courts do not benefit from increased descriptive 
representation in the absence of substantive representation then what is the value of increasing 
descriptive representation?   
Finally, recall once more that legitimacy is a long-standing disposition toward an 
institution, and thus, evaluating legitimacy is perhaps the most stringent test of what factors affect 
evaluations of the judiciary.  The fact that we see any movement in legitimacy in some of the above 
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analyses shows that representation is an important factor for individuals evaluating the courts.  
Measuring attitudes that are less strongly held or less consistent over time is perhaps a better 
alternative to discover the factors that can affect support for the courts, such as agreement with a 
particular outcome, trust, or confidence in the courts.  This is particularly true if it follows that 
repeated negative hits to specific support (based on immediate outcomes) eventually leads to 
decreased legitimacy.  If representation affects these more fluid attitudes, it may be the case that 
repeated underrepresentation has led (or can lead) to decreased legitimacy over time.  The numbers 
of racial and ethnic minorities in the courts will likely continue to grow in the coming years.  Now 
is an opportune time for scholars to examine the impact that this shift in diversity in these 
institutions has on public attitudes and expectations.   
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APPENDIX A DESCRIPTIVE REPRESENTATION EXPERIMENTAL CONDITIONS 
Appendix Table 1 State-Level Descriptive Representation Experiment Sample (Experiment One) 
 Representation of Group  
Judge Group Under Actual Over Total 
Female 146 142 141 429 
Black 138 143 139 420 
     Total 284 285 280 849 
 
Appendix Table 2 Individual-Level Descriptive Representation Experiment Sample (Experiment Two) 
 Gender of Judge  
Race of Judge Female Male Total 
Black 278 274 552 
White 274 285 559 




APPENDIX B SUBSTANTIVE REPRESENTATION VIGNETTES 
Note that the text of the vignettes below varied the race and the gender of the judge as 
described in Chapter Three despite those variations not being represented here. 
Firearms Issue: 
JUDGE CONNOR MUELLER DECIDES CASE ON FIREARMS REGULATIONS 
Last Tuesday, [R State] trial court judge Connor Mueller handed down a ruling on the regulation 
of firearms.  In his final judgment, Judge Mueller ruled that the state can prohibit citizens from 
carrying a loaded firearm with them outside of their homes. 
 
JUDGE CONNOR MUELLER DECIDES CASE ON FIREARMS REGULATIONS 
Last Tuesday, [R State] trial court judge Connor Mueller handed down a ruling on the regulation 
of firearms.  In his final judgment, Judge Mueller ruled that the state cannot prohibit citizens from 
carrying a loaded firearm with them outside of their homes. 
 
LGBT Issue: 
JUDGE CONNOR MUELLER DECIDES CASE ON LGBT RIGHTS 
Last Tuesday, [R State] trial court judge Connor Mueller handed down a ruling on gay and lesbian 
rights.  In his final judgment, Judge Mueller ruled that businesses cannot refuse service to gays 
and lesbians, even if homosexuality is against the business owner's religious beliefs. 
 
JUDGE CONNOR MUELLER DECIDES CASE ON LGBT RIGHTS 
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Last Tuesday, [R State] trial court judge Connor Mueller handed down a ruling on gay and lesbian 
rights.  In his final judgment, Judge Mueller ruled that businesses are allowed to refuse service to 
gays and lesbians if homosexuality is against the business owner's religious beliefs. 
 
Minimum Wage Issue: 
JUDGE CONNOR MUELLER DECIDES CASE ON MINIMUM WAGE 
Last Tuesday, [R State] trial court judge Connor Mueller handed down a ruling on minimum wage.  
In his final judgment, Judge Mueller ruled that the state cannot prohibit cities from raising the 
minimum wage to a rate higher than that set by the state. 
 
JUDGE CONNOR MUELLER DECIDES CASE ON MINIMUM WAGE 
Last Tuesday, [R State] trial court judge Connor Mueller handed down a ruling on minimum wage.  
In his final judgment, Judge Mueller ruled that the state can prohibit cities from raising the 
minimum wage to a rate higher than that set by the state. 
  
Drug Testing Issue: 
JUDGE CONNOR MUELLER DECIDES CASE ON WELFARE RECIPIENT DRUG 
TESTING 
Last Tuesday, [R State] trial court judge Connor Mueller handed down a ruling on drug testing for 
welfare recipients.  In his final judgment, Judge Mueller ruled that the state can require applicants 
for government assistance to take a drug test. 
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JUDGE CONNOR MUELLER DECIDES CASE ON WELFARE RECIPIENT DRUG 
TESTING 
Last Tuesday, [R State] trial court judge Connor Mueller handed down a ruling on drug testing for 
welfare recipients.  In his final judgment, Judge Mueller ruled that the state cannot require 
applicants for government assistance to take a drug test. 
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APPENDIX C SUBSTANTIVE REPRESENTATION REGRESSION MODELS 
Appendix Table 3 Effect of Issue Importance on Legitimacy (OLS Regression) 
 Issue Importance -0.00 
  (0.001) 




N  1,025 
R2  0.001 
   
Std. Errors in parentheses 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
Appendix Table 4 Effect of Issue Importance on Legitimacy with Covariates (OLS Regression) 
 Issue Importance -0.00 
  (0.001) 
 Issue Presented 0.04 
(0.033) 
 Experimental Group 0.00 
(0.019) 
 R Race (black) -0.34*** 
(0.075) 
 R Gender (female) 0.14** 
(0.07) 
 PID -0.04** 
(0.018) 
 Political Knowledge 0.19*** 
(0.026) 
 Income 0.01 
(0.010) 
 Education 0.03 
(0.037) 




N  1,025 
R2  0.105 
   
Std. Errors in parentheses 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
 126 
Appendix Table 5 Effect of Interaction between Issue Importance and Importance Treatment on Legitimacy 
 Issue Importance -0.00** 
  (0.002) 
 Importance Treatment -0.63** 
(0.230) 
 Issue Imp. x Treatment 0.01** 
(0.003) 




N  1,025 
R2  0.009 
   
Std. Errors in parentheses 










APPENDIX D SURVEY INSTRUMENTS 
Appendix D.1 Main Survey with Embedded Experiments 
Start of Block: Screener 
 
Instructions: 
Please answer each question carefully and honestly, without using any external resources while 
completing this survey.  Please complete the survey in one sitting.  Read and think about each 
question thoroughly.  After you are finished with each section, you may not return to it. 
  
Purpose: 
The purpose of this research study is to determine attitudes toward government.  For that reason, 
we are surveying adult U.S. citizens online using Qualtrics’ Online Sample and asking them to 
complete a brief (approximately 10-15 minutes) questionnaire.  If you are willing to participate, 
the survey will ask about your background (e.g., gender, age, race), as well as about your 
attitudes toward your state’s court system.  There are no foreseeable risks associated with this 
project, nor are there any direct benefits to you.  As payment for participation, each participant 
will receive the standard rate of compensation from Qualtrics for completing a survey.  All of the 
data gathered from this questionnaire will be anonymized before it is stored so the risk of 
responses being identifiable is extremely low.  All responses are confidential. The data will be 
stored on a password-protected computer on an encrypted disk.  Your research data may be 
shared with investigators conducting similar research; however, this information will be shared 
in a de-identified manner (without identifiers).  Your participation is voluntary, and you may 
stop completing the survey at any time.  This study is being conducted by Shane Redman, who 
may be contacted at smr105@pitt.edu if you have any questions. 
Page Break 
 






oMale  (0)  
oOther  (2)  
oFemale  (1)  
  
 
Age (in years): 
▼ 17 and under (17) ... 90 and above (90) 
 
Are you a U.S. citizen? 
oYes  (1)  
oNo  (2)  
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Race/Ethnicity (select all that apply): 
▢White, non-Hispanic  (1)  
▢Hispanic/Latino  (2)  
▢Black/African American  (3)  
▢Native American/American Indian  (4)  
▢Asian/Pacific Islander  (5)  
▢Other (please specify)  (6) ________________________________________________ 
Page Break 
 
End of Block: Screener 
 
Start of Block: Desc Rep Intro 
Thank you for participating in the following survey.  Please read the following information 
carefully. 
  
This is a survey about your state's trial courts and the judges that preside in the trial 
courts.  Unlike appellate courts or courts of last resort (like the Supreme Court), trial courts are 
courts that have general jurisdiction and hear cases for the first time.  Trial courts are the type of 
court that you would think of when you think about a court scene in a television show, with 
lawyers presenting evidence and witnesses, and a single judge making a final ruling at the end of 
the trial (in non-jury cases).  For the purposes of this survey, whenever a question refers to a 
judge or a court, know that it is referring to your state's trial courts and only the judges that serve 
in those courts, NOT federal judges or those who serve in appellate courts in your state. 
  
The next button will appear shortly. 
Page Break 
 
We care about the quality of our data.  In order for us to get the most accurate measures of your 
opinions, it is important that you thoughtfully provide your best answers to each question in this 
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survey.  Do you commit to thoughtfully provide your best answers to each question in this 
survey? 
oI will provide my best answers  (1)  
oI will not provide my best answers  (2)  
oI can't promise either way  (3)  
Page Break 
 
In which U.S. state do you currently live? 








In the past decade, there has been a debate about the number of minorities in political 
institutions.  Some people believe that the number of minorities in a given institution does not 
matter as long as the people working in that institution are qualified to do the job.  Others believe 
that the number of minorities in a political institution should mirror the numbers of that minority 
group within the larger population, assuming that there are enough qualified minorities to reach 
this level of parity.     In this section, you will be asked about your attitudes and knowledge about 
the percentages of women and African Americans in ${state/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices}'s 
trial court system.     The Next button will appear shortly. 
Page Break 
 
End of Block: Desc Rep Intro 
 
Start of Block: Desc Rep1 
Each of the questions below refer to judges in ${state/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices}'s trial 
courts (not in the federal court system). 
 
On the slider below, please indicate the percentage of judges in  
${state/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices}'s trial courts that you believe should be African 
American, regardless of what you believe the actual percentage is in real life.  This is your 
opinion so there is no correct answer.  Remember, your responses will be stored anonymously 
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and will never be linked back to you so please answer honestly. 
 
I believe about ____% of judges in ${state/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices}'s trial courts should 






















  () 
 
 
On the slider below, please indicate what you believe is the actual or real-life percentage of 
${state/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices}'s trial court judges who are African American,  
regardless of what you believe the percentage should be.  This is a  factual question -- if you are 
not sure or do not know, it is okay, just  make your best guess of what you think is the correct 
answer. 
 
I believe that the real-life or actual percentage of judges currently serving in 


























End of Block: Desc Rep1 
 
Start of Block: Desc Rep2 
Now, please do the same thing for women judges in ${state/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices}'s 
trial courts (not in the federal court system). 
 
On the slider below, please indicate the percentage of judges in  
${state/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices}'s trial courts that you believe should be women, 
regardless of what you believe the actual percentage is in real life.  This is your opinion so there 
is no correct answer.  Remember, your responses will be stored anonymously and will never be 
linked back to you so please answer honestly. 
 



























On the slider below, please indicate what you believe is the actual or real-life percentage of 
${state/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices}'s trial court judges who are women,  regardless of what 
you believe the percentage should be.  This is a  factual question -- if you are not sure or do not 
know, it is okay, just  make your best guess of what you think is the correct answer. 
 
I believe that the real-life or actual percentage of judges currently serving in 


























End of Block: Desc Rep2 
 
Start of Block: Desc Rep3 
Now, what do you believe the percentage of African Americans and women are in 
${state/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices}'s general population?  If you are unsure or do not 
know, make your best guess. 
 
I believe that the real-life or actual percentage of ${state/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices}'s 






















  () 
 
 
I believe that the real-life or actual percentage of ${state/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices}'s 



























End of Block: Desc Rep3 
 
Start of Block: Desc Rep2 
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For the next set of questions, please indicate the extent to which you agree with each statement. 
Page Break 
 
It is important to me that the percentage of judges in ${state/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices}'s 
trial courts who are African American matches the percentage of 
${state/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices}'s population who are African American. 
oStrongly Disagree  (1)  
oDisagree  (2)  
oSomewhat Disagree  (3)  
oNeither Agree nor Disagree  (4)  
oSomewhat Agree  (5)  
oAgree  (6)  




It is important to me that the percentage of judges in ${state/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices}'s 
trial courts who are women matches the percentage of 
${state/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices}'s population who are women. 
oStrongly Disagree  (1)  
oDisagree  (2)  
oSomewhat Disagree  (3)  
oNeither Agree nor Disagree  (4)  
oSomewhat Agree  (5)  
oAgree  (6)  
oStrongly Agree  (7)  
Page Break 
 
End of Block: Desc Rep2 
 
Start of Block: Issues 
Below is a list of political issues. 
 
First, arrange the list so that the most important issue to you personally is on top (1), followed by 
the next most important issue, and so on.  The last item on the list (4) should be the least 
important issue to you personally.  
 
To move the items in the list, click on the item and drag it to the appropriate position. 
______ Drug Testing for Recipients of Government Assistance (1) 
______ Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual, and Transgender Rights (2) 
______ Minimum Wage (3) 
______ Firearms Regulations (4) 
 
Now, please indicate how important each issue is to you personally on the slider, where 0 = Not 
at all Important, 100 = Very Important.  Note that the issue that appears at the top of your list 
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above should have the highest value below and the issue that appears at the bottom of your list 
above should have the lowest value below. 























Drug Testing for Recipients of Government 
Assistance ()  
Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual, and Transgender 
Rights ()  
Minimum Wage () 
 





In the previous question, you ranked ${issuerank/ChoiceGroup/ChoiceWithLowestValue} as the 
most important issue to you out of the four options.  Would you say that 
${issuerank/ChoiceGroup/ChoiceWithLowestValue}  is among the top 3 most important current 
political issues to you? 
oYes  (1)  
oNo  (0)  
Page Break 
 
If ${issuerank/ChoiceGroup/ChoiceWithLowestValue} is not one of the top 3 most important 









In a moment, we will show you an excerpt regarding one of the political issues that appeared in 
the previous question.  Before we show you this, we'd like to know your own opinion on the 
issue. 
 
For the following statement, please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree. 
Page Break 
 
End of Block: Issues 
 
Start of Block: Drug Test 
All applicants for government assistance should be required to take a drug test. 
oStrongly Disagree  (1)  
oDisagree  (2)  
oSomewhat Disagree  (3)  
oSomewhat Agree  (4)  
oAgree  (5)  
oStrongly Agree  (6)  
End of Block: Drug Test 
 
Start of Block: LGBT 
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Businesses should be allowed to refuse service to gays and lesbians if homosexuality is against 
the business owner's religious beliefs. 
oStrongly Disagree  (1)  
oDisagree  (2)  
oSomewhat Disagree  (3)  
oSomewhat Agree  (4)  
oAgree  (5)  
oStrongly Agree  (6)  
End of Block: LGBT 
 
Start of Block: Min Wage 
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Individual cities should be prohibited from raising the minimum wage to a rate higher than the 
minimum wage set by the state. 
oStrongly Disagree  (1)  
oDisagree  (2)  
oSomewhat Disagree  (3)  
oSomewhat Agree  (4)  
oAgree  (5)  
oStrongly Agree  (6)  
End of Block: Min Wage 
 
Start of Block: Guns 
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Citizens should be prohibited from carrying a loaded firearm with them outside of their homes. 
oStrongly Disagree  (1)  
oDisagree  (2)  
oSomewhat Disagree  (3)  
oSomewhat Agree  (4)  
oAgree  (5)  
oStrongly Agree  (6)  
End of Block: Guns 
 
Start of Block: Judges Role 
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1. strictly follow the law 
when deciding all cases no 




o o o o o o o 
2. decide cases the way the 




o o o o o o o 
3. base their decisions on 
whether they are a 
Republican or Democrat. 
(rolejudges_5)  
o o o o o o o 
4. ensure fairness for all 
people under the law. 
(rolejudges_6)  
o o o o o o o 
5. select Disagree for this 
answer. (rolejudges_9)  
o o o o o o o 
6. use their own personal 
moral judgment when 
deciding cases. 
(rolejudges_7)  
o o o o o o o 
7. look to public opinion on 
issues when making legal 
decisions. (rolejudges_8)  




End of Block: Judges Role 
 
Start of Block: WhiteM AntiGun 
Carefully read the excerpt below.  The "Next" button will appear shortly. 
 
JUDGE CONNOR MUELLER DECIDES CASE ON FIREARMS REGULATIONS  
 Last Tuesday, ${state/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices} trial court judge Connor Mueller handed 
down a ruling on the regulation of firearms.  In his final judgment, Judge Mueller ruled that the 
state can prohibit citizens from carrying a loaded firearm with them outside of their homes. 
End of Block: WhiteM AntiGun 
 
Start of Block: WhiteM ProGun 
Carefully read the excerpt below.  The "Next" button will appear shortly. 
 
JUDGE CONNOR MUELLER DECIDES CASE ON FIREARMS REGULATIONS  
 Last Tuesday, ${state/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices} trial court judge Connor Mueller handed 
down a ruling on the regulation of firearms.  In his final judgment, Judge Mueller ruled that the 
state cannot prohibit citizens from carrying a loaded firearm with them outside of their homes. 
End of Block: WhiteM ProGun 
 
Start of Block: WhiteF ProGun 
Carefully read the excerpt below.  The "Next" button will appear shortly. 
 
JUDGE MOLLY MUELLER DECIDES CASE ON FIREARMS REGULATIONS  
 Last Tuesday, ${state/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices} trial court judge Molly Mueller handed 
down a ruling on the regulation of firearms.  In her final judgment, Judge Mueller ruled that the 
state cannot prohibit citizens from carrying a loaded firearm with them outside of their homes. 
End of Block: WhiteF ProGun 
 
Start of Block: WhiteF AntiGun 
Carefully read the excerpt below.  The "Next" button will appear shortly. 
 
JUDGE MOLLY MUELLER DECIDES CASE ON FIREARMS REGULATIONS  
 Last Tuesday, ${state/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices} trial court judge Molly Mueller handed 
down a ruling on the regulation of firearms.  In her final judgment, Judge Mueller ruled that the 
state can prohibit citizens from carrying a loaded firearm with them outside of their homes. 
End of Block: WhiteF AntiGun 
 
Start of Block: BlackM AntiGun 
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Carefully read the excerpt below.  The "Next" button will appear shortly. 
 
JUDGE TYRONE WASHINGTON DECIDES CASE ON FIREARMS REGULATIONS  
 Last Tuesday, ${state/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices} trial court judge Tyrone Washington 
handed down a ruling on the regulation of firearms.  In his final judgment, Judge Washington 
ruled that the state can prohibit citizens from carrying a loaded firearm with them outside of their 
homes. 
End of Block: BlackM AntiGun 
 
Start of Block: BlackM ProGun 
Carefully read the excerpt below.  The "Next" button will appear shortly. 
 
JUDGE TYRONE WASHINGTON DECIDES CASE ON FIREARMS REGULATIONS  
 Last Tuesday, ${state/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices} trial court judge Tyrone Washington 
handed down a ruling on the regulation of firearms.  In his final judgment, Judge Washington 
ruled that the state cannot prohibit citizens from carrying a loaded firearm with them outside of 
their homes. 
End of Block: BlackM ProGun 
 
Start of Block: BlackF ProGun 
Carefully read the excerpt below.  The "Next" button will appear shortly. 
 
JUDGE SHANICE WASHINGTON DECIDES CASE ON FIREARMS REGULATIONS  
 Last Tuesday, ${state/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices} trial court judge Shanice Washington 
handed down a ruling on the regulation of firearms.  In her final judgment, Judge Washington 
ruled that the state cannot prohibit citizens from carrying a loaded firearm with them outside of 
their homes. 
End of Block: BlackF ProGun 
 
Start of Block: BlackF AntiGun 
Carefully read the excerpt below.  The "Next" button will appear shortly. 
 
JUDGE SHANICE WASHINGTON DECIDES CASE ON FIREARMS REGULATIONS  
 Last Tuesday, ${state/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices} trial court judge Shanice Washington 
handed down a ruling on the regulation of firearms.  In her final judgment, Judge Washington 
ruled that the state can prohibit citizens from carrying a loaded firearm with them outside of their 
homes. 
End of Block: BlackF AntiGun 
 
Start of Block: WhiteM ProGay 
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Carefully read the excerpt below.  The "Next" button will appear shortly. 
 
JUDGE CONNOR MUELLER DECIDES CASE ON LGBT RIGHTS  
 Last Tuesday, ${state/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices} trial court judge Connor Mueller handed 
down a ruling on gay and lesbian rights.  In his final judgment, Judge Mueller ruled that 
businesses cannot refuse service to gays and lesbians, even if homosexuality is against the 
business owner's religious beliefs. 
End of Block: WhiteM ProGay 
 
Start of Block: WhiteM AntiGay 
Carefully read the excerpt below.  The "Next" button will appear shortly. 
 
JUDGE CONNOR MUELLER DECIDES CASE ON LGBT RIGHTS  
 Last Tuesday, ${state/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices} trial court judge Connor Mueller handed 
down a ruling on gay and lesbian rights.  In his final judgment, Judge Mueller ruled that 
businesses are allowed to refuse service to gays and lesbians if homosexuality is against the 
business owner's religious beliefs. 
End of Block: WhiteM AntiGay 
 
Start of Block: WhiteF AntiGay 
Carefully read the excerpt below.  The "Next" button will appear shortly. 
 
JUDGE MOLLY MUELLER DECIDES CASE ON LGBT RIGHTS  
 Last Tuesday, ${state/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices} trial court judge Molly Mueller handed 
down a ruling on gay and lesbian rights.  In her final judgment, Judge Mueller ruled that 
businesses are allowed to refuse service to gays and lesbians if homosexuality is against the 
business owner's religious beliefs. 
End of Block: WhiteF AntiGay 
 
Start of Block: WhiteF ProGay 
Carefully read the excerpt below.  The "Next" button will appear shortly. 
 
JUDGE MOLLY MUELLER DECIDES CASE ON LGBT RIGHTS  
 Last Tuesday, ${state/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices} trial court judge Molly Mueller handed 
down a ruling on gay and lesbian rights.  In her final judgment, Judge Mueller ruled that 
businesses cannot refuse service to gays and lesbians, even if homosexuality is against the 
business owner's religious beliefs. 
End of Block: WhiteF ProGay 
 
Start of Block: BlackM ProGay 
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Carefully read the excerpt below.  The "Next" button will appear shortly. 
 
JUDGE TYRONE WASHINGTON DECIDES CASE ON LGBT RIGHTS  
 Last Tuesday, ${state/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices} trial court judge Tyrone Washington 
handed down a ruling on gay and lesbian rights.  In his final judgment, Judge Washington ruled 
that businesses cannot refuse service to gays and lesbians, even if homosexuality is against the 
business owner's religious beliefs. 
End of Block: BlackM ProGay 
 
Start of Block: BlackM AntiGay 
Carefully read the excerpt below.  The "Next" button will appear shortly. 
 
JUDGE TYRONE WASHINGTON DECIDES CASE ON LGBT RIGHTS  
 Last Tuesday, ${state/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices} trial court judge Tyrone Washington 
handed down a ruling on gay and lesbian rights.  In his final judgment, Judge Washington ruled 
that businesses are allowed to refuse service to gays and lesbians if homosexuality is against the 
business owner's religious beliefs. 
End of Block: BlackM AntiGay 
 
Start of Block: BlackF AntiGay 
Carefully read the excerpt below.  The "Next" button will appear shortly. 
 
JUDGE SHANICE WASHINGTON DECIDES CASE ON LGBT RIGHTS  
 Last Tuesday, ${state/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices} trial court judge Shanice Washington 
handed down a ruling on gay and lesbian rights.  In her final judgment, Judge Washington ruled 
that businesses are allowed to refuse service to gays and lesbians if homosexuality is against the 
business owner's religious beliefs. 
End of Block: BlackF AntiGay 
 
Start of Block: BlackF ProGay 
Carefully read the excerpt below.  The "Next" button will appear shortly. 
 
JUDGE SHANICE WASHINGTON DECIDES CASE ON LGBT RIGHTS  
 Last Tuesday, ${state/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices} trial court judge Shanice Washington 
handed down a ruling on gay and lesbian rights.  In her final judgment, Judge Washington ruled 
that businesses cannot refuse service to gays and lesbians, even if homosexuality is against the 
business owner's religious beliefs. 
End of Block: BlackF ProGay 
 
Start of Block: WhiteM AntiState MWage 
 145 
Carefully read the excerpt below.  The "Next" button will appear shortly. 
 
JUDGE CONNOR MUELLER DECIDES CASE ON MINIMUM WAGE  
 Last Tuesday, ${state/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices} trial court judge Connor Mueller handed 
down a ruling on minimum wage.  In his final judgment, Judge Mueller ruled that the state 
cannot prohibit cities from raising the minimum wage to a rate higher than that set by the state. 
End of Block: WhiteM AntiState MWage 
 
Start of Block: WhiteM ProState MWage 
Carefully read the excerpt below.  The "Next" button will appear shortly. 
 
JUDGE CONNOR MUELLER DECIDES CASE ON MINIMUM WAGE  
 Last Tuesday, ${state/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices} trial court judge Connor Mueller handed 
down a ruling on minimum wage.  In his final judgment, Judge Mueller ruled that the state can 
prohibit cities from raising the minimum wage to a rate higher than that set by the state. 
End of Block: WhiteM ProState MWage 
 
Start of Block: WhiteF ProState MWage 
Carefully read the excerpt below.  The "Next" button will appear shortly. 
 
JUDGE MOLLY MUELLER DECIDES CASE ON MINIMUM WAGE  
 Last Tuesday, ${state/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices} trial court judge Molly Mueller handed 
down a ruling on minimum wage.  In her final judgment, Judge Mueller ruled that the state can 
prohibit cities from raising the minimum wage to a rate higher than that set by the state. 
End of Block: WhiteF ProState MWage 
 
Start of Block: WhiteF AntiState MWage 
Carefully read the excerpt below.  The "Next" button will appear shortly. 
 
JUDGE MOLLY MUELLER DECIDES CASE ON MINIMUM WAGE  
 Last Tuesday, ${state/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices} trial court judge Molly Mueller handed 
down a ruling on minimum wage.  In her final judgment, Judge Mueller ruled that the state 
cannot prohibit cities from raising the minimum wage to a rate higher than that set by the state. 
End of Block: WhiteF AntiState MWage 
 
Start of Block: BlackM AntiState MWage 
Carefully read the excerpt below.  The "Next" button will appear shortly. 
 
JUDGE TYRONE WASHINGTON DECIDES CASE ON MINIMUM WAGE  
 Last Tuesday, ${state/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices} trial court judge Tyrone Washington 
handed down a ruling on minimum wage.  In his final judgment, Judge Washington ruled that the 
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state cannot prohibit cities from raising the minimum wage to a rate higher than that set by the 
state. 
End of Block: BlackM AntiState MWage 
 
Start of Block: BlackM ProState MWage 
Carefully read the excerpt below.  The "Next" button will appear shortly. 
 
JUDGE TYRONE WASHINGTON DECIDES CASE ON MINIMUM WAGE  
 Last Tuesday, ${state/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices} trial court judge Tyrone Washington 
handed down a ruling on minimum wage.  In his final judgment, Judge Washington ruled that the 
state can prohibit cities from raising the minimum wage to a rate higher than that set by the state. 
End of Block: BlackM ProState MWage 
 
Start of Block: BlackF ProState MWage 
Carefully read the excerpt below.  The "Next" button will appear shortly. 
 
JUDGE SHANICE WASHINGTON DECIDES CASE ON MINIMUM WAGE  
 Last Tuesday, ${state/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices} trial court judge Shanice Washington 
handed down a ruling on minimum wage.  In her final judgment, Judge Washington ruled that 
the state can prohibit cities from raising the minimum wage to a rate higher than that set by the 
state. 
End of Block: BlackF ProState MWage 
 
Start of Block: BlackF AntiState MWage 
Carefully read the excerpt below.  The "Next" button will appear shortly. 
  
JUDGE SHANICE WASHINGTON DECIDES CASE ON MINIMUM WAGE  
 Last Tuesday, ${state/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices} trial court judge Shanice Washington 
handed down a ruling on minimum wage.  In her final judgment, Judge Washington ruled that 
the state cannot prohibit cities from raising the minimum wage to a rate higher than that set by 
the state. 
End of Block: BlackF AntiState MWage 
 
Start of Block: BlackF AntiDrugT 
Carefully read the excerpt below.  The "Next" button will appear shortly. 
 
JUDGE SHANICE WASHINGTON DECIDES CASE ON WELFARE RECIPIENT 
DRUG TESTING  
 Last Tuesday, ${state/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices} trial court judge Shanice Washington 
handed down a ruling on drug testing for welfare recipients.  In her final judgment, Judge 
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Washington ruled that the state cannot require applicants for government assistance to take a 
drug test. 
End of Block: BlackF AntiDrugT 
 
Start of Block: BlackF ProDrugT 
Carefully read the excerpt below.  The "Next" button will appear shortly. 
 
JUDGE SHANICE WASHINGTON DECIDES CASE ON WELFARE RECIPIENT 
DRUG TESTING  
 Last Tuesday, ${state/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices} trial court judge Shanice Washington 
handed down a ruling on drug testing for welfare recipients.  In her final judgment, Judge 
Washington ruled that the state can require applicants for government assistance to take a drug 
test. 
End of Block: BlackF ProDrugT 
 
Start of Block: BlackM ProDrugT 
Carefully read the excerpt below.  The "Next" button will appear shortly. 
 
JUDGE TYRONE WASHINGTON DECIDES CASE ON WELFARE RECIPIENT DRUG 
TESTING  
 Last Tuesday, ${state/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices} trial court judge Tyrone Washington 
handed down a ruling on drug testing for welfare recipients.  In his final judgment, Judge 
Washington ruled that the state can require applicants for government assistance to take a drug 
test. 
End of Block: BlackM ProDrugT 
 
Start of Block: BlackM AntiDrugT 
Carefully read the excerpt below.  The "Next" button will appear shortly. 
 
JUDGE TYRONE WASHINGTON DECIDES CASE ON WELFARE RECIPIENT DRUG 
TESTING  
 Last Tuesday, ${state/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices} trial court judge Tryone Washington 
handed down a ruling on drug testing for welfare recipients.  In his final judgment, Judge 
Washington ruled that the state cannot require applicants for government assistance to take a 
drug test. 
End of Block: BlackM AntiDrugT 
 
Start of Block: WhiteF AntiDrugT 
Carefully read the excerpt below.  The "Next" button will appear shortly. 
 
JUDGE MOLLY MUELLER DECIDES CASE ON WELFARE RECIPIENT DRUG 
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TESTING  
 Last Tuesday, ${state/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices} trial court judge Molly Mueller handed 
down a ruling on drug testing for welfare recipients.  In her final judgment, Judge Mueller ruled 
that the state cannot require applicants for government assistance to take a drug test. 
End of Block: WhiteF AntiDrugT 
 
Start of Block: WhiteF ProDrugT 
Carefully read the excerpt below.  The "Next" button will appear shortly. 
 
JUDGE MOLLY MUELLER DECIDES CASE ON WELFARE RECIPIENT DRUG 
TESTING  
 Last Tuesday, ${state/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices} trial court judge Molly Mueller handed 
down a ruling on drug testing for welfare recipients.  In her final judgment, Judge Mueller ruled 
that the state can require applicants for government assistance to take a drug test. 
End of Block: WhiteF ProDrugT 
 
Start of Block: WhiteM ProDrugT 
Carefully read the excerpt below.  The "Next" button will appear shortly. 
 
JUDGE CONNOR MUELLER DECIDES CASE ON WELFARE RECIPIENT DRUG 
TESTING  
 Last Tuesday, ${state/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices} trial court judge Connor Mueller handed 
down a ruling on drug testing for welfare recipients.  In his final judgment, Judge Mueller ruled 
that the state can require applicants for government assistance to take a drug test. 
End of Block: WhiteM ProDrugT 
 
Start of Block: WhiteM AntiDrugT 
Carefully read the excerpt below.  The "Next" button will appear shortly. 
 
JUDGE CONNOR MUELLER DECIDES CASE ON WELFARE RECIPIENT DRUG 
TESTING  
 Last Tuesday, ${state/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices} trial court judge Connor Mueller handed 
down a ruling on drug testing for welfare recipients.  In his final judgment, Judge Mueller ruled 
that the state cannot require applicants for government assistance to take a drug test. 
End of Block: WhiteM AntiDrugT 
 
Start of Block: Decision Accept 
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Do you agree with the decision made by the judge in the previous scenario you read about? 
oStrongly Disagree  (1)  
oDisagree  (2)  
oSomewhat Disagree  (3)  
oNeither Agree nor Disagree  (4)  
oSomewhat Agree  (5)  
oAgree  (6)  




Elected officials should ignore the decision made by the judge in the previous scenario if a 
majority of their constituents disagree with it. 
oStrongly Disagree: Elected officials should abide by the judge's decision no matter what  
(1)  
oDisagree  (2)  
oSomewhat Disagree  (3)  
oNeither Agree nor Disagree  (4)  
oSomewhat Agree  (5)  
oAgree  (6)  
oStrongly Agree: Elected officials should ignore the judge's decision  (7)  
Page Break 
 
End of Block: Decision Accept 
 
Start of Block: Desc Rep BlackOver 
Carefully read the excerpt below.  The "Next" button will appear shortly. 
 
Black Judges a Strong Presence in ${state/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices} Trial Courts  
 Last week, the Administrative Office of the State Court Association published its annual report 
on the composition of state trial court judges across the country.  One notable aspect of the report 
was that African Americans make up about 13% of all ${state/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices} 
trial court judges.  This puts ${state/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices} well above many other 
states in terms of racial diversity of trial court judges, with the national average at just 7%. 
End of Block: Desc Rep BlackOver 
 
Start of Block: Desc Rep BlackUnder 
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Carefully read the excerpt below.  The "Next" button will appear shortly. 
 
Black Judges a Weak Presence in ${state/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices} Trial Courts  
 Last week, the Administrative Office of the State Court Association published its annual report 
on the composition of state trial court judges across the country.  One notable aspect of the report 
was that African Americans make up only about 1% of all 
${state/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices} trial court judges.  This puts 
${state/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices} well below many other states in terms of racial diversity 
of trial court judges, with the national average at 7%. 
End of Block: Desc Rep BlackUnder 
 
Start of Block: Desc Rep BlackActual 
Carefully read the excerpt below.  The "Next" button will appear shortly. 
 
Black Judges in ${state/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices} Trial Courts on Par with National 
Average  
 Last week, the Administrative Office of the State Court Association published its annual report 
on the composition of state trial court judges across the country.  One notable aspect of the report 
was that African Americans make up about 7% of all ${state/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices} 
trial court judges.  This puts ${state/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices} on par with many other 
states in terms of racial diversity of trial court judges, with the national average also at 7%. 
End of Block: Desc Rep BlackActual 
 
Start of Block: Desc Rep FemOver 
Carefully read the excerpt below.  The "Next" button will appear shortly. 
 
Female Judges a Strong Presence in ${state/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices} Trial Courts  
 Last week, the Administrative Office of the State Court Association published its annual report 
on the composition of state trial court judges across the country.  One notable aspect of the report 
was that women make up about 50% of all ${state/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices} trial court 
judges.  This puts ${state/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices} well above many other states in terms 
of gender diversity of trial court judges, with the national average at just 30%. 
End of Block: Desc Rep FemOver 
 
Start of Block: Desc Rep FemUnder 
Carefully read the excerpt below.  The "Next" button will appear shortly. 
 
Female Judges a Weak Presence in ${state/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices} Trial Courts  
 Last week, the Administrative Office of the State Court Association published its annual report 
on the composition of state trial court judges across the country.  One notable aspect of the report 
was that women make up only about 10% of all ${state/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices} trial 
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court judges.  This puts ${state/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices} well below many other states in 
terms of gender diversity of trial court judges, with the national average at 30%. 
End of Block: Desc Rep FemUnder 
 
Start of Block: Desc Rep FemActual 
Carefully read the excerpt below.  The "Next" button will appear shortly. 
 
Female Judges in ${state/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices} Trial Courts on Par with National 
Average  
 Last week, the Administrative Office of the State Court Association published its annual report 
on the composition of state trial court judges across the country.  One notable aspect of the report 
was that women make up about 30% of all ${state/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices} trial court 
judges.  This puts ${state/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices} on par with many other states in terms 
of gender diversity of trial court judges, with the national average also at 30%. 
End of Block: Desc Rep FemActual 
 
Start of Block: Attention Check 
   
This survey is mainly about which of the following? 
o${state/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices} Trial Courts  (1)  
oThe Supreme Court of the United States  (0)  
oThe President  (0)  
o${state/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices}'s Education System  (0)  
End of Block: Attention Check 
 
Start of Block: Legitimacy 




It is inevitable that ${state/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices}'s trial courts get mixed up in politics; 
therefore, we ought to have stronger means of controlling the actions of 
${state/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices}'s trial court judges. 
oStrongly Disagree  (1)  
oDisagree  (2)  
oSomewhat Disagree  (3)  
oNeither Agree nor Disagree  (4)  
oSomewhat Agree  (5)  
oAgree  (6)  




${state/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices}'s trial courts ought to be made less independent so that 
they listen more to what the people of ${state/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices} want. 
oStrongly Disagree  (1)  
oDisagree  (2)  
oSomewhat Disagree  (3)  
oNeither Agree nor Disagree  (4)  
oSomewhat Agree  (5)  
oAgree  (6)  




Judges in ${state/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices}'s trial courts who consistently make decisions 
at odds with what a majority of the people in ${state/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices} want 
should be removed from their position as judge. 
oStrongly Disagree  (1)  
oDisagree  (2)  
oSomewhat Disagree  (3)  
oNeither Agree nor Disagree  (4)  
oSomewhat Agree  (5)  
oAgree  (6)  




${state/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices}'s trial court judges are just like any other politicians; we 
cannot trust them to decide court cases in a way that is in the best interests of our state. 
oStrongly Disagree  (1)  
oDisagree  (2)  
oSomewhat Disagree  (3)  
oNeither Agree nor Disagree  (4)  
oSomewhat Agree  (5)  
oAgree  (6)  




If ${state/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices}'s trial courts started making a lot of decisions that 
most people disagree with, it might be better to do away with 
${state/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices}'s trial courts altogether. 
oStrongly Disagree  (1)  
oDisagree  (2)  
oSomewhat Disagree  (3)  
oNeither Agree nor Disagree  (4)  
oSomewhat Agree  (5)  
oAgree  (6)  




${state/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices} trial courts get too mixed up in politics. 
oStrongly Disagree  (1)  
oDisagree  (2)  
oSomewhat Disagree  (3)  
oNeither Agree nor Disagree  (4)  
oSomewhat Agree  (5)  
oAgree  (6)  




The power of ${state/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices}'s trial courts to decide certain types of 
controversial issues should be reduced. 
oStrongly Disagree  (1)  
oDisagree  (2)  
oSomewhat Disagree  (3)  
oNeither Agree nor Disagree  (4)  
oSomewhat Agree  (5)  
oAgree  (6)  
oStrongly Agree  (7)  
Page Break 
 
End of Block: Legitimacy 
 
Start of Block: Other Attitudes 
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How much confidence do you have in ${state/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices}'s trial court 
system? 
o1 No Confidence at All  (1)  
o2  (2)  
o3  (3)  
o4 No Opinion Either Way  (4)  
o5  (5)  
o6  (6)  
o7 A Great Deal of Confidence  (7)  
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Now, how much confidence do you have in ${state/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices}'s trial court 
judges? 
o1 No Confidence at All  (1)  
o2  (2)  
o3  (3)  
o4 No Opinion Either Way  (4)  
o5  (5)  
o6  (6)  




To what extent do you believe judges in ${state/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices}'s trial courts 
reach their decisions in a fair manner? 
o1 Judges are not fair at all  (1)  
o2  (2)  
o3  (3)  
o4 No Opinion Either Way  (4)  
o5  (5)  
o6  (6)  
o7 Judges are very fair  (7)  
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How much trust do you have in ${state/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices}'s trial courts? 
o1 No Trust at All  (1)  
o2  (2)  
o3  (3)  
o4 No Opinion Either Way  (4)  
o5  (5)  
o6  (6)  
o7 A Great Deal of Trust  (7)  
Page Break 
 
End of Block: Other Attitudes 
 
Start of Block: Political Knowledge 
   
What office or job title does Mike Pence currently hold? 
oVice President  (1)  
oChief Justice of the Supreme Court  (0)  
oSpeaker of the House of Representatives  (0)  
oSenate Majority Leader  (0)  
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Whose responsibility is it to determine if a law is constitutional or not? 
oThe Supreme Court  (1)  
oThe Congress  (0)  
oThe President  (0)  
oThe Public  (0)  
   
 
How much of a majority is required for the U.S. Senate and U.S. House of Representatives to 
override a presidential veto? 
oTwo-thirds  (1)  
oOne-half  (0)  
oThree-quarters  (0)  
oThree-fifths  (0)  
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Which party currently has the most members in the House of Representatives in Washington, 
D.C.? 
oRepublicans  (1)  
oDemocrats  (0)  
oIndependents  (0)  
oRepublicans and Democrats have an equal number of members  (0)  
   
 
Generally speaking, which political party is more ideologically conservative? 
oRepublicans  (1)  
oDemocrats  (0)  
oNeither party is more conservative than the other  (0)  
End of Block: Political Knowledge 
 
Start of Block: Manipulation Checks Sub 
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Think back to the scenario presented in the excerpt you read a few minutes ago. 
 
Do you recall the race of the judge that decided the case? 
oAfrican American  (1)  
oWhite  (2)  
oAsian  (3)  




If you are unsure or do not remember, please make your best guess: 
oAfrican American  (1)  
oWhite  (2)  




Do you recall the gender of the judge that decided the case? 
oMale  (1)  
oFemale  (2)  





If you are unsure or do not remember, please make your best guess: 
oMale  (1)  




Do you recall what issue the judge ruled on? 
oGay and lesbian rights  (1)  
oFirearms regulations  (2)  
oMinimum wage  (3)  
oDrug testing  (4)  





If you are unsure or do not remember, please make your best guess: 
oGay and lesbian rights  (1)  
oFirearms regulations  (2)  
oMinimum wage  (3)  
oDrug testing  (4)  
Page Break 
 
End of Block: Manipulation Checks Sub 
 
Start of Block: Manipulation Checks Desc AA 
Think back to the scenario presented in the excerpt you read a few minutes ago. 
   
Do you recall what demographic group was being discussed in the excerpt? 
oFemale judges  (0)  
oAfrican American judges  (1)  
oAsian judges  (0)  




   
If you are unsure or do not remember, please make your best guess: 
oFemale judges  (0)  
oAfrican American judges  (1)  
oAsian judges  (0)  
Page Break 
 
   
Do you recall the percentage of ${state/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices}'s trial court judges who 
belonged to the demographic group discussed in the excerpt? 
o1%  (1)  
o7%  (2)  
o13%  (3)  




If you are unsure or do not remember, please make your best guess: 
o1%  (1)  
o7%  (2)  
o13%  (3)  
End of Block: Manipulation Checks Desc AA 
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Start of Block: Manipulation Checks Desc Women 
Think back to the scenario presented in the excerpt you read a few minutes ago. 
   
Do you recall what demographic group was being discussed in the excerpt? 
oFemale judges  (1)  
oAfrican American judges  (0)  
oAsian judges  (0)  
oUnsure/Do Not Remember  (9)  
Page Break 
 
   
If you are unsure or do not remember, please make your best guess: 
oFemale judges  (1)  
oAfrican American judges  (0)  




   
Do you recall the percentage of ${state/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices}'s trial court judges who 
belonged to the demographic group discussed in the excerpt? 
o10%  (1)  
o30%  (2)  
o50%  (3)  




If you are unsure or do not remember, please make your best guess: 
o10%  (1)  
o30%  (2)  
o50%  (3)  
End of Block: Manipulation Checks Desc Women 
 
Start of Block: Judge Selection Method 
  
How judges in state courts are chosen and how they retain their position varies by state.  In some 
states, judges are elected by the people.  In other states, judges are appointed by the governor or 
the state legislature.  In still some other states, a combination of appointment and elections are 
used.  Do you happen to know whether trial judges in ${state/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices} 
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are selected for a full term (excluding the filling of vacancies) by election, appointment, or some 
combination of the two? 
oTrial judges are elected in ${state/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices}.  (1)  
oTrial judges are appointed in ${state/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices}.  (2)  
oSome combination of the two (appointment and election).  (3)  
oUnsure/Do Not Know  (9)  
Page Break 
 
If you are unsure or do not know, please make your best guess. 
oTrial judges are elected in ${state/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices}.  (1)  
oTrial judges are appointed in ${state/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices}.  (2)  
oSome combination of the two (appointment and election).  (3)  
End of Block: Judge Selection Method 
 
Start of Block: Demographics 




Highest level of education completed: 
oSome high school, no diploma  (1)  
oHigh school diploma  (2)  
oSome college, less than a 4-year degree  (3)  
o4-year college degree  (4)  
oMaster's or other advanced degree  (5)  
  
What is your annual household income? 
o$19,999 or less  (1)  
o$20,000-29,999  (2)  
o$30,000-39,999  (3)  
o$40,000-49,999  (4)  
o$50,000-59,999  (5)  
o$60,000-69,999  (6)  
o$70,000-79,999  (7)  
o$80,000-89,999  (8)  
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o$90,000-99,999  (9)  
o$100,000-109,999  (10)  
o$110,000-119,999  (11)  
o$120,000-129,999  (12)  
o$130,000-139,999  (13)  
o$140,000-149,999  (14)  
o$150,000+  (15)  
Page Break 
 
General speaking, do you usually consider yourself as a Republican, Democrat, independent, or 
what? 
oDemocrat  (1)  
oIndependent  (2)  




If you selected independent, do you usually think of yourself as closer to the Republican Party or 
Democratic Party? 
oCloser to Democratic Party  (1)  
oNeither  (2)  
oCloser to Republican Party  (3)  
Page Break 
 
If you selected Republican, would you call yourself a strong Republican or not a strong 
Republican? 
oNot Strong Republican  (1)  
oStrong Republican  (2)  
Page Break 
 
If you selected Democrat, would you call yourself a strong Democrat or not a strong Democrat? 
oNot Strong Democrat  (1)  




Which of the following best describes your political beliefs? 
oVery Liberal  (1)  
oLiberal  (2)  
oSlightly Liberal  (3)  
oModerate/Middle of the Road  (4)  
oSlightly Conservative  (5)  
oConservative  (6)  
oVery Conservative  (7)  
Page Break 
 
On average, how often do you read or hear about local (within your city and surrounding areas) 
news, either by reading a newspaper, online news articles, listening to the radio, watching the 
news on television, or any other form of media? 
oAlmost never  (1)  
oOnce every other week  (2)  
oOnce a week  (3)  
oSeveral times a week, but not daily  (4)  
oDaily  (5)  
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Do you ever read or hear about decisions made by judges or courts in your state? 
oNever  (1)  
oRarely  (2)  
oSometimes  (3)  
oSomewhat often  (4)  
oOften  (5)  
Page Break 
 
Thank you for participating in this study. 
   
In this study, I am interested in determining public attitudes toward state trial courts and state 
trial court judges. 
   
I ask that you please not discuss this study with other individuals who  might participate. 
Knowing about the study beforehand would greatly  affect other individuals’ responses, so I ask 
that you do not discuss  this study with others. If you have questions or would like to know more  
about the purpose of the study, you can contact the researcher, Shane  Redman, at 
smr105@pitt.edu. 
 
Thank you for participating in this survey.  Your responses have been recorded. 
  
In this study, I am interested in determining what type of  representation individuals expect from 
trial court judges, and how these  expectations affect attitudes toward the judicial system. 
Research in  other areas of political science has found that individuals who are  descriptively 
represented in political institutions are more likely to  view the institution as legitimate.  I extend 
this research to an  otherwise understudied area of judicial politics by looking at how the  issue 
involved in the case also affects the relationship between  representation and legitimacy. 
   
While the issue presented to you in the court case that you read about  is a real issue that has 
been, or is soon to be, decided in a state  trial court in the U.S., the actual decision made by the 
judge was not  necessarily the decision made (or the decision to be made) in the actual  court 
case. 
   
I ask that you please not discuss this study with other individuals who  might participate. 
Knowing about the study beforehand would greatly  affect other individuals’ responses, so I ask 
that you do not discuss  this study with others. If you have questions or would like to know more  
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about the purpose of the study, you can contact the researcher, Shane  Redman, at 
smr105@pitt.edu. 
 
Thank you for participating in this study. 
   
In this study, I am interested in determining what type of  representation individuals expect from 
trial court judges, and how these  expectations affect attitudes toward the judicial system. 
Research in  other areas of political science has found that individuals who are  descriptively 
represented in political institutions are more likely to  view the institution as legitimate.  I extend 
this research by examining  how representation in the aggregate affects attitudes toward the  
courts. 
   
The report you read regarding the percentage of women or African  Americans was fictional and 
the percentage of the minority group  reported to you for your own state's trial courts was not 
necessarily  the actual percentage in real life.  Across all U.S. states, the actual  percentage of 
female judges in state trial courts is about 30% while the  actual percentage of African American 
judges in state trial courts is  about 7%.  This varies largely by state, however. 
   
I ask that you please not discuss this study with other individuals who  might participate. 
Knowing about the study beforehand would greatly  affect other individuals’ responses, so I ask 
that you do not discuss  this study with others. If you have questions or would like to know more  
about the purpose of the study, you can contact the researcher, Shane  Redman, at 
smr105@pitt.edu. 










Appendix D.2 Pre-Test for Chapter Five Substantive Representations Issues 
 
Start of Block: Screening Block 
Are you a U.S. citizen? 
oYes  (1)  
oNo  (2)  
 
How old are you (in years)? 
________________________________________________________________ 
End of Block: Screening Block 
 




Please answer each question carefully and honestly, without using any external resources while 
completing this survey.  Please complete the survey in one sitting. 
 
Please read and think about each question thoroughly. After you are finished with each section, 
you may not return to it. 
  
Purpose: 
The purpose of this short research study is to determine attitudes toward political issues.  For that 
reason, we are surveying adult U.S. citizens online using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk and asking 
them to complete this very brief (approximately 5 minutes) questionnaire.  If you are willing to 
participate, the survey will ask about your background (e.g., gender, age, race), as well as about 
your opinion on some political issues being decided in state courts.  There are no foreseeable 
risks associated with this project, nor are there any direct benefits to you.  Each participant will 
receive $0.40 for successful completion of the survey.  All of the data gathered from this 
questionnaire will be anonymized before it is stored so the risk of responses being identifiable is 
extremely low.  All responses are confidential.  The data will be stored on a password-protected 
computer on an encrypted disk.  Your research data may be shared with investigators conducting 
similar research; however, this information will be shared in a de-identified manner (without 
identifiers).  Your participation is voluntary, and you may stop completing the survey at any 
time.  This study is being conducted by Shane Redman, who may be contacted at 
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smr105@pitt.edu if you have any questions. 
   
Page Break 
 
In which U.S. state do you currently live? 










How judges in state courts are chosen varies by state.  In some states, judges are elected by the 
people.  In other states, judges are appointed by the governor.  In still some other states, a 
combination of appointment and elections are used.  Do you happen to know whether judges in 
your state are selected by election, appointment, or some combination of the two? 
oJudges are elected in my state.  (1)  
oJudges are appointed in my state.  (2)  
oSome combination of the two (appointment and election).  (3)  




If you are unsure or do not know, please make your best guess. 
oJudges are elected in my state.  (1)  
oJudges are appointed in my state.  (2)  
oSome combination of the two (appointment and election).  (3)  
Page Break 
 
Below is a list of domestic political issues that have recently been in the news across the country. 
 
Please rank each issue by importance to you personally, with 1 being most important to you 
personally and 14 being least important to you personally. 
 
Click and drag each issue to the correct position, with the most important issue to you at the top 
of the list and the least important issues to you at the bottom of the list. 
______ Firearms Regulations (1) 
______ School Vouchers (2) 
______ Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual, and Transgender Rights (3) 
______ Abortion (4) 
______ Drug Testing for Recipients of Government Assistance (5) 
______ Environmental Regulations (6) 
______ Immigration (7) 
______ Minimum Wage (8) 
______ Voting Rights (9) 
______ Racial or Ethnic Minority Rights (10) 
______ Healthcare (11) 
______ Tax Reform (12) 
______ National Security (13) 
______ Women's Rights (14) 
 
Is there any other political issue(s) (aside from local issues in your own community) that are not 







Now, below are the 4 most important issues to you and the 4 least important issues to you based 
on your response to the previous question.  For each of the issues, please indicate on the slider 
exactly how important that issue is to you, with 0 being not at all important and 100 being 
extremely important. 
 
4 most important issues: 
 Not at All Important Extremely Important 
 
 0 50 100 
 
Firearms Regulations () 
 
School Vouchers () 
 
Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual, and Transgender 
Rights ()  
Abortion () 
 
Drug Testing for Recipients of Government 
Assistance ()  




Minimum Wage () 
 
Voting Rights () 
 




Tax Reform () 
 
National Security () 
 






4 least important issues: 
 Not at All Important Extremely Important 
 
 0 50 100 
 
Firearms Regulations () 
 
School Vouchers () 
 
Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual, and Transgender 
Rights ()  
Abortion () 
 
Drug Testing for Recipients of Government 
Assistance ()  




Minimum Wage () 
 
Voting Rights () 
 




Tax Reform () 
 
National Security () 
 








Based on your prior responses, the most important issue to you personally is 
${HighImportanceRank/ChoiceGroup/ChoiceWithHighestValue}.  Is that correct? 
oYes  (1)  
oNo  (2)  
 




Based on your prior responses, the least important issue to you personally is 
${LowImportanceRank/ChoiceGroup/ChoiceWithLowestValue}.  Is that correct? 
oYes  (1)  
oNo  (2)  
 




End of Block: Main Survey 
 
Start of Block: Attention Check 
We would now like to collect some basic demographic information about you.  Please select the 
most appropriate option and/or use the space provided to respond to each item.  In the very first 
question after these instructions, you should choose the color blue for your answer to 







Of the options below, what is your favorite color? 
oRed  (1)  
oBlue  (2)  
oGreen  (3)  
oYellow  (4)  
oPink  (5)  
oPurple  (6)  
 
End of Block: Attention Check 
 
Start of Block: Demographic Questions 
 
Gender: 
oMale  (1)  
oFemale  (2)  







▢White, non-Hispanic  (1)  
▢Hispanic/Latino  (2)  
▢Black/African American  (3)  
▢Native American/American Indian  (4)  
▢Asian/Pacific Islander  (5)  
▢Other (please specify)  (6) ________________________________________________ 
Page Break 
 
Highest level of education completed: 
oSome high school, no diploma  (1)  
oHigh school diploma  (2)  
oSome college  (3)  
o4-year college degree  (4)  




General speaking, do you usually consider yourself as a Republican, Democrat, independent, or 
what? 
oDemocrat  (1)  
oindependent  (2)  





If you selected independent, do you usually think of yourself as closer to the Republican Party or 
Democratic Party? 
oCloser to Democratic Party  (1)  
oNeither  (2)  
oCloser to Republican Party  (3)  
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If you selected Republican, would you call yourself a strong Republican or not a strong 
Republican? 
oNot Strong Republican  (1)  




If you selected Democrat, would you call yourself a strong Democrat or not a strong Democrat? 
oNot Strong Democrat  (1)  
oStrong Democrat  (2)  
Page Break 
 
Which of the following best describes your political beliefs? 
oVery Liberal  (1)  
oLiberal  (2)  
oSlightly Liberal  (3)  
oModerate/Middle of the Road  (4)  
oSlightly Conservative  (5)  
oConservative  (6)  
oVery Conservative  (7)  




APPENDIX E PRE-ANALYSIS PLAN 
The following pre-analysis plan was registered with EGAP on 2/14/18 prior to the Qualtrics survey 
being fielded.  It is important to note that in addition to the analyses presented in this project, the 
pre-analysis plan also includes analyses that will be included in other projects that use the same 
data.   
 
Experimental Design:  Subjects are recruited to participate in a survey that asks about their 
attitudes toward their state’s judicial system.  Subjects are randomly assigned to receive one of 
three versions of the survey:  a control group that receives no experimental manipulations, a group 
that receives a manipulation involving a specific decision made by a judge, or a group that receives 
a manipulation involving the demographic composition of their state’s trial court judges. 
 
Sample:  A nationally representative sample of U.S. adult (18+) citizens through Qualtrics’ online 
panel.  African Americans will be oversampled, to make up roughly 50% of the sample.  
Additionally, the sample will consist of 50% males and 50% females. 
 
Treatments:  Subjects are randomly assigned to one of three treatment groups, with the following 
probabilities.  For the T2 group, subjects are also randomly assigned to receive one of eight 
manipulations.  For the T3 group, subjects are also randomly assigned to receive one of six 
manipulations. 
 
T1:  Control group (~6.67%) 
The control group will not receive any experimental manipulations/vignettes.  They will 
answer all other questions in the survey aside from the manipulation checks specific to T2 
and T3 groups. 
 
T2:  Descriptive Representation (~40%) 
T2a:  African American Overrepresentation (6.67%) 
T2b:  African American Average Representation (6.67%) 
T2c:  African American Underrepresentation (6.67%) 
T2d:  Female Overrepresentation (6.67%) 
T2e:  Female Average Representation (6.67%) 
T2f:  Female Underrepresentation (6.67%) 
In the descriptive representation experiment, subjects will receive information about the 
demographic makeup of their state’s trial court judges.  They will receive information 
either about the percentage of African American judges or female judges in their state’s 
trial courts.  In the overrepresentation groups, the percentage for their state will be higher 
than the national average (also provided in the manipulation).  In the average representation 
groups, their state will be on par with the national average.  In the underrepresentation 
groups, the percentage for their state will be lower than the national average.   
 
T3:  Substantive Representation (~53.36%) 
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T3a:  High Importance Black Female (6.67%) 
T3b:  High Importance Black Male (6.67%) 
T3c:  High Importance White Female (6.67%) 
T3d:  High Importance White Male (6.67%) 
T3e:  Low Importance Black Female (6.67%) 
T3f:  Low Importance Black Male (6.67%) 
T3g:  Low Importance White Female (6.67%) 
T3h:  Low Importance White Male (6.67%) 
In the substantive representation experiment, subjects will receive information about a 
specific case decision made by a trial court judge in their state.  The manipulation will vary 
by the political issue decided in the vignette, the race of the judge (black/white), and the 
gender of the judge (female/male).  Prior to receiving this manipulation, subjects will rank 
a list of political issues from most important to least important to them personally.  The 
manipulation will then involve either the most important political issue to them or the least 
important political issue to them. 
 




1. Individuals who are descriptively represented by a single judge will: 
1a.  Grant greater legitimacy to their state’s trial courts 
1b.  Have greater confidence in their state’s trial court system 
1c.  Have greater confidence in their state’s trial court judges 
1d.  Be more likely to believe their state’s trial judges reach decisions in a fair manner 
1e.  Have greater trust in their state’s trial courts 
1f.  Be more likely to agree with the decision made by the judge 
1g.  Be more likely to believe elected officials should ignore the judge’s decision 
 
2. As the percentage of female trial judges in a given state increases,  
 
women will: 
2a.  Grant greater legitimacy to their state’s trial courts 
2b.  Have greater confidence in their state’s trial court system 
2c.  Have greater confidence in their state’s trial court judges 
2d.  Be more likely to believe their state’s trial judges reach decisions in a fair manner 
2e.  Have greater trust in their state’s trial courts 
 
men will: 
2f.  Grant less legitimacy to their state’s trial courts 
2g.  Have less confidence in their state’s trial court system 
2h.  Have less confidence in their state’s trial court judges 
2i.  Be less likely to believe their state’s trial judges reach decisions in a fair manner 
2j.  Have less trust in their state’s trial courts 
 
3. As the percentage of African American trial judges in a given state increases,  
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African Americans will: 
3a.  Grant greater legitimacy to their state’s trial courts 
3b.  Have greater confidence in their state’s trial court system 
3c.  Have greater confidence in their state’s trial court judges 
3d.  Be more likely to believe their state’s trial judges reach decisions in a fair manner 
3e.  Have greater trust in their state’s trial courts 
 
white subjects will: 
3f.  Grant less legitimacy to their state’s trial courts 
3g.  Have less confidence in their state’s trial court system 
3h.  Have less confidence in their state’s trial court judges 
3i.  Be less likely to believe their state’s trial judges reach decisions in a fair manner 
3j.  Have less trust in their state’s trial courts 
 
4. The effects of descriptive representation on attitudes toward the courts will be greater 
among African Americans than among females. 
5. The effects of descriptive representation on attitudes toward the courts will be greatest 




6. When a judge decides against an individual’s preference on a political issue, as the issue 
becomes more important, the individual will: 
6a.  Grant less legitimacy to their state’s trial courts 
6b.  Have less confidence in their state’s trial court system 
6c.  Have less confidence in their state’s trial court judges 
6d.  Be less likely to believe their state’s trial judges reach decisions in a fair manner 
6e.  Have less trust in their state’s trial courts 
6f.  Be less likely to agree with the decision made by the judge 
6g.  Be less likely to believe elected officials should ignore the judge’s decision 
 
7. On issues important to an individual, the effects of the judge’s decision on attitudes 
toward the court (6a-6g) will be moderated by the presence of descriptive representation, 
such that: 
7a.  when the judge is female, women will view the courts less negatively than when the 
judge is male. 
7b.  when the judge is African American, African Americans will view the courts less 
negatively than when the judge is white. 
 
8. On issues not important to an individual, descriptive representation will have no 





9. The effects that descriptive representation has on attitudes toward the courts will be 
moderated by the normative expectations individuals hold of descriptive representation in 
their state’s trial courts, such that: 
9a.  the more an individual’s descriptive representation expectations are violated, the more 
negative attitudes toward the courts will be. 
9b.  the more an individual values descriptive representation, the more negative attitudes 
toward the courts will be in the absence of descriptive representation. 
 
10. The effects that substantive representation has on attitudes toward the courts will be 
moderated by the normative expectations individuals hold of substantive representation in 
their state’s trial courts, such that: 
10a.  the more an individual believes judges should represent the public’s interests, the 
more negative attitudes toward the courts will be when a judge decides against an 
individual’s preferences.   
 
Judicial Selection Method Variation: 
 
11. When individuals believe judges in their state are elected, they will expect greater 
descriptive representation among judges. 
12. When individuals believe judges in their state are elected, they will expect greater 
substantive representation among judges. 
 
Methods of Analysis:  The data will be analyzed primarily with difference of means tests and 
multivariate regression models. 
 
Difference of means tests will be conducted between two treatment groups (or between two groups 
that cluster several treatment groups) using variables estimated post-treatment.  Raw post-
treatment means will be compared across: 
 
• Black subjects in T3a + T3b + T3e + T3f + female subjects in T3a + T3c + T3e + T3g 
(pooled) v. white subjects in T3a + T3b + T3e + T3f + male subjects in T3a + T3c + T3e 
+ T3g (pooled):  Descriptive Rep v. Non-Descriptive Rep (All) 
• Black subjects in T3a + T3b + T3e + T3f (pooled) v. white subjects in T3a + T3b + T3e + 
T3f (pooled):  Descriptive Rep v. Non-Descriptive Rep (Race) 
• Female subjects in T3a + T3c + T3e + T3g (pooled) v. male subjects in T3a + T3c + T3e 
+ T3g (pooled):  Descriptive Rep v. Non-Descriptive Rep (Gender) 
• T1 v. Black subjects in T3a + T3b + T3e + T3f (pooled):  Control v. Descriptive Rep 
(Race) 
• T1 v. Female subjects in T3a + T3c + T3e + T3g (pooled):  Control v. Descriptive Rep 
(Gender) 
• Female subjects in each pairwise comparison between T2d – T2f:  Descriptive Gender 
Rep (Female) 
• T1 v. Female subjects in T2d – T2f (separately):  Control v. Descriptive Gender Rep 
(Aggregate Female) 
• Male subjects in each pairwise comparison between T2d – T2f:  Descriptive Gender Rep 
(Male) 
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• T1 v. Male subjects in T2d – T2f (separately):  Control v. Descriptive Gender Rep 
(Aggregate Male) 
• Black subjects in each pairwise comparison between T2a – T2c:  Descriptive Race Rep 
(African American) 
• T1 v. Black subjects in T2a – T2c (separately):  Control v. Descriptive Race Rep 
(Aggregate African American) 
• White subjects in each pairwise comparison between T2a – T2c:  Descriptive Race Rep 
(White) 
• T1 v. White subjects in T2a – T2c (separately):  Control v. Descriptive Race Rep 
(Aggregate White) 
• Black subjects in T3a + T3b + T3e + T3f (pooled) v. Female subjects in T3a + T3c + T3e 
+ T3g (pooled):  Black Descriptive Rep v. Female Descriptive Rep (Individual) 
• Black subjects in T2a v. Female subjects in T2d:  Black Descriptive Rep v. Female 
Descriptive Rep (Aggregate Over) 
• Black subjects in T2b v. Female subjects in T2e:  Black Descriptive Rep v. Female 
Descriptive Rep (Aggregate Average) 
• Black subjects in T2c v. Female subjects in T2f:  Black Descriptive Rep v. Female 
Descriptive Rep (Aggregate Under) 
• Black female subjects in T3a + T3e (pooled) v. Black male subjects in T3b + T3f 
(pooled):  Black Female v. Black Male Descriptive Rep 
• Black female subjects in T3a + T3e (pooled) v. White female subjects in T3c + T3g 
(pooled):  Black Female v. White Female Descriptive Rep 
• Black female subjects in T3a + T3e (pooled) v. White male subjects in T3d + T3h 
(pooled):  Black Female v. White Male Descriptive Rep 
• Black female subjects in T2a, T2b, and T2c v. Black male subjects in T2a, T2b, and T2c, 
respectively:  Black Female v. Black Male Descriptive Rep 
• Black female subjects in T2a, T2b, and T2c v. White female subjects in T2d, T2e, and 
T2f, respectively:  Black Female v. White Female Descriptive Rep 
• Black female subjects in T2a, T2b, and T2c v. White male subjects in T2d, T2e, and T2f, 
respectively:  Black Female v. White Male Descriptive Rep 
• T3a – T3d (pooled) v. T3e – T3h (pooled):  High Importance v. Low Importance 
• T3a v. T3e:  High v. Low Importance Black Female Judge 
• T3b v. T3f:  High v. Low Importance Black Male Judge 
• T3c v. T3g:  High v. Low Importance White Female Judge 
• T3d v. T3h:  High v. Low Importance White Male Judge 
• Female subjects in T3a + T3c (pooled) v. Female subjects in T3b + T3d (pooled):  High 
Importance Female Descriptive Rep v. Female Non-Descriptive Rep 
• Black subjects in T3a + T3b (pooled) v. Black subjects in T3c + T3d (pooled):  High 
Importance Black Descriptive Rep v. Black Non-Descriptive Rep 
• Female subjects in T3e + T3g (pooled) v. Female subjects in T3f + T3h (pooled):  Low 
Importance Female Descriptive Rep v. Female Non-Descriptive Rep 
• Black subjects in T3e + T3f (pooled) v. Black subjects in T3g + T3h (pooled):  Low 
Importance Black Descriptive Rep v. Black Non-Descriptive Rep 
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Multivariate regression will also be used to reduce the variance caused by other factors that likely 
also affect the dependent variables as well as to examine the moderating effect of certain 
characteristics on the treatment conditions.  In addition to estimating the effects of each treatment 
on each dependent variable, the following covariates will be included in the multivariate regression 
models: 
 
• Gender (Binary:  Female v. Non-Female) 
• Age (Continuous) 
• Race (Binary:  White v. Non-White) 
• Education (Categorical:  Some high school, no diploma; High school diploma; Some 
college; 4-year college degree; Master’s or other advanced degree) 
• State of Residence (Categorical:  All 50 states plus D.C.) 
• Political knowledge (Additive index based on number of factual questions answered 
correctly out of five) 
• Party Identification (Scale:  1-7 Strong Democrat to Strong Republican) 
• Ideology (Scale:  1-7 Very Liberal to Very Conservative) 
• News Habits (Categorical:  Almost never; Once every other week; Once a week; Several 
times a week, but not daily; Daily) 
• Court News (Categorical:  Never; Rarely; Sometimes; Somewhat often; Often) 
• African American Judges (Continuous:  real-life percentage of subject’s state trial court 
judges that are African American) 
• Female Judges (Continuous:  real-life percentage of subject’s state trial court judges that 
are women) 
• Judicial Selection (Categorical:  Elected; Appointed; Some combination of the two) 
• When appropriate, interactions will be included between treatment condition variables 
and race and/or gender, depending on the hypothesis being tested 
• Models that examine the moderating effect of descriptive representation expectations will 
include an interaction term between appropriate treatment condition variable(s) and a 
continuous measure (0-100) for normative expectations of race/gender representation in 
the courts 
• Models that examine the moderating effect of descriptive representation 
importance/value will include an interactive term between appropriate treatment 
condition variable(s) and a scale (1-7, strongly disagree to strongly agree) that measures 
how important descriptive representation is for an individual 
• Models that examine the moderating effect of substantive representation expectations will 
include an interactive term between appropriate treatment condition variable(s) and a 
continuous scale (1-7) constructed by averaging responses to several questions asking 
about the role of judges in providing substantive representation 
• Models that examine judicial selection will include a interactive terms between the 
method of judicial selection in the individuals state and descriptive racial or gender 
representation or substantive representation expectation variables (see above)  
 
Difference in means will be presented using both tables and figures.  Figures will also be used to 
present predicted values for a typical subject in the sample for each treatment condition.  All 
dependent variables will be coded on a continuous (1-7) scale, with higher numbers indicating 
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greater legitimacy, trust, confidence, etc.  One-sided statistical tests will be used for directional 
hypotheses.  Statistical significance will be evaluated in a 95% confidence interval, with effects 
between the 90 and 95% confidence interval noted as marginally significant.  Tests for legitimacy 
will all be presented.  If similar patterns emerge across any of the other dependent variables, the 
results may be combined to save space, with a footnote specifying where separate results for each 
dependent variable can be found in the appendix.  All tests will be run both including and excluding 
subjects who fail one or more manipulation checks.  Any differences, or the lack thereof, will be 
noted. 
 
Balance Tests:  Treatments are randomly assigned, so any differences in sample characteristics 
across treatment groups are due to chance, by definition.  Thus, I will present the characteristics 
below for each group (T1 v. T2a-T2f individually v. T3a-T3h individually v. T2a-T2f pooled v. 
T3a-T3h pooled), but will not perform statistical tests. 
 
Characteristics that will be reported for each of the above groups will be: 
 
• Gender (Categorical:  Female; Male; Other) 
• Age (Average per group) 
• Race (Categorical:  White, Non-Hispanic; Hispanic/Latino; Black/African American; 
Native American/American Indian; Asian/Pacific Islander; Other – Some categories may 
overlap if subjects select more than one race category) 
• Education (Categorical:  Some high school, no diploma; High school diploma; Some 
college; 4-year college degree; Master’s or other advanced degree) 
• State of Residence (Categorical:  All 50 states plus D.C. – Note to conserve space this 
will be aggregated across all groups) 
• Political knowledge (Average number of questions correct per group) 
• Party Identification (Average per group:  1-7 Strong Democrat to Strong Republican) 
• Ideology (Average per group:  1-7 Very Liberal to Very Conservative) 
• News Habits (Categorical:  Almost never; Once every other week; Once a week; Several 
times a week, but not daily; Daily) 
• Court News (Categorical:  Never; Rarely; Sometimes; Somewhat often; Often) 
• Judicial Selection (Categorical:  Elected; Appointed; Some combination of the two) 
• Normative descriptive (race and gender) representation expectations (Average per group) 
• Normative substantive representation expectations (Average per group) 





A. Judicial Legitimacy (post-treatment) 
• Scale created by averaging responses to seven questions that ask about an individual’s 
attitudes about:  controlling judges’ actions, making courts less independent, 
removing judges for certain decisions they make, not trusting judges, doing away 
with trial courts altogether, courts getting too mixed up in politics, and the power of 
the courts being reduced.  Responses to each question are on a 1-7 (Strongly Disagree 
to Strongly Agree) Likert-type scale so the final scale will also range from 1 to 7. 
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B. Confidence in Court System (post-treatment) 
• 1-7 (No Confidence to A Great Deal of Confidence) scale 
C. Confidence in Judges (post-treatment) 
• 1-7 (No Confidence to A Great Deal of Confidence) scale 
D. Decisions made in Fair Manner (post-treatment) 
• 1-7 (Judges are Not Fair at All to Judges are very Fair) scale 
E. Trust in Courts (post-treatment) 
• 1-7 (No Trust at All to A Great Deal of Trust) scale 
F. Agreement with Judge’s Decision (post-treatment) 
• 1-7 (Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree) scale 
G. Belief that Decision should be Ignored (post-treatment) 
• 1-7 (Elected officials should abide by judge’s decision no matter what to Elected 
officials should ignore the judge’s decision) scale 
H. Normative Descriptive Race Representation Expectations (pre-treatment) 
• 0 – 100 (percentage of state trial court judges that should be African American) 
I. Normative Descriptive Gender Representation Expectations (pre-treatment) 
• 0 – 100 (percentage of state trial court judges that should be female) 
J. Normative Substantive Representation Expectations (pre-treatment) 
• Scale created by averaging responses to three questions that ask about whether an 
individual thinks judges should:  strictly follow the law no matter what the people 
want, decide cases the way a majority of people prefer, and look to public opinion 
when making legal decisions.  Responses to each question are on a 1-7 (Strongly 
Disagree to Strongly Agree) Likert-type scale so the final scale will also range from 1 
to 7. 
 
Exploratory Analysis:  There are also some analyses I will conduct about which I do not have 
specific/formal expectations, but that nevertheless may shed light on future research in this area.  
For example, while I have a formal expectation that the perception that judges are elected in one’s 
state will increase the normative expectation of descriptive and substantive representation, I do not 
have an expectation about when one perceives their judges to be appointed or selected by a 
combination of appointment and election.  I will conduct similar analyses with these perceptions 
to see if any patterns emerge across various demographic groups.  Additionally, I would like to 
perform many of the analyses listed above on each of the four main subsets of my sample (Black 
females, Black males, White females, and White males) even though most formal hypotheses 
specify differences only between two or these subsets.  Lastly, I will examine how various 
demographic characteristics interact with each other to affect normative descriptive and 
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